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A consensus on how to characterise the anterograde and retrograde memory pro-
cesses that are lost or spared after hippocampal damage has not been reached. In
this thesis, I critically re-examine the empirical literature and the assumptions behind
current theories. I formulate a coherent view of what makes a task hippocampally-
dependent at acquisition and how this relates to its long-term fate. Findings from a
neural net simulation indicate the plausibility of my proposals.
My proposals both extend and constrain current views on the role of the hip-
pocampus in the rapid acquisition of information and in learning complex associa-
tions. In general, tasks are most likely to require the hippocampus for acquisition if
they involve rapid, associative learning about unfamiliar, complex, low salience stim-
uli. However, none of these factors alone is sufficient to obligatorily implicate the
hippocampus in acquisition. With the exception of associations with supra-modal in-
formation that are always dependent on the hippocampus, it is the combination of
factors that is important.
Detailed, complex information that is obligatorily hippocampally-dependent at
acquisition remains so for its lifetime. However, all memories are semanticised as
they age through the loss of detailed context-specific information and because generic
cortically-represented information starts to dominate recall. Initially hippocampally-
dependent memories may appear to become independent of the hippocampus over
time, but recall changes qualitatively. Multi-stage, lifelong post-acquisition memory
processes produce semanticised re-representations of memories of differing specificity
and complexity, that can serve different purposes.
The model simulates hippocampal and cortical interactions in the acquisition and
maintenance of episodic and semantic events, and behaves in accordance with my
proposals. In particular, conceptualising episodic and semantic memory as represent-
ing points on a continuum of memory types appears viable. Support is also found for
proposals on the relative importance of the hippocampus and cortex in the rapid ac-
quisition of information and the acquisition of complex multi-model information; and
the effect of existing knowledge on new learning. Furthermore, episodic and seman-
tic events become differentially dependent on cortical and hippocampal components.
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1.1 Motivation for the thesis
The hippocampus has been implicated in memory function since Scoville and Milner
(1957) noted a link between hippocampal damage and amnesia in human patients.
Since then there has been a burgeoning experimental literature on the hippocampus
— several thousand such papers are now published each year — and there are many
theories of hippocampal function. One might expect that an ever-expanding body
of data should more tightly constrain speculation so that theories would increasingly
converge. However, a consensus on the role of the hippocampus remains elusive, and
many current proposals appear incompatible. Even when there is agreement as to
what data is important (which often there is not), there are widely different interpre-
tations of even the same data. Although most authors agree that the hippocampus has
some role in certain sorts of memory, there is little agreement about the fundamental
nature of hippocampally-dependent tasks, about the role of the hippocampus in the
acquisition of tasks, or the long-term role of the hippocampus in the maintenance of
information.
A re-examination of the empirical data shows that the acquisition of tasks that
are typically considered to be “hippocampally-dependent” is not equally impaired
by hippocampal lesions. Similarly, different types of information, and even different
sub-components of information acquired in the same learning episode, appear to have
different long-term fates in terms of hippocampal dependency. Since deficits that are
different in degree or that refer to different material are likely to depend on quanti-
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tatively and qualitatively different facets of hippocampal function, it is important to
make such distinctions for the purposes of formulating hippocampal theories. Broadly
speaking, the motivation for this thesis was the belief that by acknowledging such is-
sues, I would be able to reach a better understanding of the role of the hippocampus.
1.2 Aims of the thesis
The research question addressed by this thesis is:
What is the nature of the relationship between the dependence of information on
the hippocampus at acquisition and its long-term dependency on the hippocampus?
More specifically, this thesis addresses the question by attempting to:
• Strictly define the nature of tasks that are dependent on the hippocampus for
their acquisition, taking into account differences in the degree of effect of hip-
pocampal damage on acquisition.
• Identify common traits within groups of tasks whose acquisition is affected sim-
ilarly by hippocampal damage, and explain how these traits relate to the role of
the hippocampus in acquisition.
• Strictly define the nature of hippocampal long-term involvement in the mainte-
nance of information.
• Determine how the long-term maintenance of information by the hippocampus
relates to the nature of the information initially acquired.
• Formulate proposals about the fate of memories after initial acquisition by the
hippocampus.
• Provide a ’proof of concept’ for the key ideas proposed in this thesis through the
design, implementation and testing of a computational model.
1.3 Boundaries of thesis
This thesis focuses on what the hippocampus itself does, and therefore does not deal
in detail with the role of related memory structures.
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Similarly, as the thesis is concerned with understanding the role of the hippocam-
pus at a cognitive rather than mechanistic level, issues relating to the specific func-
tional mechanisms of the hippocampus are not addressed.
The model makes no attempt at biological realism, instead providing a method for
testing the plausibility of proposals put forward in this thesis.
1.4 Outline of the thesis
In this chapter I outline the motivation, aims and structure of this thesis. I briefly
describe the key features of hippocampal anatomy in section 1.5.
In Chapter 2, I review theories and perspectives on the hippocampus, and introduce
existing models of hippocampal function.
Despite years of research, there is no consistent view on how to characterise the
memory processes that are lost or spared when the hippocampal formation is dam-
aged. In Chapter 3, I explore several issues that may have contributed to this confu-
sion, and re-examine the empirical literature on task acquisition and the hippocampus.
Crucially, tasks that are traditionally considered to be hippocampally-dependent at ac-
quisition are in fact affected to different extents and in different ways by hippocampal
damage: some information (such as task-dependent allocentric spatial information)
is obligatorily dependent on the hippocampus for acquisition, whereas other infor-
mation (such as conditional motor learning) is merely acquired faster or more easily
when the hippocampus is intact. In general, tasks are most likely to require the hip-
pocampus for acquisition if they involve rapid, complex, arbitrary associative learning
about novel, low salience stimuli. So-called ’procedural’ factors, such as the number
of trials available or the intensity of task stimuli can have as profound effect on task
acquisition after hippocampal damage as the logical high-level nature of the task.
In Chapter 4 I argue that there are both quantitative and qualitative differences be-
tween the functions of the hippocampus and other areas: it is the interaction between
these features and the nature of the information to be acquired that determines the rel-
ative extent to which the hippocampus and other areas can acquire information under
given task conditions. Many of the features of tasks that were identified in chapter 3
as being hippocampally-dependent, such as their speed of acquisition, complexity,
salience or novelty, can be envisaged as continuous dimensions. I suggest that tasks
that ’score’ highly on one or more of these dimensions, or contain many such features
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even if not at extreme values, will require the hippocampus if learning is to proceed in
the normal fashion. I discuss the contribution of these different task features to infor-
mation acquisition, and thereby both extend and constrain previous proposals relating
to rapid learning and complex associative learning by the hippocampus. I also show
that traditional definitions of ’episodic’ and ’semantic’ memory need refinement, and
provide definitions for use in the rest of the thesis.
The long-term role of the hippocampus in supporting recall is logically separable
from its role in trace acquisition. In Chapter 5, I examine the long-term role of the
hippocampus in mediating the recall of tasks that are affected by it at acquisition. I
conclude that memories that are obligatorily hippocampally-dependent at acquisition
remain hippocampally-dependent for their lifetime (which may be less than the life-
time of the animal), whereas the recall of traces whose acquisition is merely facilitated
by the hippocampus may gradually become independent of the hippocampus. Typi-
cally as memories age they become less detailed and more generic or ’semanticised’:
this is central to understanding the long-term role of the hippocampus in memory.
In Chapter 6 I argue that the graded retrograde amnesia seen after hippocampal
damage on tasks whose acquisition is merely facilitated by an intact hippocampus
stems from the gradual semanticisation of memories over time. Semanticisation can
result from the decay of the most detailed information, the enhancement of seman-
ticised representations, or from a change over time in the recall strategy used to ac-
cess stored information. Multi-stage, lifelong post-acquisition memory processes act
to produce semanticised re-representations of memories of differing degrees of com-
plexity, which can support performance on different tasks depending on their require-
ments. Information that is obligatorily hippocampally-dependent at acquisition is dif-
ficult to re-represent outside the hippocampus, and therefore stays dependent on the
hippocampus for its lifetime. However, since all information tends to decay with time,
a memory’s lifetime in its original form will usually be less than the lifetime of the or-
ganism.
In Chapter 7 I present findings from a computational model that simulates the ac-
quisition and maintenance of episodic and semantic information by the hippocam-
pus and cortex. The simulation findings provide clear ’proof of concept’ for the ideas
put forward in earlier chapters. The model consists of a quickly learning ’hippocam-
pal’ component that stores orthogonalised traces; and an input ’cortical’ component
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which maps information topographically, and has very slow-learning long-range con-
nections and relatively faster local connections. Initially, the hippocampal component
supports the best recall of the specific details of all memories. As memories age, the
cortical components become relatively more important for their recall. Recall via the
cortical components is dominated by semantic generic information and does not sup-
port good recall of specific random information. The decay of detailed information
from the hippocampus and the shift in the neural basis of recall with memory age
therefore contributes to the semanticisation of memories.
Finally, in Chapter 8 I conclude by briefly summarising my proposals, and outlining
the main contributions of the thesis. I also make some predictions that could be tested
empirically.
In the next section, I introduce the key features of the hippocampus.
1.5 Introduction to the hippocampus
Comprehensive and detailed reviews of the anatomy of the hippocampal system can
be found in papers such as Amaral and Witter (1989) or Arbib et al. (1998). General
introductions can be found in neuroscience texts such as Shepherd (1994) and Kan-
del et al. (1995). In this section I provide a brief introduction to the key elements of
hippocampal anatomy and physiology.
The hippocampus is situated in the medial temporal lobe (MTL). It consists of
two elongated C-shaped structures (located symmetrically, one in each hemisphere)
oriented perpendicularly (in rodents) to the corpus callosum. Physically the hip-
pocampus is continuous with the fornix (a major efferent pathway) and there are
numerous transverse fibres between the posterior columns of the fornix which al-
lows information arising from the hippocampus in each hemisphere to be integrated.
The functional “hippocampal system” is generally considered to be composed of the
hippocampus-proper or cornu ammonis (CA), the dentate gyrus (DG), the subicular com-
plex (SUB) and the entorhinal cortex (EC).
A slice orthogonal to the longitudinal axis of the hippocampus reveals the basic
neural circuitry. The cell layers appear as two interlocking curves of cells, the CA re-
gion and the dentate fascia (see Figure 1.1). The hippocampus-proper (CA) consists of
large pyramidal cells that are the major output cells, whilst the dentate fascia (DG) has
smaller pyramidal output neurons called granule cells. This basic hippocampal struc-
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Figure 1.1: Cresyl violet stain of a coronal slice of rat brain, showing the two interlocking Cs of
the dentate gyrus (DG) and the hippocampus-proper (CA3 and CA1) on each side of the brain.
Reproduced from Redish (1999), original picture courtesy of C. Barnes.
ture is well established, and dates back to early Golgi studies such as those of Ramón y
Cajal (1893) and Lorente de Nó (1934). More recent anatomical methods have however
revealed much additional detail. Lorente de Nó (1934) distinguished four CA subre-
gions (CA1 – CA4) and this is the most commonly used labelling scheme. However
CA4 is now not usually considered to be a separate region, and the boundaries of the
small field CA2 are unclear (Arbib et al. (1998)), so the hippocampus is usually referred
to as containing DG, CA1 and CA3.
Internally, the major excitatory hippocampal circuits follow a distinct pattern (see
Figure 1.2): inputs from the entorhinal cortex terminate mainly in the dentate fascia.
The dentate granule cells project to CA3 via the “mossy fibres”. CA3 cells project to
the septum through the fornix and send a collateral, the Schaffer collateral, to CA1.
These receiving cells project to the subiculum, and also send outputs to the septum
via the fornix. A more direct perforant path route from the entorhinal cortex to area
CA3 bypasses the dentate gyrus. In addition, there are direct projections between
most subfields in this “trisynaptic” circuit, especially recurrent CA3 connections. In
summary, there is great inter-connectivity within the hippocampus, although there is
probably some functional segregation: the details of these connections are still being
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Figure 1.2: The neocortical-hippocampal processing hierarchy; and major connections between
the entorhinal cortex and the hippocampus, and within the hippocampus.
worked out.
From the point of view of this thesis, what is perhaps more important is that the
hippocampus can be conceived of as the ’top-node’ in a neocortical-hippocampal pro-
cessing hierarchy (see Figure 1.2). It receives massive inputs from tertiary and other
association areas and from the supra-modal integrative areas, and heavy but relatively
neglected inputs from sub-cortical areas. It also projects extremely widely on the out-
put side.
Comparative anatomists have traditionally identified a homologue of the hip-
pocampus in all vertebrates. However, without comparative behavioural experiments
across species, it is difficult to separate functional and structural homologies, and
to rule out the possibility that apparently similar neural structures compute differ-
ent functions, or that physically different structures perform the same function(s)
(O’Keefe and Nadel (1978)). However, in this thesis I consider data from many
species in order to arrive at my conclusions as to what the hippocampus does (see
section 3.1.1.2 for a discussion of this approach).
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It is becoming clear that there are differences in the roles of left and right hip-
pocampus, which are especially prominent in humans. For example, the right hip-
pocampus has been implicated in spatial learning (e.g., Maguire et al. (1997, 1998a)),
and the left in autobiographical memory and public events (e.g., Burgess et al. (2002)).
There may also be a differential involvement of the left and right hippocampus in the
long-term maintenance of information (Maguire and Frith, 2003). There is also evi-
dence that different regions in the hippocampus are specialised for acquiring different
information (Moser and Moser, 1998), or for acquiring information at different rates
(de Hoz et al., 2003). Whilst clearly important, such inter-regional differences are not
considered in this thesis. Similarly, whilst there is no wish to imply that the hippocam-
pus operates in isolation, the focus is on what the hippocampus itself does, rather than
on the wider learning and memory systems of which it is part.
Chapter 2
Theories of hippocampal function
This chapter reviews existing theories of the hippocampus, drawing out the main
themes. Existing models of hippocampal function are also introduced.
2.1 Introduction
Learning and memory have been topics of interest since ancient Greek times: the study
of memory is integral to understanding the mind. Modern ideas about memory ap-
pear from about 1800 onward. For example de Biran (1804) distinguished several
types of memory systems; Gall (1835) proposed that each mental faculty has a sepa-
rate memory; James (1890) separated habits and memories, and “primary” and “sec-
ondary” memory (the latter was revised in the 1950’s as short-term and long-term
memory); and Ribot (1881) discussed the inverse relationship between the age of a
memory and the likelihood of it being lost after brain damage. These ideas remain
central to modern memory study. Hebb (1949)’s highly influential idea that memory
properties must be based within individual cells forms the basis of most current mem-
ory models. Lashley (1950)‘s conclusion that the “engram” for a particular memory is
represented throughout an entire region paved the way for modern distributed mem-
ory theories.
Three years after Lashley gave up on his attempt to localise the engram, William
Scoville operated on the patient “HM”. HM had his temporal lobes removed to cure
intractable epilepsy; the seizures were reduced, but he was left profoundly and unex-
pectedly amnesic. Scoville and Milner (1957) subsequently found evidence of amnesia
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in another eight subjects who had received similar operations, and concluded that it
was the removal specifically of the hippocampus and amygdala that had led to the
severe amnesia. The hippocampus was firmly placed under the spotlight of memory
research, and HM became the most famous and most studied patient in the field of
cognitive science.
Initially it was proposed that the hippocampus was an all-encompassing learning
structure, but it soon became clear that HM had intact motor learning abilities, al-
though he could not explicitly remember the learning episodes (e.g., Corkin (1968)).
Furthermore, animal studies showed that lesions restricted to the hippocampus did
not produce the massive memory deficits seen in HM (e.g., Orbach et al. (1960); Kim-
ble and Pribram (1963)). The current view is that the hippocampus is part of a larger
learning system (including the entorhinal, perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices)
and that some of HM’s deficits are due to damage to the amygdala and overlying
cortices.
It is now generally accepted that several anatomically and operationally different
special purpose memory systems have evolved to acquire and store different types
of information and solve different tasks. For example, response learning requires the
caudate putamen (Kesner et al. (1993)), and conditioned emotional responses require
the amygdaloid circuits (Phillips and Le Doux (1992)). In contrast, the role of the hip-
pocampus remains vigorously debated. A consideration of neuropsychological data
(such as that from HM-type amnesics) has led to the view that the hippocampus is in-
volved primarily in remembering daily events (e.g. Squire (1992)), whereas data from
other animals (primarily rodents) has led to the hypothesis that the hippocampus is in-
volved specifically in spatial tasks (e.g. O’Keefe and Nadel (1978)). The hippocampus
has also been implicated in innumerable other processes, such as novelty detection
(Knight (1996)), emotional behaviour (Papez (1937)), working memory (Olton (1979)),
consciousness (Clark and Squire (1998)), configural learning (Sutherland and Rudy
(1989)), contextual learning (Phillips and Le Doux (1992)) and recognition memory
(Reed and Squire (1998)), amongst others.
In this chapter I provide a review of theories and models of the hippocampus.
In section 2.2 I review qualitative theories of the hippocampus – that is, those that
attempt to define the essence of hippocampal function. In section 2.4 I review compu-
tational theories and models.
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2.2 Qualitative theories of hippocampal function
The main aim of this section is to provide a conceptual overview of extant theories
of the hippocampus. Full historical reviews are available elsewhere (e.g., Rosenzweig
(1998)). Here I attempt to draw out the main themes.
Many early theories have been superseded, although some provide the conceptual
basis for current views. On the basis that hippocampal lesions can disrupt sponta-
neous alternation and consistently produce hyperactivity, it was argued that the hip-
pocampus served as a basis for Pavlovian inhibition (Douglas (1967); Kimble (1968)).
Since there are alternative plausible explanations for these phenomena, and such the-
ories are too under-specified to explain current data, it has been largely abandoned.
Similarly, Gray (1982)’s suggestion that animals have a behavioural inhibition system,
which causes feelings of anxiety when activated, and Rawlins (1985)’s proposal that
the role of the hippocampus is to act as a temporary memory buffer to span delays
have been largely forgotten. On the other hand, Hirsh (1974)’s early view, that many
of the learning deficits associated with hippocampal damage can best be described as
context effects, and O’Keefe and Nadel (1978)’s proposal that the hippocampus is the
site of “cognitive map” formation, inform current spatial theories of the hippocampus.
Many of the functions that have at one time been ascribed to the hippocampus do
in fact depend on different local substructures. For example, early lesion studies sug-
gested that the hippocampus was involved primarily in mediating the emotional state
of an animal, and that it, together with other parts of the heavily interconnected “lim-
bic system”, was essential for emotional behaviour (Papez (1937), Isaacson (1974)).
In fact, structures adjacent to the hippocampus (such as the amygdala and anterior
cingulate cortex) and other fibres of passage were probably inadvertently lesioned.
Recognition memory was also thought to be hippocampally-dependent (e.g. Gaffan
(1974)), but current studies suggest that the parahippocampal areas are responsible for
recognition functions, although this is still hotly debated.
2.2.1 “Declarative” versus “procedural” memory
An early view in psychology was that memory was a dual-store system, consisting of
a separate small capacity short-term memory and a larger capacity long-term memory.
Amnesia was proposed to be due to an impairment of transfer of information into the
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long-term store from an otherwise intact and functioning short-term store (e.g., Atkin-
son and Shiffrin (1968); Baddeley and Warrington (1970)). Slightly later process views
posited that amnesia arose as a result of too-shallow encoding (e.g., Cermak and But-
ters (1972); Cermak et al. (1973)), or increased susceptibility to interference at retrieval
(e.g., Warrington and Weiskrantz (1968, 1970)). Thus differential impairment of differ-
ent tasks after brain damage cannot be accommodated by these hypotheses. However,
hippocampal amnesics show normal learning on tasks such as mirror writing or learn-
ing a tactile maze (so-called procedural tasks), despite a complete lack of recollection
of the learning experience (Corkin (1968); Milner (1962)). Later studies also showed
that with appropriate implicit tests of memory (“...complete these word stems...”) am-
nesics showed normal performance, whereas only with explicit tests (“...write down
those words we just showed you...”) were they impaired (Graf et al. (1984)). A new
conception of memory was required.
It is now generally accepted that there are multiple memory systems (Squire
(1992)). Most researchers today would accept a division of some kind between (1)
hippocampally-independent memory that is typically only revealed by a change in
the facility of task performance (such as some skills and dispositions, priming, habit-
uation and sensitisation), and (2) memory for facts and/or events and/or experiences
that depends (at least initially) on the integrity of the hippocampus and related struc-
tures.
There is converging agreement on the identity and anatomical basis of various as-
pects of the former systems. For example, classical conditioning requires the cere-
bellum (Thompson (1988)), fear conditioning requires the amygdala (Phillips and
Le Doux (1992)), priming requires the systems engaged at perception, stimulus-
response learning requires the striatum (Packard et al. (1989)), and response learning
requires the caudate putamen (Kesner et al. (1993)). These types of learning are col-
lectively known by various terms, including non-declarative (Squire (1983); Squire and
Zola-Morgan (1988)), procedural (Cohen and Squire (1981), habit (Mishkin and Petri
(1984)) or implicit (Schacter (1987)) memory. The detailed description and anatomi-
cal substrate of the purportedly hippocampal latter system(s) (for facts and/or events
and/or experiences) is rather more controversial. Different authors have made dif-
ferent distinctions, and the system is known as declarative (Cohen and Squire (1981);
Squire (1992), explicit (Schacter (1987)), relational (Eichenbaum et al. (1992)) and config-
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Figure 2.1: A memory classification (Redrawn from Squire (1992): It is generally accepted that
non-declarative (procedural/implicit) memory is independent of the hippocampus. Which as-
pects of declarative (explicit) memory are hippocampally-dependent is somewhat controversial.
Cohen and Squire (1981) first made the distinction between declarative and proce-
dural memory. The term “declarative” derives from work with human subjects and
is often linked to the notion of conscious memory. Declarative memory was charac-
terised as the record of everyday facts and events that can be brought to conscious
recollection and typically is subject to verbal reflection. Procedural memory was char-
acterised as the non-conscious acquisition of a bias or adaptation that typically is only
revealed by implicit measures of performance.
This initial conception of declarative memory was based on work with humans
and is difficult to apply to animals. We do not have means for monitoring conscious
recollection in animals (if indeed it exists, see Eichenbaum et al. (1992) for a discus-
sion). The definitions can be operationalised by making further distinctions between
declarative and procedural memory that do not rely on verbal expression or subjective
awareness. For example, several authors have proposed that a defining feature of the
declarative code is that it is common across different processes or processing systems
and allows information from different sources to be compared and contrasted; infer-
ences can then be made in novel situations on the basis of what had happened before
in another situation (e.g., Eichenbaum et al. (1992); Shapiro and Olton (1994)). As evi-
dence accumulated that amnesics could perform normally on a variety of tasks given
appropriate testing, “procedural” memory was renamed non-declarative memory (e.g.,
Squire (1983); Squire and Zola-Morgan (1988)).
Numerous other similar distinctions have been made. Tulving (1972) made a dis-
tinction between a hippocampally-dependent episodic memory and hippocampally-
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independent semantic memory. Episodic memory was defined as a memory system
for learning material presented in a particular place and time. Semantic memory
was defined in terms of language-related declarative memory operations. A sim-
ilar distinction was made between explicit memory (responsible for intentional or
conscious recollection, and impaired in amnesia) and implicit memory (responsible
for non-intentional recollection tasks) (Schacter (1987)). Olton (1983) argued for a
hippocampally-dependent working memory (for the specific, personal or temporal
context of a situation) and a hippocampally-independent reference memory (for rules
and procedures that re-occur across specific situations, so-called “general knowl-
edge”). Squire (1992) argued that the essential feature of the hippocampally depen-
dent declarative memory system is the ability to rapidly establish novel associations
in memory. In contrast, non-declarative memory is specialised for “incremental, cu-
mulative change”, so that new associations can be acquired but only after many rep-
etitions. Placing a different emphasis on representational format, Eichenbaum et al.
(1992) distinguished a hippocampally-dependent declarative memory, supporting the
conscious processing of information and distinguished by the relational representa-
tion and representational flexibility and a non-hippocampal procedural memory based
on the representations of single stimuli or configurations of stimuli. A distinction has
also been made between hippocampally-based remembering (recollecting an experi-
ence) and knowing which permits a recognition judgement to be made on the basis of
familiarity (Mandler (1980)). According to Tulving and Markowitsch (1997) episodic
remembering always implies semantic knowing, whereas knowing does not imply
remembering. More recently, Tulving and Markowitsch (1998) have suggested that
declarative memory should be defined in terms of the overlap between semantic and
episodic memory.
2.2.1.1 Current “declarative” views: semantic and episodic memory
Two main streams of thought have emerged with respect to the role of the hippocam-
pus in the acquisition of ‘declarative’1 information. Some authors argue that both
semantic (fact) and episodic (event) memory are dependent on the hippocampus for
1The term ‘declarative’ is still in widespread use, even though authors continue to use the term differ-
ently, and despite the potentially confusing overtones of conscious processing. For clarity I will use the
terms semantic and episodic memory to refer respectively to memory for facts and commonalities across
events, and to detailed memory for events that occurred once. In non-human animals, such memories
are usually referred to as context-independent, and context-specific respectively.
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acquisition (eg., Murre (1996)), whereas others argue that the hippocampus is obliga-
tory only for episodic learning (e.g., Nadel and Moscovitch (1997)). For an instructive
insight into these differences see the conflicting discussions of Vargha-Khadem et al.
(1997)’s key finding of apparently intact semantic memory in the face of impaired
episodic memory in young hippocampal amnesic patients (Eichenbaum (1997); Tulv-
ing and Markowitsch (1998); Squire and Zola (1998); Mishkin et al. (1998)).
Those involved in the study argue that selective hippocampal damage causes
an impairment only in context-rich episodic memory but not context-free semantic
memory (Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997), Mishkin et al. (1998) and Gadian et al. (2000)).
This is in accord with the distinction made by Tulving (1972)) between semantic and
hippocampally-dependent episodic memory, and is the view espoused by Tulving and
Markowitsch (1998). Tulving’s “episodic theory” views episodic memory as an exten-
sion of semantic memory. The Serial encoding, Parallel storage and Independent retrieval
(SPI) model (Tulving (1995)) posits that encoding information into the episodic sys-
tem critically depends on the semantic system, whereas semantic encoding does not
require an intact episodic system. Retrieval from the episodic or semantic store can be
independent (Tulving and Markowitsch (1998)).
The alternative view is that both episodic and semantic memory (“declarative”
memory) are equally dependent on the hippocampus (e.g., Squire and Zola (1996,
1998); Cohen et al. (1999)). In this “unitary declarative memory” view, damage to both
semantic and episodic memory is proportional to the degree of damage to the ’hip-
pocampal system’. The apparently preserved semantic abilities of Vargha-Khadem’s
patients are claimed to be incomplete and to depend on similarly partially preserved
episodic capacities (Squire and Zola (1998)). Thus in this view, episodic memory is the
gateway to semantic memory (Squire and Zola (1998)).
2.2.2 Spatial theories
The declarative/non-declarative memory distinction, and the view that the hippocam-
pus is a general cross-domain learning structure, derives largely from work with hu-
man amnesics. Experimental work with non-human animals has led to various differ-
ent proposals; the most influential of which is that the hippocampus has a specifically
spatial learning role. In the spatial approach, impairments in ostensibly non-spatial
tasks after hippocampal lesions are explained in terms of supporting functions that
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depend on spatial processing (e.g., episodic memory may depend on recall of context,
Gaffan (1994b); language processing may have co-opted a spatial mechanism, O’Keefe
(1996)). In more general memory hypotheses, spatial learning is seen as merely one of
the functions of the hippocampus, albeit an important one.
In my opinion there is little evidence for an exclusively spatial role for the hip-
pocampus; however, spatial theories have been very influential and make up the ma-
jority of implemented models.
2.2.2.1 Cognitive Mapping
Animals can show short-cut and detour behaviour through previously unexplored ar-
eas of an environment (Tolman (1948), although see Bennett (1996) for some scepticism
about such abilities). Many authors have argued that the most parsimonious expla-
nation for these abilities is that animals can create and store cognitive maps, that is,
stored neural representations of environments that permits an animal to solve naviga-
tional problems using information about the structure or geometry of the environment
(Muller and Stead (1996), p709). On the basis of evidence that hippocampal cells en-
code spatial information, O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) argued that such cognitive maps
were created and stored in the hippocampus. This Cognitive Mapping Theory is perhaps
the most influential theory of hippocampal function and has spawned innumerable
variants.
O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) and Nadel (1994) proposed two distinct systems for pro-
cessing spatial information: The hippocampal locale system encodes places in the en-
vironment into allocentric (world-centred) cognitive maps, whilst the hippocampally-
independent taxon system codes motor responses in terms of specific orientations
within a spatial environment. The systems differ in their susceptibility to interference
(the locale system is more sensitive and acts to separate memory traces, whilst the
taxon system combines memory traces based on overlapping features) and consolida-
tion characteristics (learning in the locale system is all-or-nothing, whereas traces in
the taxon system are built up incrementally). There are many models based on these
ideas (e.g, Zipser (1985); Hetherington and Shapiro (1993); Muller and Stead (1996);
Burgess and O’Keefe (1996)) and variants of the theory.
Cognitive Mapping theories propose that any ostensibly non-spatial phenomena
that are sensitive to hippocampal damage emerge as secondary properties of spatial
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mapping. For example, spatial context can be seen as integral to episodic memories,
or as a vital cue for recall. The theory has been extended to account for the language
deficits observed after hippocampal lesion (O’Keefe (1996)) and for sequence recall,
by adding a temporal aspect. It is somewhat unclear when such theories cease to be
“specifically spatial”.
2.2.2.2 Scene and context memory
Scene or context memory refers to memory for the spatial arrangements of objects; it
has also been described as “object in place” memory (Gaffan and Parker (1996)) and
“memory for the location of objects” (Parkinson et al. (1988)). Several authors have
proposed that one of the functions of the hippocampus is to store snapshot-like views
of the environmental context (e.g., Gaffan (1994b,a); Gaffan and Parker (1996)). Many
of the general associative memory theories of the hippocampus have similarly posited
that an ability to store scene snapshots would naturally arise out of the hippocampus’s
role in binding together convergent inputs from various neural processors (e.g., Squire
(1992); Cohen and Eichenbaum (1993); Eichenbaum et al. (1994).)
Scene information could be used in several ways; the information about the learn-
ing context in which a task is acquired could generally aid recall (e.g., Hirsh (1974))
or more specifically allow disambiguation of similar tasks learnt in different contexts
(e.g., Gaffan (1994b)). In some ways, these theories are like the configural association
theory in that they propose that the role of the hippocampus is to augment a basic
stimulus-response learning ability.
2.2.2.3 Path integration
Path integration (PI) is the process of integrating information acquired in the process
of self-movement to compute a current position with respect to a starting position. It
provides the capacity to return directly to a starting point after following a circuitous
out-bound path. Few experimental studies have linked PI to a specific brain structure,
perhaps because PI most likely involves several processes including identifying an
initial reference point, monitoring various idiothetic cue sources and computing cur-
rent position (Taube (1999)). Several researchers have suggested that the hippocampus
is the substrate for path integration (e.g., McNaughton et al. (1996); Samsonovich and
McNaughton (1997); Whishaw et al. (1997)). Whilst it seems likely that path integration
18 2. Theories of hippocampal function
information is represented in the hippocampus, the lesion evidence does not appear
to support the strong claim that the hippocampus is the path-integrator proper.
2.2.3 Other hypotheses about the role of the hippocampus
Declarative and Spatial theories of hippocampal function dominate today’s literature.
However, there are many important issues and hypotheses that cut across these pro-
posals:
2.2.3.1 The hippocampus as a convergence zone
The hippocampus receives massive convergent projections from both cortical and sub-
cortical areas. Many authors have argued that this makes the hippocampus ideal for
forming traces of events occurring throughout the brain.
Teyler and Discenna (1986) posited that the role of the hippocampus is to form
and retain an index of neocortical areas activated by experiential events. Reactiva-
tion of the stored hippocampal trace of an event via a proposed one-to-one mapping
between hippocampal loci and neocortical modules serves to re-instantiate the asso-
ciated activity in the neocortex. The Convergence Zone theory (Damasio (1989a,b))
can be seen as an extension of the Indexing theory. In Damasio’s theory, fragments of
information stored in the cortex make up the building blocks of memory and conver-
gence zones distributed throughout the brain (of which the hippocampus is one) act to
trigger activity in lower convergence zones and fragments. Other authors have sug-
gested that the hippocampus has a general binding function (e.g., Alvarez and Squire
(1994); Murre (1996)). It is unclear how the binding theory differs from the index the-
ory (Milner (1989)); the hippocampal component of a memory trace is not necessarily
qualitatively different from that part stored in the cortex.
On the other hand some authors argue that memories stored in the hippocampus
are not complete copies of cortical patterns of activation but ”reduced descriptions
that exploit redundancies in the cortical patterns” (McClelland and Goddard (1996),
p655). In other words, the hippocampus is the (temporary) store for all the information
acquired in a learning experience, and there is initially no cortical component. This
view is explicitly espoused by Rolls (e.g., Rolls (1996); Rolls and Treves (1998)), and
implicitly by others (e.g., Rawlins (1985); Marr (1971); McClelland et al. (1995)).
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2.2.3.2 The hippocampus as a fast learner
A pervasive idea is that the hippocampus is a fast (but temporary) storage system for
the patterns of activity that are induced in it from cortical areas (e.g, Murre (1996);
Alvarez and Squire (1994); McClelland et al. (1995); Morris and Frey (1997); Treves and
Rolls (1994)). This idea of a fast, small temporary hippocampal store and large incre-
mental cortical store can be traced back to Marr (1970, 1971) and the idea forms the
basis for many models of hippocampal function. In a generalised Hebb-Marr model
the neocortex stores large complex event memories. To prevent interference between
traces, Marr suggested that a separate processor was required — the hippocampus
— that could rapidly store events, and then allow gradual transfer to the neocortex,
which could reorganise and classify this information before incorporating it into the
existing knowledge base. In a similar vein, but on the basis of considerations of learn-
ing in artificial connectionist systems, McClelland et al. (1995) argued that the role of
the hippocampus is to store and play back new memories to the cortex to allow inter-
leaved cortical learning.
On the other hand, authors such as Murre (1996) have argued that the hippocam-
pus is required for fast on-line learning of episodic information not to prevent inter-
ference or because the cortex can only do slow learning, but because there is limited
a priori long-range connectivity in the cortex. Recently Wise and Murray (1999, 2000)
have proposed that the hippocampus is required (amongst other things) for the rapid
acquisition of arbitrary antecedent-to-action mappings (e.g. see a yellow card — wave
your right paw). The hippocampus is posited to be required for its speed of acquisition
of these new associations.
A somewhat different set of ideas derives from the proposal of Morris and Frey
(1997) that the hippocampus is involved in automatic fast encoding of attended expe-
rience, irrespective of the importance of an event at the time of its occurrence. They ar-
gue that this entails a mechanism such as “synaptic tagging” (Frey and Morris (1998))
that allows the long-term strength of a trace to be determined sometime after acquisi-
tion at which time the affective value of the information may have become apparent,
rather than at storage.
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2.2.3.3 Novelty detection and comparator functions
Various authors have proposed that the hippocampus is particularly concerned with
the detection of novelty, and that it acts to guide behavioural responses on the basis of
the nature of impinging stimuli and their familiarity (e.g., Gray (1982); Knight (1996);
Tulving et al. (1994); Parkin (1997)). Gray (1982) proposed that the hippocampal for-
mation acts as a comparator of incoming information with old stored information, to
set up conditions for changes in behavioural inhibition, arousal and attention. Com-
mon current opinion is that if there is a behavioural inhibition system, it is likely to be
elsewhere, but there are moves to rehabilitate the theory (e.g., Lemaire et al. (1999)).
A more recent proposal is that the hippocampus plays a critical role in associative
mismatch processes, beyond that of simple stimulus novelty processing (e.g., Squire
(1992); Bunsey and Eichenbaum (1996); Honey et al. (1998)). Various studies (e.g.,
imaging (Henke et al. (1997)), cell recording (Wood et al. (1999)) and c-fos (Wan et al.
(1999))) show that the hippocampus is activated by novel or complex arrangements of
stimuli, but not novel stimuli per se. Honey et al. (1998) claim that simple stimulus ha-
bituation can proceed without the hippocampus. It seems likely that the mechanisms
that generate increased signals for novel individual stimuli are extra-hippocampal. Of
course, independently from any specific “cognitive” role in the processing of novelty,
differential activity in response to novel versus familiar stimuli might be expected in
any putative memory system, since it is desirable to encode novel information.
2.2.3.4 Incidental learning
The stimuli that are available when a task is learnt may either be integral to task per-
formance (e.g., a tone on a tone-conditioning task), or incidental and unimportant
to the performance of the current task (e.g., room layout or door colour on a tone-
conditioning task). Hippocampal animals frequently show deficits on tests of inciden-
tal learning; that is, they acquire less information than controls about stimuli which
need not be processed for the task for which the animal is rewarded. This has led
several authors to propose that the hippocampus has a critical role in the encoding of
incidental information (e.g., Phillips and LeDoux (1994); Good et al. (1998)). One com-
mon view is that this incidental learning may provide retrieval cues. Another view is
that it is important for an animal in the real-world to encode information even if it is
apparently incidental and unimportant when it occurs, since it might turn out to be
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highly salient (Morris and Frey (1997)). If the event was not initially stored, associative
learning across time (e.g., that exposure to an apparently meaningless tone predicts a
shock in 20-min) would not be possible.
Rudy and Sutherland (1995)’s suggestion that the hippocampus can act to en-
hance the activation or salience of certain representations encoded outside of the hip-
pocampus may be of relevance to putative hippocampal incidental learning, in that
it would provide a mechanism for modulating the encoding of low salience informa-
tion. In Rudy and Sutherland’s theory, the differential reinforcement provided by the
hippocampus primarily works to aid extra-hippocampal configural learning mecha-
nisms.
2.2.3.5 Relational representation
In the Relational Representation theory (Eichenbaum et al. (1992, 1994); Eichenbaum
(1997)) the hippocampus is required for the creation and use of flexible relational repre-
sentations that permit the inferential use of knowledge in novel situations, whilst the
“para-hippocampal region” encodes isolated individual representations within those
modules engaged at learning which are thus inflexible in that they will only be re-
activated by a restricted range of events similar to those occurring at storage. Both
relational and individual representations can support declarative memory, thus the
distinction here is not along the episodic/semantic line.
2.2.3.6 Configural representation
An event in which two stimuli A and B are together paired with a stimulus C, could
be stored as the two elemental associations A-C & B-C or as the single configural as-
sociation [AB]-C. Various tasks (e.g., negative patterning, trans-switching) can only
be solved using configural encodings, and many of these tasks were found to be im-
paired after hippocampal lesions. The Configural Association theory (Sutherland and
Rudy (1989)) distinguished between a (1) hippocampally-independent simple associa-
tive system that stores experiences as changes in strengths of associations between sin-
gle stimuli as presented to the organism and (2) a hippocampal configural associative
system which can combine these representations of elementary stimuli to form new
configural representations, which can then be associated with other configural or ele-
mental representations. Wickelgren (1979)’s “chunking” proposals can be considered
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a predecessor to this Configural Processing theory. Squire (1992) similarly proposed
that the hippocampus is necessary for memory tasks that involve the development of
configural as opposed to simple associations.
2.2.3.7 Sequence and temporal learning
Several authors have proposed that the essential role of the hippocampus is to store
and replay sequences of events (e.g., Minai and Levy (1994); Levy (1996); Skaggs and
McNaughton (1996); Wu et al. (1998)). The encoding of sequences of events could be
seen as integral to episodic memory, if episodic memory is viewed as a sequence of
static views of the world. Levy and colleagues show that the recurrent connections of
CA3 are suited for the storage of sequences. They and others (e.g., Wallenstein and
Hasselmo (1997)) argue that conceptualising the hippocampus as a sequence learner
unifies various theoretic and paradigmatic perspectives. Interestingly, the most recent
proposal from the Eichenbaum lab (that the hippocampus is an associator of discon-
tiguous spatial or temporal events) is based on a sequence learning model (Wallenstein
et al. (1998)).
Hippocampal lesions disrupt not only memory for temporal order, but also the fre-
quency of occurrence of items in a list, duration estimates and relative recency judge-
ments. This has led to proposals that the hippocampus is required for the processing
of temporal information per se (e.g., Kesner and DiMattia (1987); Kesner (1998); Wal-
lenstein et al. (1998)).
2.2.3.8 Awareness, attention and consciousness
Memory performance on hippocampally-dependent tasks in humans, such as recall-
ing what you had for breakfast, or a list of words, is usually accompanied by conscious
awareness (hence the term “declarative” memory). It has recently been proposed that
it is this factor that governs whether an event requires the hippocampus (e.g., Clark
and Squire (1998); Manns et al. (2000)). This conclusion was based on studies that
showed that only those patients who became aware of certain stimulus contingencies
showed good performance on trace-conditioning tasks. The argument is thus circular,
and more recent studies have dissociated awareness from performance (e.g., Chun and
Phelps (1999)). It is more likely that awareness is not a prerequisite for learning per
se, but both tend to occur as a consequence of hippocampal processing. Moscovitch
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proposed that conscious memory is only special because the conscious experience of
the remembered event is stored with other event information. Similarly, Eichenbaum
(1999) suggested that the hippocampus could be the gateway by which awareness
enters memory. It is clear that the hippocampus could not be the sole “source” of
consciousness, since hippocampal amnesics remain self-aware.
Some authors have attributed attentional control mechanisms to the hippocam-
pus (e.g., Buhusi and Schmajuk (1996)). The direction of attentional control processes
could be related to putative novelty detecting functions of the hippocampus.
2.3 The long-term role of the hippocampus
This section reviews theories that address the long-term role of the hippocampus in
memory.
2.3.1 The standard view: temporary storage
Hippocampal damage commonly leads to both anterograde and retrograde amnesia,
that is, to an inability to lay down new memories of a particular kind, and a loss
of information acquired before damage. Retrograde amnesia is commonly graded
such that more remote memories are disproportionately less affected than recently
acquired memories. This observation underpins the “standard model” (so called by
Nadel and Moscovitch (1997)). In this view, medial temporal lobe structures store
traces initially, after which there is gradual reorganisation within long-term memory
such that the hippocampus becomes less important for the recall of a given trace and
a more permanent memory is set up elsewhere. Thus medial temporal lobe struc-
tures are merely temporary stores of memory traces (e.g., Scoville and Milner (1957);
Teyler and Discenna (1986); Squire (1992); Murre (1996); Squire and Alvarez (1995);
Kim and Fanselow (1992); Shen and McNaughton (1996)). In most standard views,
the hippocampus is involved in some way in consolidating memories into their non-
hippocampal long-term form.
2.3.1.1 Mechanisms of consolidation
Numerous writers have proposed that sleep (specifically REM sleep) is important for
memory processing. Vertes and Eastman (2000) trace the proposal back to Jenkins and
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Dallenbach (1924). Marr proposed that neocortical long-term memories are trained
by the hippocampus during sleep whilst there is low interference from daily events
(Marr, 1970, 1971). Interest in the idea of sleep as a consolidation mechanism has
waxed and waned, but recent neurophysiological data have provided some new sup-
port for this idea, although it is somewhat circumstantial.
Many recent authors (e.g., McClelland et al. (1995); Chrobak and Buzsáki (1994))
have similarly suggested that sleep acts to replay events to the cortex so that traces
can be slowly potentiated there. A few have proposed that consolidation may occur
during engagement in “type II” behaviour in rats (such as awake grooming or eating,
e.g., Vanderwolf et al. (1975)) or during conscious and unconscious rehearsal (e.g.,
Chrobak and Buzsáki (1994); Murre (1996)).
2.3.2 Long-term involvement of the hippocampus
Until recently the standard view has had few detractors. However, Nadel and
Moscovitch (1997) have argued that the evidence cited in support of the standard view
is equivocal. They propose instead that the “hippocampal system”2 is the long-term
store for traces that are obligatorily hippocampally-dependent at acquisition. In their
Multiple Trace Theory, each time an event is recalled (whether internally or externally
triggered) another slightly different trace of that event is stored. The Headed Records
account of Morton et al. (1985) is a similar early view.
The influential Cognitive Map theory also proposed that the hippocampus is a
long-term memory store, albeit only for maps of environments (O’Keefe and Nadel
(1978)). Milner (1989)’s ideas are also of relevance, since they provide an intermediate
view between the standard view and that of Nadel and Moscovitch. Milner proposed
that easily modified but transient “soft” limbic system traces and weak “hard” neo-
cortical traces are initially laid down in response to an event — after neocortical trace
have been reactivated a sufficient number of times they may become strong enough
to be of functional importance. Thus the only traces that will exist of non-reoccurring
events (such as episodic traces) will be in the hippocampus.
2Moscovitch and Nadel (1998) define the “hippocampal system” as the entorhinal and perirhinal cor-
tices, dentate gyrus, subiculum, parahippocampal cortices and the amygdala, as well as the hippocampal
formation.
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2.4 Computational theories of the hippocampus
The theories of hippocampal function reviewed so far are qualitative, consisting of a
central concept or metaphor that attempts to characterise the essence of hippocampal-
region function. In this section I briefly introduce extant high-level cognitive models
of hippocampal function. I focus on declarative memory models, especially those that
aim to model the development of graded retrograde amnesia, as they are closest in
spirit to my model (Chapter 7). For a full exposition of implementation details and
mathematical underpinnings, see the original journal articles.
Most theories of learning and memory (whether qualitative or computational) are
predicated on Hebbian type learning mechanisms, in which the co-activation of con-
nected neurons results in a progressive strengthening of the connections between them
(Hebb (1949)). Furthermore, despite the diversity of current models of the hippocam-
pus, with few exceptions (e.g., Gluck (1996)) they are influenced by Marr (1971)’s con-
ceptualisation of the hippocampus as an auto-associative memory that performs pat-
tern storage and retrieval. Marr established several precedents that remain influential
today: the model was based on (the then-known) details of neuroanatomy, and in-
corporated a learning mechanism based on the idea of Hebbian synaptic plasticity; it
emphasised the importance of interference (and how it can be reduced); and it recog-
nised the importance of understanding the interaction between the hippocampus and
the cortex in consolidation.
2.4.1 Models of declarative function
If episodic storage is conceived of as the storage of patterns of co-occurring activity
in different areas of the cortex, then with an appropriate conceptualisation of what
the inputs represent, a minimal auto-associative network could be said to implement
episodic storage and recall. This has been considered to be a weakness when com-
pared to implementations of putative spatial functions, since for “general memory
models” it is often unclear what the inputs represent, and how recall performance can
be compared with real-world “remembering”.
In most models, the hippocampus acts to bind or index patterns of activity occur-
ring in cortical areas (e.g., Damasio (1989b); Teyler and Discenna (1986); Moll et al.
(1994); McClelland et al. (1995); Squire and Alvarez (1995); Murre (1996)) since the
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hippocampus is so small with respect to the cortex. Others argue that this small size
makes the hippocampus ideal for the storage of compressed representations of corti-
cal activity (e.g., McClelland and Goddard (1996); Rolls (1996)). The relatively simple
sequence learning models of Levy can also do one-trial (episodic) learning (e.g., Levy
(1996)). The models of Gluck and Myers (1997) and McClelland and Goddard (1996)
are based on the properties of hidden layers in multi-layer nets. Other models aim for
more detailed neurobiological plausibility (e.g., Buzsáki (1989); Crick and Mitchison
(1983); Rolls and Treves (1998); Hasselmo et al. (1996)).
Four connectionist models have simulated the long-term role of the hippocam-
pus in protecting information initially stored there from the effects of subsequent hip-
pocampal damage (Alvarez and Squire (1994); the Complementary Learning Systems
Framework, McClelland et al. (1995); Tracelink, Murre (1996); and Multiple Trace The-
ory, Nadel and Moscovitch (1997)). The first three models share the assumption that
the hippocampus learns quickly on exposure to an event so is initially important for re-
call; whereas the cortex learns slowly through hippocampally-supported interleaved
learning, gradually making the hippocampus redundant over time for the recall of
that information.
Alvarez and Squire’s (1994) simple network model consists of two ’cortical’ re-
gions (each of 4 units) reciprocally connected with a ’MTL’ region (of four units, see
figure 2.2a). Two non-overlapping patterns are stored in the net, using a learning rate
an order of magnitude higher in the MTL-cortical connections than the cortico-cortical
connections. Random activity in the MTL then drives rehearsal allowing the slow in-
crementation of cortico-cortico connections. Global forgetting occurs in all weights in
proportion to their current strength.
In the Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) framework, McClelland, Mc-
Naughton, O’Reilly and others have explored several analytical issues and imple-
mented several models that they consider to be one unified model (O’Reilly and Nor-
man, 2002). Instead of acting as an ’index’ for information stored in the cortex, the fast-
learning hippocampus is considered to initially store all information about an event,
that it then teaches to the cortex. The models consist of several layers (see Figure 2.2b),
trained using the back-propagation algorithm, making them sensitive to catastrophic
interference. Training and hippocampal replay to the cortex are interleaved to pro-
tect the cortex from interference - this slow learning allows the extraction of structure.
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(a) McClelland, McNaughton & O’Reilly’s
Complementary Learning Systems model
(b) Alvarez & Squire’s (1994) model (c) Murre’s (1996) Tracelink’ model
Figure 2.2: Network models of consolidation share several characteristics. The ’hippocam-
pal/MTL’ component has relatively more convergent inputs, relatively more orthogonalisation of
patterns, and a higher learning rate compared to the ’cortical’ component.
Weight decay occurs in the ’hippocampal’ component.
Tracelink (Murre, 1996) consists of three systems: a trace system (the neocortex),
a smaller link system (the hippocampus), and a modulatory system (amygdala and
other areas) that alters the rate at which memories are stored (see figure 2.2c). In a
typical run, the link systems consists of 42 nodes, and the trace system 200 nodes.
Link-link and trace-link connections are formed more rapidly than trace-trace connec-
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tions, although all connections are active during learning. Random noise in the link
system activates a random subset of nodes, and the net is allowed to settle into an
attractor for the strengthening of trace-trace connections. There is no weight decay.
In contrast to the preceding models, the Multiple Trace model (Nadel et al., 2000)
allows multiple traces to build up over time in the hippocampus for a given memory,
which protects memories from partial hippocampal damage as they age. The recall
of episodic and spatial detail remains dependent on the hippocampus indefinitely.
The neural network consists of a ’hippocampal’ (HC) component and a ’cortical’ (NC)
component, each consisting of 1000 units; which are fully-connected. Training and
replay are interleaved, with events chosen randomly for replay. Replay is initiated by
activating a NC trace, which activates a HC pattern. Noise is then added to the HC
pattern, and the pattern re-stored in NC-HC connections producing a new trace.
2.4.2 Models of sequence learning
The recurrent architectures of auto-associative networks are suited to sequence learn-
ing. Given a partial input of the present state, an auto-associative network can perform
pattern completion and also then retrieve the predicted next state. Levy argues that a
general sequence prediction paradigm can provide a computational unification of var-
ious putative hippocampally-dependent functions, such as one-trial episodic learning,
short-cut behaviour and inference tasks (Levy (1996)). Skaggs and McNaughton (1996)
also propose that the hippocampus can store and replay sequences to drive long-term
consolidation processes in the cortex. Liaw and Berger (1996)’s model of “dynamic
synapses” encodes spike-trains into spatio-temporal network patterns. Each synapse
is sensitive only to action potentials occurring in a relatively small time window, thus
“temporal chunking” occurs; this acts as a mechanism for sequential pattern recogni-
tion.
Whilst most sequence learning models focus on CA3, Granger et al. (1996) de-
veloped a model of CA1 which incorporates a (not strictly Hebbian) temporally-
dependent LTP learning rule: the amount of potentiation depends upon the order
of arrival of afferent activity to a target neuron. Together with putative asynchronous
inputs from CA3, the CA1 model can store brief simulated temporal sequences of in-
puts.
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2.4.3 Models of spatial function
Many connectionist models of hippocampal spatial processing have been based on an
auto-associative model of the hippocampus. The basic idea is that the broad memory
of a place could be evoked by aspects of the scene, such as different views or spe-
cific features (e.g., McNaughton and Morris (1987); Muller and Stead (1996); Recce
and Harris (1996); Sharp (1991)). If it can be shown that apparently non-spatial func-
tions of the hippocampus (e.g., general episodic memory or transitive inference) can
be modelled by the same networks as spatial functions, this would suggest that spa-
tial learning is not necessarily fundamentally different to other kinds of representative
learning.
Spatial theories of hippocampal function are largely founded on the existence of
so-called place cells. Most such models thus aim to capture at least some of the charac-
teristics of place cell activity.
Several theories have proposed that place cells show place fields because they are
sensitive to combinations of visual landmark cues in the environment (e.g., Zipser
(1985); Sharp (1991); Hetherington and Shapiro (1993); Shapiro and Hetherington
(1993)3). These place cell models are thus in line with O’Keefe and Nadel (1978)’s
original hypothesis that the hippocampus was required for locale navigation, which de-
pends on a combination of cues (rather than taxon or praxic navigation which depends
on a single cue or motor strategy).
However, place cells can continue to show place fields in the dark (O’Keefe (1976)),
so the hypothesis that place cells are solely driven by (visual) local view is inadequate.
Many theories rely on purported associative memory properties to complete missing
details on the basis of what is perceivable (e.g., McNaughton and Morris (1987); Rolls
(1996); Recce and Harris (1996)). However, place cells can also show place fields in
the dark even if an animal first enters an environment in the dark, although the place
fields have a tendency to drift (O’Keefe (1976); Quirk et al. (1990); Knierim et al. (1995)).
One likely possibility is that place cell activity in the dark can be driven by non-visual
sensory inputs (e.g., O’Keefe and Nadel (1978)), although some authors argue that
this would lead to large errors (e.g., Redish (1997)). Alternatively, internally generated
information such as self-motion may be used to keep track of position (and predict the
3Unlike the other associative models, Shapiro and Hetherington (1993) identify place cells with the
recurrent hidden layer of a three-layer (back-propagation of error) net, and train using supervised back-
propagation of error methods.
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next expected local view) in the absence of any external sensory cues (Wan et al. (1994);
Recce and Harris (1996)).
Some models place heavy emphasis on inputs from path integration systems, and
it has been proposed that place cell firing in the absence of sensory cues is the direct
result of path integration processes (e.g., O’Keefe (1976); Muller et al. (1991b); Mc-
Naughton et al. (1996); Redish (1999)). McNaughton and collaborators propose that
the hippocampus is an auto-associator that associates local views with movements
to predict future local views, forming a sort of “transition table” (e.g., McNaughton
(1989); McNaughton et al. (1991)). An ability to navigate in the dark thus arises by
updating place representations with self-motion information. Before the model can
show path integration abilities (and thereby the ability to navigate in the dark) in a
given environment, the environment must be explored to set up the correct associa-
tions between self-motion and local-view information.
In the Cognitive Graph theory, Muller and colleagues argue that Hebb-type cor-
relational learning along with random exploration of an environment will produce a
synaptic weight function such that the weight between two place cells is inversely pro-
portional to the overlap between their place fields (Muller et al. (1991a, 1996); Muller
and Stead (1996)). The synaptic weights thus represent the distance between place
field centres, and the connection matrix represents the topology of the space. They
argue that a graph-search algorithm could plan paths using this structure. There is
some evidence that similarly structured connections get set up after exploration (e.g.
Wilson and McNaughton (1994)), but it is difficult to see how the search algorithms
could be implemented neurally. Another proposal is that a combination of asymmet-
ric LTP and phase precession4 produces an asymmetric connection matrix in the recur-
rent connections of CA3 that can represent recently travelled routes (Blum and Abbott
(1996); Skaggs et al. (1996)); these asymmetric connections could be used to guide nav-
igation (Blum and Abbott (1996)). However, recent empirical data does not support
these hypotheses. Levy’s sequence learning model implements goal-directed navi-
gation without a search algorithm, by assuming that a goal representation (e.g., of a
source of water if an animal is thirsty) is partially activated at navigation and acts to
pull path attractors towards it (Levy (1996)).
4Phase precession is a rapid LTP-dependent experience-dependent expansion of place fields in the
direction that the animal enters a place field on route-following tasks (Mehta et al. (1997); Shen et al.
(1997)).
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An alternative proposal is that the hippocampus is the path integrator proper (Mc-
Naughton et al. (1996); Samsonovich and McNaughton (1997)). The model is based
on the cognitive graph theory (Muller et al. (1991a)). A loop between the hippocam-
pus and the subiculum is proposed to perform path integration. The cognitive graph
needs to be pre-wired into the system before an animal explores an environment. This
extension of the cognitive graph theory is known as the multi-chart model of the hip-
pocampus (each map is a “chart”).
2.4.4 Other models
Several apparently non-declarative functions are lost after hippocampal region dam-
age, such as classical conditioning tasks that involve learning about unconditioned
stimuli, configurations of stimuli, contextual information, or relationships span-
ning short-term delays (see chapter 3). Several models have addressed such non-
declarative roles of the hippocampus (e.g. Hirsh (1974); Buhusi and Schmajuk (1996);
Myers et al. (1996); Sutherland and Rudy (1989)). Most associative models of incre-
mental learning assume that the hippocampus is required for some complicated forms
of stimulus association (e.g. relational, configural or contextual), whereas the neocor-
tex is sufficient for simpler stimulus-response associations, such as those underlying
classical conditioning. A few of the models addressing non-episodic encoding are not
associative models, but incorporate multi-layer networks (e.g. for classical condition-
ing (Gluck and Myers (1997)) or attentional and configurational mechanisms (Buhusi
and Schmajuk (1996)). For example, in the Gluck and Myers model, the hippocampus
is modelled by a 3-layer feed-forward network; the “hippocampal” hidden layer rep-
resentation is used to teach the hidden layer of a “cortical” auto-encoder network. It
is currently unclear whether such nets can be trained in a biologically plausible way.
Notwithstanding, the higher proportion of non-associative models of classical condi-
tioning compared to those for episodic learning suggests that these functions may be
incompatible5. A recent paper acknowledges that the ’incremental’ functions may in
fact be based outside the hippocampus proper (Gluck et al., 2003).
Other models have been concerned with predictive differentiation in the dentate
gyrus or hippocampus proper (e.g., Levy (1985); Lynch and Granger (1992); Rolls and
5Given that classical conditioning, as modelled by Gluck and Myers, is not obligatorily
hippocampally-dependent (see chapter 3) it would hardly be surprising if episodic memory and clas-
sical conditioning required different implementations.
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Treves (1998)). This is consistent with several suggestions that the hippocampus is
involved in predicting future events such as the arrival of an unconditioned stimulus,
given current inputs. Other models have proposed that the hippocampus is respon-
sible for forming configural associations (Schmajuk and DiCarlo (1992)) or relational
representations (e.g., Buhusi and Schmajuk (1996); Hasselmo (1995); Hasselmo et al.
(1996)). Whilst relational processing could support episodic memory, it could serve
other functions too.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter I have outlined the important ideas and theories associated with the
hippocampus. Most researchers agree that the hippocampus is important for autobi-
ographical recall in humans and spatial learning in non-human animals; and that the
importance of the hippocampus in the recall of at least some tasks, wanes over time.
However, there is a lack of consensus on several key issues. There is little agreement
about the specific types of learning and memory tasks that the hippocampus is crucial
for, or about the long-term role of the hippocampus in memory recall. Few theories to
date have attempted to directly relate the nature of hippocampally-dependent tasks
to their long-term fate in the brain.
2.5.1 A note about terminology: ’episodic’ and ’semantic’ memory
Episodic and semantic memory have been defined in several different ways, initially
in terms of the nature of the information being retrieved (e.g., episodic memory refers
to memory for personally experienced events, whilst semantic memory corresponds
with knowledge of the world, Tulving (1972)), and later on increasingly in terms of
the phenomenal subjective experiences accompanying retrieval (episodic memory is
accompanied by self-knowing ’autonoetic’ consciousness that gives rise to feelings of
mental time travel, whereas semantic knowledge is accompanied by knowing ’noetic’
consciousness that gives awareness of familiarity with facts, Tulving (1983)). The
terms ’episodic’ and ’autobiographical’ are often used interchangeably, although for
some authors they have specific (and even contradictory) meanings. For example,
Kopelman and Kapur (2001) state that the term ’autobiographical memory’ is typically
used to refer to a person’s recollection of past incidents and events, whilst ’episodic’
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is a broader term including performance on certain learning tasks such as the recall
of word lists in addition to autobiographical memories; whereas Conway (2001) con-
ceives of episodic memories as traces of sensory-perceptual details of recently experi-
enced events that are of short duration (lasting less than 24-h), and autobiographical
memory as a permanent system that represents knowledge of the self. The term ’se-
mantic’ memory is usually used more consistently by authors, but that is perhaps
because it refers to such a broad range of types of information from grammar and
word meanings, though categories and relationships between objects, to the knowl-
edge about public events and famous personalities.
Clearly, episodic and semantic memory must be strictly operationally-defined if
sense is to be made of empirical data, and especially if one is to adequately describe
a theory of progressive semanticisation of memories with age (as I do in chapter 6). I
therefore return to the issue of the relationship between episodic and semantic mem-
ory in several sections in this thesis.
Chapter 3
The elusive role of the hippocampus
In this chapter I examine empirical data on the role of the hippocampus in the ac-
quisition of information. I conclude that task-dependent allocentric information and
detailed episodic information cannot be acquired at all in the absence of the hippocam-
pus. The acquisition of different types of semantic memory is impaired to different
extents, depending on how much detail is required at recall and how much exposure
there has been to information. The acquisition of associative information may be un-
affected if the information to be acquired is relatively simple. However, as learning
demands increase (such as when the information to be acquired is complex and cross-
modal, of low salience or must be acquired quickly), associative learning is more likely
to be affected by hippocampal damage. Generally, the acquisition of low-salience or
incidental information is reduced by hippocampal damage. Procedural features of
tasks such as the number of trials or stimulus-salience and the animals’ learning his-
tory are as important in determining hippocampal-dependency as the high-level fea-
tures that are typically used to describe tasks.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on elucidating the nature of tasks that require the hippocam-
pus for their acquisition. I start from the observation that ’hippocampally-dependent’
tasks can be divided into those that are obligatorily hippocampally-dependent and can-
not be acquired at all after hippocampal damage; and those whose acquisition is fa-
cilitated by an intact hippocampus and probably mediated by the hippocampus under
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normal conditions, but can be acquired to some extent after hippocampal damage.
Since such deficits are likely to depend on qualitatively different facets of hippocam-
pal function, it is important to make such a distinction for the purposes of formulating
hippocampal theories.
In this chapter I use the term “hippocampally-dependent” to refer to tasks that re-
quire the hippocampus at acquisition, irrespective of whether the dependency is tran-
sient or permanent. Empirically, this refers to tasks whose acquisition is impaired
by interference with the normal function of the hippocampus. The logically sepa-
rate question of the long-term role of the hippocampus on such tasks is addressed in
Chapters 5 and 6. Furthermore, whilst I focus on the hippocampal system there is
no intention to imply that it alone supports any of the functions discussed: different
“hippocampally-dependent” tasks are affected to varying extents by various extra-
hippocampal lesions.
3.1.1 Issues for hippocampal theories
Most dominant current theories of hippocampal function are unitary and one-
dimensional (Bannerman et al. (1999)), in that each hinges on a single central concept
that attempts to encompass all hippocampally-dependent tasks. Of course, the “sin-
gle concepts” evoked may be capable of capturing a wide range of tasks. For example,
Levy (1996) argues that conceptualising the hippocampus as a sequence learner would
unify various perspectives and predict that one-trial learning, finding short-cuts and
transverse patterning would be hippocampally-dependent. I am not making an a pri-
ori assumption that unidimensional theories are necessarily inadequate. However, it
is important to recognise that explanations do tend to be couched in terms of a single
qualitative feature by which the hippocampus differs from other areas, even though
we have no evidence that the functions of the hippocampus differ from those of other
areas in a uni-dimensional qualitative functional manner.
The main motivation for positing that some single feature distinguishes the hip-
pocampus from other areas appears to be parsimony. However, parsimony at the
expense of truth is undesirable. Electrophysiological (e.g., Jung et al. (1994)), anatom-
ical (e.g., Swanson et al. (1978); Amaral and Witter (1995)), c-fos1 activation (e.g., Vann
1Expression of the c-fos gene is an indirect correlate of increased neural activity, and is induced under
conditions of learning. Thus it can be used to detect differential brain activation, although it is not
expressed in all areas.
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et al. (2000)), lesion (e.g., Moser et al. (1995); Hock and Bunsey (1998); Richmond et al.
(1999)) and inactivation studies (e.g., Moser and Moser (1998)) all provide support
for the idea that there may be functional differences along the septotemporal axis of
the hippocampus, and there is evidence that CA1, CA3 and the dentate gyrus can be
differentially activated on certain tasks (Nitz et al. (1997); Wan et al. (1999)). These
data imply the hippocampus may be involved in several independent computational
functions and that it is unreasonable to attempt a priori to straitjacket all functions at-
tributed to the hippocampus into a single explanatory concept. Of course, it may turn
out that the hippocampus functions as a single functional unit, given the huge lon-
gitudinal interconnectivity in the hippocampus (Amaral and Witter (1995); Ishizuka
et al. (1990)).
Characterising the nature of hippocampally-dependent tasks must be the starting
point for any theory of hippocampal function. However, standard task descriptions
often omit some of the key features that determine the extent to which a task will
be hippocampally-dependent. Tasks are routinely described in terms of the type of
stimuli thought to be involved and the logical nature of the task to be learnt. Thus
a task might be described as an “allocentric spatial learning and navigation task in a
watermaze with a hidden platform”, or as an “eyeblink conditioning task using a tone
as a conditioned stimuli and a puff of air to the cornea as an unconditioned stimu-
lus”: these are high-level descriptions of tasks in that they have abstracted away from
more low-level detailed aspects of tasks, such as the salience of cues or the number of
trials. There is accumulating evidence that lower-level features of tasks (such as the
number of trials, and stimulus type and intensity) may in some cases be just as impor-
tant as higher-level abstract task features in determining whether a task is dependent
on the hippocampus. In addition, an animal’s learning history may also affect the
outcome of attempts to learn a task under given conditions. Greater consideration of
these procedural level aspects of tasks is crucial to a proper understanding of what the
hippocampus does.
The hippocampus is likely to be configured for particular kinds of information pro-
cessing which will be required to varying degrees by various different tasks, rather
than for the performance of particular logical type of task as defined by the exper-
imenter. Therefore it seems probable that a description of hippocampal function at
a low level of abstraction (say, that the hippocampus has a faster learning rate than
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other areas or is most suited to associating disparate information) would be prefer-
able to those theories that describe what the hippocampus does at a higher level (such
as allocentric spatial learning, or storing episodic memories). A “low-level” charac-
terisation of the hippocampus (say, that the hippocampus has a faster learning rate)
may underpin hippocampal dependency in many tasks that appear unrelated when
described at a higher level.
Moreover, since the high-level tasks that the hippocampus normally mediates in
different species are likely to be different because the type of information that is im-
portant to an individual or encountered by an individual varies across species, if we
are to capture any commonalities in the role of the hippocampus across species and
across individuals with different life experiences, then we are likely to need descrip-
tions and explanations in terms of lower-level functional features, rather than types of
information processed.
Any hypothetical problem with the level of description cannot explain why differ-
ent authors have reached such different conclusions about the role of the hippocam-
pus. At least in part, one (understandable) reason is that researchers simply have dif-
ferent interests and have focused on different data. Authors have tended to address or
emphasise different bodies of experimental literature, leading to many apparently in-
compatible theories of hippocampal function. In reality, these hypotheses may reflect
different functions of the hippocampus. Although these theories may successfully ac-
count for the data set they address, it is difficult to see how this approach can lead to
a broader inclusive understanding.
In sum, multiple types of constraints at several levels of description are likely
to be needed to adequately characterise the types of tasks that are hippocampally-
dependent. Procedural level features are at least as important as more abstract fea-
tures. A wide range of literature should be surveyed.
3.1.1.1 Interpreting the data
A more insidious reason for why different authors have reached such different con-
clusions about the role of the hippocampus appears to stem from conflating tasks that
show a differing severity of post-lesion impairment. For example, after hippocam-
pal damage some tasks can be performed only at chance irrespective of the training
period (e.g. the specifically allocentric aspects of spatial learning as evidenced by an-
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nulus crossings (Pearce et al. (1998); McDonald and Hong (2000)), whereas on other
tasks animals may show deficits when compared with controls after a fixed number
of learning trials, but show asymptote performance as good as controls when allowed
more training trials (e.g. arbitrary visuo-motor learning in primates Wise and Mur-
ray (1999); and some configural tasks, in rats, McDonald et al. (1997)). In both cases
– that is, on tasks that show no improvement with training and those that do – per-
formance may appear similar on many standard tests, such as immediate post-lesion
performance, performance after initial training trials, and possibly on performance
after a fixed number of trials (if there are insufficient trials to show learning in the
second group). Perhaps because of this, several authors appear to treat such tasks as
equivalently impaired after hippocampal lesion (see for example, Squire’s treatment
of semantic learning in humans and recognition memory in other animals).
In my opinion, these types of deficits must be interpreted differently for the pur-
poses of formulating hippocampal theories, because they are likely to depend on
qualitatively different facets of hippocampal function. Tasks that are performed at
chance and cannot be relearnt after hippocampal damage are “truly” hippocampally-
dependent, in that acquisition can only occur with an intact hippocampus. Those that
can be learnt or relearnt to some extent after hippocampal damage (albeit slowly) are
not obligatorily hippocampally-dependent: the acquisition of such tasks is facilitated
by an intact hippocampus, and probably depends on it in an intact brain at least ini-
tially, but can be acquired by other brain regions under duress. Of course, we must be
sure that such learning does not reflect learning by a partial hippocampus.
A priori it might be thought that hippocampally and non-hippocampally medi-
ated behaviour will necessarily be performed by a different “mechanism”. However
in some cases the hippocampus might in effect act to improve non-hippocampally
based learning (for example by providing a more quickly acquired scaffold for the
recall of information represented in the cortical regions), whilst in other cases the ’so-
lution’ found by the hippocampus and by other regions might differ. Very careful
investigations of the characteristics of learning and performance are needed to tease
apart these possibilities.
This distinction between (1) what can only be done by the hippocampus, that can-
not be compensated for, no matter how, or for how long a hippocampally-damaged
animal is trained; and (2) what the hippocampus normally does in an intact brain is
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crucial. Current theories appear to be agnostic as to whether they are addressing the
former or the latter issue (at least, I can find no paper that explicitly addresses this
issue). It seems plausible that the hippocampus has one or more computational fea-
tures that are qualitatively different even from those of other parahippocampal areas
(and wider brain structures) and which necessarily mediate performance on obliga-
torily hippocampally-dependent tasks; and other features that are only quantitatively
different, such that the rate of learning of some tasks will change after hippocampal
ablation.
3.1.1.2 Cross-species investigations of hippocampal function
There is converging evidence that the hippocampus or a homologous region plays
a role in spatial learning in many species from reptiles through birds to mammals
(Squire, 1992; Salas et al., 2003; Day, 2003); as well as playing a role in non-spatial
tasks such as reversal learning, extinction and context learning in species where this
has been tested (Day, 2003). This implies that there are functional similarities across
species, and that cross-species data could be potentially complementary. In my opin-
ion, considering data from different species might help us unmask the underlying
function of the hippocampus without getting seduced by very evident applications of
hippocampal function in a given species. For example, theories of hippocampal func-
tion in humans have tended to focus on episodic memory, whilst in rodents they have
focused on spatial abilities – this situation has undoubtedly arisen largely because of
the relative ease with which rodents’ spatial skills can be tested when compared with
more specific “what/when/where memory”, and the obviousness of general episodic
memory deficits in amnesic patients compared to their spatial deficits. In addition,
pooling data from several species might also allow us to partially compensate for em-
pirical difficulties in different species (such as the paucity of well-defined hippocam-
pal lesions in humans, and the difficulties in examining analogues of episodic memory
in non-human animals). I therefore believe that even if we wished to understand the
functions of the hippocampus in only a single species, then it would still be poten-
tially informative to consider data from other species, as this data might lead us to
a less blinkered and more rational interpretation of the data from the species under
question.
The possible evolutionary effects of differences in species-specific ecology should
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not however be ignored. Although there are similarities between the hippocampi and
hippocampal homologues of different species in terms of neural architecture, connec-
tivity and neurochemistry (indeed this is what makes them homologues), there can
be quite large differences in internal cell field structure and connectivity with other re-
gions in the brain (Clayton and Krebs (1995); Day (2003)), as well as large differences in
the wider brain. In addition, there can be large, apparently heritable inter-individual
differences in hippocampal anatomy and chemistry even within one species (e.g., Cru-
sio (1996); Lemaire et al. (1999); Zilles et al. (2000)).
It is not currently known in any detail how specific hippocampal differences be-
tween species or between individuals affects function. However, accumulating evi-
dence suggests it does. For example, the size of the hippocampus in food-storing birds
correlates well with spatial abilities (e.g., Sherry et al. (1992); hippocampal differences
in anatomy and chemistry between inbred strains of mice can have considerable con-
sequences for an animals’ behaviour (e.g., Crusio (1996); Lemaire et al. (1999); Zilles
et al. (2000)), and cyclical changes in the hippocampus of female rats correlate with
differences in spatial behaviour and memory (Desmond and Levy, 1997; Rudick and
Woolley, 2000). Furthermore, there is some evidence that hippocampal damage might
differentially affect even closely related species (Day (2003)). So, in considering data
from different species we must be aware that a) the tasks normally carried out by the
hippocampus of different species might not be the same (for example, supporting ver-
bal recall of autobiographical experience versus migratory navigation), although this
merely underlines the weakness of task-level descriptions of hippocampal function;
and b) that there might be variations in how the hippocampus of different species
carry out even the same functions.
Given our current state of knowledge and the lack of consensus about the function
of the hippocampus despite the vast amount of data available, I believe that we can
currently gain most from a rational consideration of the data available from all species.
Therefore I draw on data from a range of species (though mainly rodents and primates,
as the most detailed work has been done with these species).
3.2 Task acquisition and hippocampal dependency
In this section I investigate which tasks depend on the hippocampus for acquisition.
The discussion is divided into sections focusing on:
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1. Tasks whose acquisition is unaffected by hippocampal damage.
2. Tasks whose acquisition is facilitated by the hippocampus, so that acquisition is
impeded but not prevented by hippocampal damage.
3. Tasks whose acquisition is obligatorily hippocampally-dependent, so that acqui-
sition is completely prevented by hippocampal damage.
4. Tasks whose acquisition is inhibited by an intact hippocampus, so that hip-
pocampal damage improves performance.
Subtly different variations on tasks that are usually defined as ’the same type’ may
belong in one or more of these categories depending on the fine details of training and
testing procedures, such as whether quadrant occupancy or heading vectors are used
to assess spatial learning, and whether implicit or explicit responses are used to assess
recognition memory in humans.
The categories outlined may be useful for expositional purposes, but they mask
some crucial issues, both empirical and conceptual. One problem is the necessarily
tentative nature of the classification of “obligatory” and “facilitated” tasks when data
is limited. Categorising a task as belonging to the “obligatory” category (with ac-
quisition at chance irrespective of learning opportunities) assumes that documented
training has been sufficiently extended to rule out slowed learning, which is often not
the case. A recent study demonstrates this point well: de Hoz et al. (2003) replicated
Moser and Moser (1998)’s study of spatial learning in rats with hippocampal lesions
and found no evidence of learning after 4 trials, as reported by Moser and Moser
(1998). However, de Hoz et al. found that with further training, rats could learn this
task. I would be forced to categorise the task administered by de Hoz et al. (2003) as
facilitated by the hippocampus and the task administered by Moser and Moser (1998)
as obligatorily hippocampally-dependent. It should also be borne in mind that for
some tasks whose acquisition is facilitated by an intact hippocampus, it is difficult to
decide whether they are performed in a similar way in the presence and absence of an
intact hippocampus. This has a bearing on whether the hippocampus is merely better
at doing something that can also be done by other regions, or whether areas outside
the hippocampus compensate for a damaged hippocampus on these tasks using a dif-
ferent “method”.
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One important observation is that procedural factors (such as the number of trials
available, testing procedure, or the intensity of the stimuli on a task) can have a very
profound effect on task acquisition after hippocampal damage. In some cases, whilst
no learning may be apparent under one set of circumstances (leading to an ‘obliga-
tory” classification), slight changes in procedures allow learning to be demonstrated
(leading to a classification of “facilitated” or even “unaffected”). The classifications of
‘obligatory’, ’facilitated’ and ’no effect’ in reality fall on a continuum, and often do not
reflect categorical differences. Furthermore, within the ’facilitated’ classification itself
(of tasks whose acquisition is slowed or reduced by hippocampal damage) there is a
continuum of effect.
3.2.1 Empirical considerations
The most relevant data on which to assess the dependency of specific task acquisition
on the hippocampus is the traditional lesion/behavioural paradigm. Hippocampal
activation on a task (as recorded by electroencephalograph, evoked response poten-
tial, imaging or cell recording studies, for example) cannot be used as an index of
obligatory hippocampal involvement because activation is seen on many tasks which
are not apparently affected by hippocampal lesions2, and which presumably reflect
functions that are not essential to performance on the experimenter-defined task.
There are several well-known problems with the traditional lesion approach, some
of which are likely to be especially problematic for hippocampal studies. The most
obvious of these is that lesion studies can only tell us what the brain can do in the
absence of an area, not what that area does in an intact brain; and many of the tasks
commonly used to probe hippocampal function can be solved using several different
strategies dependent on different brain areas. Careful behavioural observation and
tests of performance are therefore required to distinguish possible contributions to a
learning task from different regions.
Another common problem with lesion studies is un-identified damage to struc-
tures other than those intended. Many tasks and functions that were once ascribed to
the hippocampus are now known to be dependent on neighbouring structures. Thus
2For example, imaging studies show hippocampal activation on tasks such as sitting with closed
eyes or visual fixation (Binder et al. (1999)), and recording studies find hippocampal complex-spike cell
activity on tasks such as random foraging (Muller et al. (1987)) and delay conditioning (Berger et al.
(1983)), none of which are hippocampally-dependent.
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in the rest of this section, I will focus on studies that use modern stereotaxic neuro-
toxic lesions which generally reduce though do not eliminate unintended damage to
surrounding areas and fibres of passage, and that use well-designed behavioural test-
ing paradigms that allow various performance factors to be teased apart. The most
pertinent data thus tend to be the more recent and better controlled studies, therefore
many much-cited “historical” studies will be omitted (where other studies exist) be-
cause the lack of specificity in lesion technique and/or testing renders them difficult
to interpret with respect to the role of the hippocampus.
3.2.1.1 Defining ’episodic’ and ’semantic’ memory
Generally speaking, a memory is usually designated to be ’episodic’ if it refers to some
details that are unique to one occasion, and ’semantic’ if it refers to factual or generic
information about the world. However, in reality most recall elicits both episodic and
semantic components. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how an episodic event (such
as losing one’s hat whilst feeding ducks in a park) could be recalled without recalling
semantic information (such as the generic appearance of ducks and the local park).
Thus I prefer to use the term episodic and semantic aspects of memory to make it clear
that I am referring specifically to traces mediating the recall of particular components
of a memory; even when the whole recalled memory may well contain both episodic
and semantic components.
Episodic aspects of a memory encode information about unique occurrences of per-
ceptual features or cognitive events, or unique co-occurrences of features or events
that might not in themselves be individually unique. So, for example, a trace that
could mediate the recall of a one particular unfamiliar goose with unique markings
could be episodic, as would the recall of a single specific time that a swan and a goose
were seen together on your local lake.
Semantic aspects of memory refer to traces that mediate the recall of information
that is common to repeated occurrences of a similar event or experience. So, for ex-
ample, a general memory of what a generic Canada goose or the local lake looks like
would depend on the recall of semantic information. Similarly, recalling the appear-
ance of a particular uniquely-identifiable goose that had been encountered many times
might come to depend on semantic recall. Of course, in humans at least, semantic in-
formation can apparently be acquired in one exposure, for example, through being
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told that “the capital of Mongolia is Ulaanbataar”. However, I would argue that this
is a learnt ability that depends on previous related learning experiences and possibly
on the development of a symbol system, and thus is not really “one-shot” learning. I
return to this is important issue in section 4.2.
One well-established way to visualise memory is as a hierarchy of linked represen-
tations (see figure 3.1). Assume that the activation of a node activates the nodes below
it. Thus the activation of the “goose” node would reactivate the nodes representing
features such as a goose’s foot, wing and colour. Such a pattern of activation would
therefore represent semantic recall. Activating the “specific visit to lake” node would
activate nodes representing the co-occurrence of a goose, a swan and the lake. Thus
the connections between that top node and the lake, swan and goose nodes could be
said to represent the episodic aspects of the memory, although the semantic “content”
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Figure 3.1: Memory can be visualised as a hierarchy of linked representations
The examples given to illustrate the terms ’episodic aspects’ and ’semantic aspects’
of memory are relatively clear-cut, which is useful for expositional purposes. How-
ever, I will show that there is a continuum between these two ’types’ of memory, rather
than a clear-cut biological category distinction. I return in detail to the relationship be-
tween episodic and semantic memory in section 4.6.2.
3.2.2 The acquisition of some tasks is unaffected by hippocampal damage
3.2.2.1 Skill learning and priming is unaffected
Initially, hippocampal amnesia was thought to affect all types of memory. How-
ever, it quickly became apparent that so-called “procedural” or skill learning tasks,
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priming and some implicit tasks are preserved in amnesia. Thus patients with hip-
pocampal damage can acquire perceptual/motor tasks such as mirror drawing (Mil-
ner (1962); Cohen and Squire (1981)), reading novel mirror-transformed words (Co-
hen and Squire, 1980), rotary pursuit (Corkin (1968)) and robot control (Shadmehr
et al. (1998)) at relatively normal rates despite denying at the start of each new practise
session that they have any familiarity with the task.
People generally have a lower perceptual identification threshold (and thus faster
reaction times) for recently experienced stimuli: this effect is known as priming. Prim-
ing is normal in amnesics if they are tested appropriately. Perceptual priming is very
long-lasting when compared to retention on standard explicit memory tasks, even in
amnesics (e.g., Cave and Squire (1992); Tulving et al. (1991)) and is sensitive to the
frequency of repetition even in people who cannot explicitly remember the stimuli
(Wiggs et al. (1997)). The relationship between priming and recognition memory is
controversial (see, for example, the discussion in Aggleton and Brown (1999) and
associated commentaries), but it seems likely that priming can at least contribute to
recognition/familiarity judgements.
3.2.2.2 Many implicit tasks are unaffected by hippocampal lesions
Implicit tests of memory for recently presented items can produce performance in am-
nesics indistinguishable to that of controls (e.g., Graf et al. (1984); Cohen and Squire
(1981); Kitchener et al. (1998)) if the retention test provides partial cuing information
(Squire, 1992). Amnesic patients can also learn novel single associations as normal in
sensitive tasks that rely on perceptual identification, especially when the information
is presented over multiple trials (Gabrieli et al. (1997); Musen and Squire (1993a,b));
and show intact implicit memory for newly formed verbal associations following sin-
gle study trials (Goshen-Gottstein et al., 2000). Amnesics can perform as well as nor-
mals on categorisation tasks such as classifying novel dot patterns or artificial gram-
mar strings, despite having chance recognition of specific exemplars (e.g., Knowlton
and Squire (1993); Squire and Knowlton (1995)).
Densely amnesic patients exhibit near normal performance on implicit sequence
learning tasks such as serial reaction time tasks, (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987; Reber
and Squire, 1994) and artificial grammar learning (Knowlton et al., 1992; Knowlton
and Squire, 1996). Several reviews have concluded that the areas that are damaged in
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medial temporal lobe amnesics and Korsakoff’s patients are not involved in sequence
learning (Curran (1995); Clegg et al. (1998), but see section 3.2.4.5).
3.2.2.3 Delay conditioning is unaffected by hippocampal lesions
In the commonly used eyeblink conditioning paradigm, a tone (the conditioned stim-
ulus or CS) is presented before an airpuff to the eye (the unconditioned stimuli or
US) – the index of learning is blinking at an appropriate time after the tone. In delay
conditioning, the CS and the US overlap; in trace conditioning, the CS terminates be-
fore the US begins. Hippocampal lesions do not impair acquisition of the basic delay
paradigm (e.g., Solomon and Moore (1975); Moyer et al. (1990)), and humans with hip-
pocampal damage are unimpaired on the delay eyeblink conditioned response task,
despite being unable to describe it (e.g., Weiskrantz and Warrington (1979); Clark and
Squire (1998)).
3.2.2.4 Recognition itself is unaffected by hippocampal damage
There is increasing acceptance that the perirhinal regions are crucial for recognition
memory (for review see Murray et al. (2000), also Meunier et al. (1996); Murray (1996)).
What role – if any – the hippocampus plays in recognition is less clear: the human neu-
ropsychological data has been used both to support the view that the hippocampus
is required for recognition memory (e.g., Squire (1992); Knowlton and Squire (1995);
Manns and Squire (1999) ) and that it is not (e.g. Eichenbaum (1994); Murray (1996);
Aggleton and Brown (1999); Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997)).
Clinically, a profound recognition deficit is often reported on various tasks in pa-
tients with MTL damage (e.g., Stark and Squire (2003)). However, recognition abilities
can be normal in patients with suspected focal hippocampal damage (for references see
Mumby (2001)), implying that the recognition deficits reported in many amnesics may
be due to extra-hippocampal damage. Clearly, given doubts about the extent of func-
tional damage in human patients, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the role of
the hippocampus from such studies. Interestingly, two groups of patients that appar-
ently have very localised hippocampal damage (those with developmental amnesia
such as Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997)’s well-known patients and others; and patients
with selective damage to the fornix (see Easton and Parker, 2003 for a review) are
unimpaired on many recognition memory tasks, including one-trial recognition for
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lists of words and non-words, and familiar and unfamiliar faces. Several studies have
also reported relatively preserved recognition memory in adult amnesic patients with
hippocampal damage despite totally impaired explicit recall of the same information
(Holdstock et al., 2002; Bastin et al., 2004).
This data suggests that the hippocampus is not needed for item recognition at
short delays, although long-term storage might benefit from hippocampal process-
ing. Several factors in addition to hidden pathology may have confounded research
on hippocampal involvement in human recognition memory. Firstly, it is possible
that recognition tasks can be mediated by recollection of the stimulus and its context
(“remembering”) which may depend on the hippocampus, and/or detecting stim-
ulus familiarity (“knowing”) which may depend on the perirhinal cortex (Mandler,
1980; Aggleton and Brown, 1999). Therefore, whether hippocampal damage leads to
measurable “recognition”impairments would depend on whether “know” responses
were sufficient to mediate a given task. Secondly, the common use of explicit verbal
tests might disadvantage amnesic patients, although a capacity for explicit responses
is not usually integral to a definition of “recognition”. A third possible confound is
that recognition memory in humans that takes place against a background of many
already-acquired memories might depend on the disambiguation of episodes, which
may depend on hippocampally-dependent scene memory (Gaffan, 1994b).
Studies of recognition memory in hippocampal monkeys are rather contradictory,
even if we disregard early studies that are undoubtedly confounded by parahip-
pocampal damage. Broadly speaking, studies show no impairments on recogni-
tion tasks such as delayed-non-match-to-sample (DNMS) or delayed-recognition-span
(DRS) tasks with short delays (up to 1 or 2 minutes), with increasing impairments at
longer delays (Zola-Morgan et al., 1992; Alvarez et al., 1995; Murray and Mishkin, 1998;
Beason-Held et al., 1999; Zola et al., 2000). Various factors could explain the specific dif-
ferences between the findings of different studies. These include 1) extra-hippocampal
damage – some lesions are likely to transect perirhinal cortex efferent fibres such as
those used in the studies of Alvarez et al. (1995) and Zola et al. (2000); 2) timing of
training – pre-operatively in Murray and Mishkin (1998) and post-operatively in Al-
varez et al. (1995); 3) the size of hippocampal lesions – larger hippocampal lesions re-
sult in less impairment at longer delays on DNMS tasks, (Murray and Mishkin, 1998;
Baxter and Murray, 2001); 4) whether the animals were removed from the apparatus
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before testing; and 5) the small number of subjects used in studies – for example, no
significant differences were reported between different lesion groups in the study of
Zola et al. (2000), but this is likely to result from a lack of power in the statistical tests3,
amongst other possibilities. The primate recognition literature is somewhat messy, but
there is little compelling reason to believe that the hippocampus is required for object
recognition per se, at least not with short delay periods. On balance, the fact that hip-
pocampally lesioned animals can be unimpaired even when tested with a “list” of 40
objects for recognition is pretty impressive (Murray and Mishkin, 1998).
Studies of rodents with hippocampal damage find little or no impairment on ob-
ject, odour and social recognition memory with possible signs of an impairment only
at longer delays (e.g., Wood et al. (1993); Mumby et al. (1996); Dudchenko et al. (2000);
Clark et al. (2001); Kogan et al. (2000), see also references in Hampson et al. (1999)).
They also show an impressive intact memory for long lists of non-spatial objects (Dud-
chenko et al. (2000)). Mumby (2001)’s meta-review of studies using DMS and DNMS
tasks to assess object recognition in rats with hippocampal formation damage con-
cluded that there was no impairment in 17/18 studies, with a possible mild impair-
ment at long delays in 2 studies. In addition, fornix lesions in both monkeys and
rats have little effect on DNMS tasks (e.g., Rothblat and Kromer (1991); Zola-Morgan
et al. (1989)). Since hippocampal and fornix lesions often (though not always) pro-
duce similar learning deficits, this is suggestive evidence that the hippocampus is not
necessarily required for DNMS tasks.
Extra-hippocampal areas appear to be able to support recognition memory in the
absence of the hippocampus. However, the hippocampus in an intact brain may nor-
mally be involved in the acquisition of the information that supports performance on
recognition tasks. After all, when the information is experienced, a subject would not
know how long information is to be retained. In accord with this, whilst rats with
hippocampal damage show normal anterograde performance on novelty preference
tasks, they show ungraded retrograde amnesia for novel objects experienced up to 7
weeks prior to lesion (Gaskin et al., 2003). Lesioning the hippocampus has sometimes
3At acquisition, the number of trials required to reach criterion performance is reported as not being
significantly different across the RF, IBO, ISCH and normal groups, although the initial trials-to-criterion
range from a low group average of 19 to a high group average of 352, with the control group averaging
118. Furthermore, the relative pattern of acquisition data (with the RF groups most impaired, and the
IBO group least) is repeated on the second administration of the task (4-9 months later) which would be
unexpected if the differences between groups were not consistent.
50 3. The elusive role of the hippocampus
been reported to increase the number of trials required to learn the DNMS task to cri-
terion in primates (e.g., Alvarez et al. (1995); Beason-Held et al. (1999)), suggesting that
the hippocampus might be involved in the normal acquisition of recognition tasks.
However, given the possibility of the lesion in Alvarez et al. (1995)’s study transecting
some perirhinal cortex fibres, and the partial nature of lesions in Beason-Held et al.
(1999)’s study, then at most this result must be considered tentative. Rodent studies
have found no significant difference in re-acquisition rates for a DNMS task compar-
ing rats with hippocampal lesions and controls (e.g., Dudchenko et al. (2000)) or when
initial acquisition is post-lesion (Clark et al. (2001)). However, it is possible that rodents
and primates differ in this respect, with recognition memory being more dependent
on the hippocampus in the primate.
In summary, I conclude that recognition tasks do not necessarily depend on the
hippocampus. In most cases, damage to the hippocampus has no effect on the recog-
nition component per se of recognition memory tasks, although it may play a role
with increasing delay, suggesting that it may be essential for maintaining recognition
information over longer periods. It is possible that the hippocampus may normally
play a role in encoding information needed for recognition tasks in an intact brain.
3.2.2.5 Some spatial information can be acquired without the hippocampus
Tasks commonly used to assess spatial learning (such as finding food on a multiply-
armed maze, escaping onto a platform in the Morris watermaze, or delayed matching-
to-place) can be solved using several different strategies. On the Morris watermaze,
for example, the platform can be found on the basis of random navigation (swimming
blindly until an animal hits the platform – as must happen on the first trial of a hidden
platform maze); praxic strategies (responses based on body movements); taxon meth-
ods (navigating on the basis on approaches to particular cues); route navigation (string-
ing praxic and taxon strategies together; spatial, locale or allocentric methods (using the
geometric arrangements of constellations of cues) ; or combinations thereof, such as
navigating randomly until a familiar view is recognised. Only the spatial/allocentric
method of navigation is impaired in animals with proscribed hippocampal damage.
However, evidence is accumulating that the hippocampus is not needed for an
animal to benefit from pretraining on standard spatial tasks such as the water-maze
and radial mazes (in rats, Kimble et al, 1982; Parron et al. (2001); Poucet et al. (1991), see
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also Moser and Moser (2000)). That is, it is not needed for the initial (usually untested)
acquisition of spatial information about the environment that is then used to support
subsequent navigation behaviour. In accord with this, Ramı́rez-Amaya et al. (1999)
reported that synaptic reorganisation in the hippocampus was not seen in animals
that were merely allowed to swim in a water-maze for a day (but only after 3 days of
training on a maze task). This suggests that the hippocampus is probably not the site of
a “cognitive map”4. Electrophysiological studies strongly support this interpretation,
as hippocampal place cell responses can change, sometimes profoundly, without any
change in the spatial lay-out of an environment (e.g., Bures et al. (1997); Jeffrey and
Anderson (2003)).
Recent studies that have similarly divorced the acquisition of spatial information it-
self from the demonstration of such information through behaviour support the idea
that learning about a spatial environment need not be hippocampally-dependent.
Hippocampal lesions have no effect on the incidental acquisition of “pure spatial infor-
mation” where learning is inferred from effects on subsequent reinforced learning: in
rats, dorsal hippocampal lesions do not eliminate conditioned place preference retar-
dation (White et al. (2003)); and hippocampal lesions (White and Wallet (2000), Gaffan
et al, 2000), and fornix or entorhinal cortex lesions (Gaffan et al. (2003)) do not prevent
normal enhancement of constant-negative learning by acquired allocentric informa-
tion5 (but see Good et al. (1998)). On the other hand, in humans, hippocampal damage
has been reported to impair even implicit learning about a 2D spatial scene (Whitlow
et al. (1995); Chun and Phelps (1999)). It remains to be determined whether this is due
4Definitions of cognitive maps (CMs) can be split into two main categories: (1) in the sense of Tolman
(1948) and O’Keefe and Nadel (1978), in which the CM is a powerful representation allowing novel
shortcut formation, amongst other things; and (2) in the sense of Gallistel (1990) in which a CM is simply
any representation of space held by an animal (Bennett (1996)). Many researchers believe that the ability
to swiftly find the position of a known platform from a new location in a maze after experience in that
maze, say, depends on a cognitive map in the first sense. However, most studies of maze learning to date
have allowed subjects to explore, see and travel through the areas from which they would subsequently
be required to start on probe trials. Studies which have controlled the extent to which a subject has had
access to the new region from which the platform must now be found, strongly suggest that accurate
transfer performance depends on prior experience viewing distal cues from that region whilst navigating
in that region (in rats, Sutherland et al. (1987), Alyan, 1994, and humans, Hamilton et al. (2002)): that is,
short-cut behaviour is unlikely to depend on a CM ’calculation’. Interestingly, it is now widely accepted
that despite their great navigational powers insects probably do not possess ’Tolman-like’ cognitive maps
either – instead they navigate using vectors, snapshots and landmark-based routes (Giurfa and Calpaldi,
1999). It may be that any true capacity for deductions based on ’cognitive map’ use is limited to modern
humans with a conception of 2-D maps, and is not a product of hippocampal function per se.
5When both egocentric and allocentric cues are available, acquisition of the allocentric incidental in-
formation is overshadowed in the lesioned animals of Gaffan et al. (2003).
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to a non-equivalence of tasks, whether it results from extra-hippocampal damage in
human amnesics, or whether it represents a difference between the species in terms of
the role of the hippocampus.
Single-unit recording studies in the hippocampus have demonstrated that a large
proportion of complex-spike cells have spatial correlates (e.g., see reviews in O’Keefe
and Nadel (1978); Muller (1996); Eichenbaum et al. (1999)). However, to deduce from
the prevalence of so-called “place cells” that the hippocampus has a specific role in
spatial processing is a non sequitur, yet many authors do so. Instead, the predomi-
nance is likely to reflect the fact we observe and operate in a 3D world.
In summary, the data available suggests that the hippocampus is not involved in
the acquisition of tasks that can solved using a non-allocentric strategy; and that it is
not needed for the passive (non-rewarded) acquisition of information about the layout
of an environment.
3.2.2.6 The acquisition of various associative tasks is relatively unaffected by hip-
pocampal damage
Patients with selective hippocampal damage show little impairment on one-trial as-
sociative learning of word-word and face-face associative learning when tested im-
plicitly (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997); Gadian et al. (2000); Holdstock et al. (2002)).
In monkeys, slowly acquired visual-visual paired associate learning is unimpaired by
hippocampal lesions (Murray et al., 1993), as is single-trial learning of object-reward
associations (i.e. learning which of two objects should be approached for a reward,
after fornix transections in monkeys, Gaffan et al. (1984); Spiegler and Mishkin (1996)).
Rats with hippocampal or perirhinal/entorhinal lesions learn slowly-acquired indi-
vidual visual-visual pairwise discriminations at a normal rates (Bunsey and Eichen-
baum, 1996; Dusek and Eichenbaum, 1997, 1998), although human amnesics are im-
paired on a similar task (Reed and Squire, 1999). Rats with hippocampal lesions are
also unimpaired at acquiring and retaining pair-wise olfactory discriminations (Jonas-
son et al., 2004). Unimpaired learning on a context-object association task after fornix
transections in monkeys has also been reported (Gaffan et al., 1984), although Ridley
and Baker (1997) reported deficits on a similar context-object tasks after fornix lesions.
Perhaps, as has been found in other situations involving learning about a context,
whether a deficit is observed depends on whether a single prominent stimulus in a
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context can form an association with the object in the context-object association test.
Together, these data suggest that the hippocampus might not be required for acquiring
associative information about similar stimuli within one modality.
Some tasks that involve learning associations between stimuli of different modal-
ities are also unaffected, for example, visual imprinting (e.g., in chicks, Horn (1998)),
conditioned taste aversion acquisition (e.g., in rats, Yamamoto (1993) and chicks, Rose
(1994)) and visuo-motor tracking (such as catching a ball, Lang and Bastian (2001)).
These tasks seem somehow less “cognitive” than most of those typically discussed in
the hippocampal literature, and may depend on pre-wired propensities that support
the learning of species-specific useful associations.
In some cases, associative information can be acquired normally in the absence of
the hippocampus only under very particular learning conditions. For example, odour-
odour mappings can be acquired in one trial by rats with hippocampal damage only
after extensive experience with similar mappings (Eichenbaum et al. (1986)); and fear
conditioning can be achieved in one trial without the hippocampus only if the stimuli
is sufficiently aversive (in rats, Izquierdo et al. (1999)). These data suggest that pre-
vious learning experiences and/or the salience of relevant stimuli determine whether
the hippocampus is required for the acquisition of particular kinds of associative in-
formation.
3.2.3 The acquisition of some tasks is impeded by hippocampal damage
For some tasks, hippocampal lesions lead to slower acquisition, but normal levels of
performance can be achieved with enough trials. The hippocampus could be said to
facilitate the acquisition of these tasks, but is not essential for it. This contrasts with
tasks in the next section (3.2.4) for which performance never improves beyond chance
after hippocampal damage, despite any amount of training.
3.2.3.1 The acquisition of semantic memory is slowed after hippocampal damage
Semantic information is acquired gradually through life, making it difficult to assess
the normal acquisition of such information after adult-onset hippocampal damage.
Cases of childhood-onset amnesia are therefore particularly informative. A study that
has recently received much attention is that of Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997), which
presented findings from three young amnesic patients who had received bilateral
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damage to the hippocampus at birth, age 4 or age 8. They were severely amnesic
for everyday events and items on 90-min delayed recall (as would be predicted given
the common view that the hippocampus is involved in episodic memory processes),
but all attended mainstream school and had attained levels of speech and language
competency, literacy and factual knowledge that were in the low-average to average
range. Thus these patients have relatively intact general semantic learning in the face
of severe episodic deficits. They were however impaired at semantic laboratory tests
such as story recall. Similar data from other young subjects with apparently circum-
scribed hippocampal lesions has been presented by Gadian et al. (2000) and Isaacs
et al. (2003), and data broadly in line with these findings obtained in young subjects
with hippocampal and probable additional damage (Ostergaard, 1987; Broman et al.,
1997; Brizzolara et al., 2003). One possible confound with these patients is a possi-
ble compensatory reorganisation of function, especially given the age of the patients.
However, an unpublished study reported in Gadian et al. (2000) found that patients
suffering anoxia in early or later childhood are indistinguishable on memory tests, and
Isaacs et al. (2003) recently reported no differences in the relative preservation of se-
mantic memory in the face of episodic impairments, suggesting that age-related com-
pensation is unlikely to be the whole story. Admittedly, a recent imaging study sug-
gests that the remaining hippocampus in at least one of Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997)’s
subjects shows a similar pattern of activity to control patients (Maguire et al., 2001b),
suggesting that it may be functionally active to some extent. However, the point here
is that relatively normal semantic information can be accumulated from the world
during life, in the face of severe episodic memory deficits.
In apparent contrast, clinically it is widely accepted that amnesics with presumed
hippocampal damage are impaired at acquiring general factual (semantic) knowl-
edge. Studies that have explicitly trained amnesics in the laboratory (e.g., Glisky
et al. (1986a,b); Shimamura and Squire (1987); Reed et al. (1997); Vargha-Khadem et al.
(1997); Holdstock et al. (2002)) have generally found none or a little semantic learn-
ing (for example, of new vocabulary, facts or stories). Any acquisition is slow and
arduous in these cases, and subjects usually show inflexibility in applying the knowl-
edge learnt. It has also been claimed that amnesic patients cannot acquire new facts
from ’real-world’ exposure. It has been reported that HM has retained almost no new
facts since his lesion (Gabrieli et al. (1988)); and amnesic patients with hippocampal
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and extra-hippocampal damage are reported to show no (Verfaellie et al., 1995) or
extremely limited (Cipolotti et al., 2001; Reed and Squire, 1998) learning of vocabu-
lary that had entered public language post-lesion. Cipolotti et al. (2001)’s patient also
showed no acquisition for post-morbidly experienced public knowledge.
However, ’real-world’ learning has been reported in a few cases: Kitchener et al.
(1998) reported post-morbid learning about public events and vocabulary in their
severely amnesic patient. Similarly, a patient (YR) with selective bilateral hippocampal
lesions showed normal discrimination of famous events and names from non-famous
ones for the post-morbid period, with some ability to categorise people according to
the nature of their fame, and a lesser ability for event categorisation (Holdstock et al.,
2002). Interestingly, O’Kane et al. (2004) has now reported clear evidence for seman-
tic learning about famous personalities in the severely amnesic HM. Therefore it may
simply be that clinical assessments have tended to refer to information to which there
has been insufficient exposure to demonstrate acquisition in the adult. Interestingly,
imaging studies support the idea that the hippocampus is selectively important for the
recall of material that has only been infrequently encountered: whilst activity in the
rhinal cortex is predictive of subsequent memory only for high frequency words, hip-
pocampal activity was predictive of memory for both high and low frequency words
(Fernandez et al., 2002).
More generally, fewer semantic details on tests or public events and knowledge of
personalities are recalled by amnesic patients (Nadel et al., 2000; Holdstock et al., 2002).
Spatial semantic information can also be lacking in detail and higher-order complex-
ity in amnesic patients. Rosenbaum et al. (2000) reported that their amnesic patient
KC was progressively more impaired as more specific information was required: his
performance at identifying oceans and continents on a map was normal, but he was
impaired at identifying cities, and even more impaired at locating geographical fea-
tures. Therefore, even when some semantic information can be acquired or retained,
it may be deficient in detail.
3.2.3.2 The acquisition of trace conditioning tasks is very much reduced by hippocam-
pal damage
Tasks which require timing across a temporal gap are impaired by hippocampal le-
sions. For example, acquisition of a trace fear conditioning task (in which a 15-s
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tone precedes a shock by a 30-s trace interval) is impaired by damage that includes
the hippocampus (McEchron et al., 1998). Similarly, Huerta et al. (2000) found that
knock-out mice that lacked NMDA receptors in CA1 were slow to acquire a trace
fear-conditioning task in which the white noise (CS) and shock (US) were separated
by 30-s, but unimpaired when the trace interval was removed. It is possible that in
this task, the gap that needs to be bridged may simply exceed the short-term memory
capacities remaining after hippocampal damage, as proposed by Nichelli for human
amnesics.
However, the hippocampus is required for bridging very small temporal gaps too.
If the trace interval exceeds ∼500-ms, hippocampal lesions severely impair the subse-
quent acquisition of eyeblink conditioned responses (e.g., Moyer et al. (1990); Solomon
et al. (1986)). Human amnesics are also impaired at trace tasks when the trace period
exceeds ∼500-ms (e.g., Clark and Squire (1998)). On well controlled studies, a lim-
ited acquisition of conditioned responses is evident after hippocampal lesions (Take-
hara et al., 2003). Therefore, I categorise trace-conditioning as a task that is merely
facilitated by an intact hippocampus, rather than obligatorily-dependent on the hip-
pocampus for acquisition, although the acquisition of trace eyeblink conditioning is
very severely impaired by hippocampal lesions. This perhaps underlines the fact that
tasks that are affected by damage to the hippocampus fall on a continuum of effect,
and that the tasks that I have separated out as ’obligatorily hippocampally-dependent’
are merely at one end of that continuum.
Why trace eyeblink conditioning is impaired after hippocampal lesions is diffi-
cult to explain, since the time interval employed (0.5-sec) is clearly within remaining
short-term memory capacities that can support recognition memory over many sec-
onds. However, eyeblink conditioning is itself particularly difficult to learn and this
may interact in some way with the hippocampus. Eyeblink responses even in intact
animals are poorly learnt when the trace interval is longer than 1 or 2-secs (Solomon
et al. (1986); Moyer et al. (1990), whereas fear heart-rate responses can be learnt with
trace intervals of up to 9-secs and shock-induced freezing responses to a tone with
30-sec delays (McEchron et al. (1998)). Similarly, trace eyeblink responses typically
take many more trials to learn than trace fear responses — 7-14 days for eyeblink
responses (Moyer et al. (1990)) compared to 1-2 days for trace fear (McEchron et al.
(1998)). Even delay eyeblink conditioning takes longer to acquire than tone-freeze con-
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ditioning, which can be learnt in one trial if the shock is sufficiently aversive (Izquierdo
et al. (1999)). It is well-known that some associations are particularly difficult for some
species to learn (e.g., a chick cannot learn to associate a tone with subsequent sickness,
but will avoid a bitter tasting bead that precedes sickness (Rose, 1994)). It is possible
that tone-eyeblink conditioning is one such association.
On trace eyeblink conditioning tasks, the performance measure is whether the CR
– the eyeblink – is emitted in a particular narrow time window after the US. There
is some evidence that different lesions affect the timing of CRs, which may be inde-
pendent of whether lesioned animals can learn to make the US-CR association. In
addition, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the procedural aspects such as cue
modality and intensity, and whether the period to be timed is filled or empty of os-
tensibly timing tasks affects the behaviour of the animal. Therefore results cannot be
interpreted solely in terms of timing processes (Buhusi and Meck (2000)) or in terms of
whether the animal can acquire the association. Hippocampally lesioned animals may
be differentially affected by some of these parameters. In accord with this, in lesioned
animals whether the CR occurs before or after the US appears to depend on the nature
of the US (O’Keefe (1999)).
In summary, the hippocampus is required for some tasks that must span tempo-
ral gaps. Trace eyeblink tasks are the most well-documented, but it is possible that
eyeblink conditioning is unusual in some way.
3.2.3.3 The acquisition of some ’cross-modal’ associative tasks is slowed by hippocam-
pal damage
Patients with hippocampal damage are impaired at learning cross-modal associations,
such as face-voice, object-location, picture-sound, and word-position associations, al-
though they can eventually show good performance with extended training (e.g.,
Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997); Mayes et al. (2001); Holdstock et al. (2002)).
As noted by Brasted et al. (2003), many studies have reported that neither hip-
pocampal or fornix lesions have a discernable effect on the learning of conditional vi-
suomotor associations in rats. However, monkeys with removal of the hippocampus
and subjacent cortex (Murray and Wise (1996); Wise and Murray (1999, 2000)) are ex-
tremely slow at acquiring visuo-motor mappings in which they must learn to make an
arbitrary movement in response to a visual stimuli, although they do eventually reach
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the same level of performance as controls. Brasted et al. (2003) reported a similar effect
(with fornix lesions) when there is no spatial component to the task and responses are
distinguished by temporal features (e.g., tapping or long presses), when more than
two visuo-motor response pairs must be acquired. Although it is difficult to precisely
compare the speed of learning in primates and rodents because the amount and na-
ture of pretraining and existing knowledge is unclear, rats typically require hundreds
or thousands of trials to acquire two conditional associations, whereas monkeys can
acquire such information in a few trials.
It is plausible that the representation of conjunctions of stimuli is stored in a dif-
ferent area to the representation of the individual elements themselves. Therefore
configural tasks can be considered to be ’cross-modal’ if the term is used to refer to
tasks that require the association of information represented in significantly different
geographical areas of the brain. The literature on the effects of hippocampal damage
on non-linear learning are mixed. Early data suggested that the hippocampus was
obligatory for learning tasks that required a configural solution, i.e. differential rein-
forcement of elements and compounds (such as negative patterning, AB−, A+, B+;
or bi-conditional learning, AB+, AC−, DB+, DC−), but accumulating data suggests
that areas outside the hippocampus mediate such learning (see Rudy and Sutherland
(1995) for a review). However, there is suggestive evidence that hippocampal lesions
slow the acquisition of a negative patterning task (AB−, A+, B+; in rats, (McDon-
ald et al., 1997)) and mildly slow the acquisition of a bi-conditional auditory/visual
discrimination task (AB+, AC−, DB+, DC−; in rats, (McDonald et al., 1997)).
Rats with either dorsal or ventral hippocampal lesions have sometimes been re-
ported to show slowed acquisition of tasks that use hunger signals as a conditioned
stimulus (e.g., Davidson and Jarrard (1993); Hock and Bunsey (1998)), although Dea-
con et al, 2001 reported no impairment on a conditional object discrimination cued by
internal state.
Honey et al. (1998) reported that rats with neurotoxic hippocampal lesions fail to
recognise (orient) when combinations of familiar cross-modal stimuli (tone or click
and constant or flashing light sequences) are rearranged, although they orient as nor-
mal when properties of the visual targets changed. However, whether this reflects
changes in normal orienting behaviour or a failure to learn the requisite association
is unknown, as the animals were not trained further to see if they could be trained to
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behave ’normally’ on this task.
Taken together, these data suggest that hippocampal damage might lead to slowed
acquisition of information about associations between stimuli of different kinds. In
accord with this idea, functional neuroimaging studies find greater hippocampal and
para-hippocampal activation on associative tasks than during the learning of single
items (Henke et al., 1997, 1999; Yonelinas et al., 2001).
3.2.4 The acquisition of some tasks is totally prevented by hippocampal damage
The tasks examined in this section can be considered to be obligatorily hippocampally-
dependent as they cannot be acquired at all after complete hippocampal damage.
3.2.4.1 Normal episodic memory depends on the hippocampus
Several studies have linked discrete human hippocampal formation lesions with an-
terograde memory impairments (e.g, Zola-Morgan et al. (1986); Kartsounis et al. (1995);
Rempel-Clower et al. (1996); Reed and Squire (1998); Kapur and Brooks (1999)6). An-
terograde amnesia (AA) typically manifests itself as a severe deficit on both exper-
imental and day-to-day memory tasks, such as recalling a list of unrelated words,
or what was eaten for breakfast, as well as remembering significant personally-
experienced events. Hippocampal patients are also widely reported to fail to orientate
themselves in space and time.
One test that is commonly administered to test anterograde memory in amnesic
patients is list-learning of words or pictures. Patients are quizzed on the list content,
as well as the ’context’ of items within it, such as whether items were from the first
or second list or presented on the right or left. In general, there is very little evidence
of such learning after hippocampal lesions, whether patients are tested hours, days or
weeks after initial acquisition. For example, one amnesic patient with hippocampal
damage showed chance performance in remembering which list correctly recognised
words were from and for the recall of the correct order of word lists; and despite
performing normally on a forced-choice word pair recognition task, was at chance
in recognising the original order of presentation of items in the pairs (Mayes et al.,
6Since many cases of non-surgical hippocampal damage arise from anoxia, and there is evidence
that anoxia can result in “invisible”, but functionally relevant extra-hippocampal damage (Mumby et al.
(1996)) there remains the possibility that even patients with apparently circumscribed damage at post
mortem have sustained extra-hippocampal damage.
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2001; Holdstock et al., 2002). Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997)’s well-known patients are
similarly impaired.
The majority of formal memory studies of personally experienced events probe
memories that have been acquired years or even decades before the test date. There-
fore the hippocampus’ possible role in the initial acquisition of information (the topic
of this chapter) and its long-term maintenance (Chapters 5 & 6) is confounded in much
of the available data. However, for memories of all ages, it is the most specific details
of memories that appear particularly affected by hippocampal damage. For exam-
ple, in Oxbury et al. (1997)’s study, the patient developed severe AA combined with
16-months RA for autobiographical information, with a “patchy RA for earlier years
mainly for sequencing and detail of events” after a series of convulsions that appar-
ently destroyed the remaining hippocampus7. Sequencing and detailed information is
of course exactly what distinguishes event-specific episodic information from generic
semantic information or semanticised ’episodic’ information. Similarly, one of the
subjects in Kapur and Brooks (1999)’s study apparently confused places that he had
visited alone with those he had visited with his wife during the period of RA. Again,
it is the more specific features (“who with?”) that are missing, not the semantic infor-
mation (“I visited place X”). Patient KS (Kitchener et al. (1998)) was aware that his son
had been accidentally shot in the eye, but did not know how, when or where the event
had happened, or even if he had been present (he had). Therefore whilst episodic-like
information can be recalled after hippocampal damage, it is deficient in important
details and has the flavour of semantic information.
List learning and the recall of item context is widely assumed to be analogous to
the recall of personally experienced memories. However, these tests of information
are widely different in several ways, such as the typical retention period (minutes,
hours or possibly weeks on list-learning tasks; possibly months, but usually years and
decades for autobiographical recall); complexity of the context information; and the
significance of the information to the individual. As I discuss in the next chapter,
all of these factors play a role in determining the importance of the hippocampus in
the acquisition of information. Furthermore, Gilboa et al. (2004) has recently shown
that the functional anatomy of list recall and autobiographical recall is significantly
7The patient had previously had a left temporal lobectomy, which led to a mild verbal memory im-
pairment. A later set of convulsions apparently led to atrophy of the right hippocampus (with sparing
of the right EC, right PHG and rest of right temporal lobe).
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different. Care should therefore be exercised in extrapolating from list-learning events
in the laboratory to real-world autobiographical events.
To date, most studies with non-human animals have been unable to demonstrate
learning that is analogous to human episodic memory (Griffiths et al., 1999). To do so
they would have to demonstrate that performance depended on the recall of specific
detailed experiences (“remembering”), rather than on, say, simple familiarity for par-
ticular items or responses (“knowing”). Several tasks that were once assumed to as-
sess the same memory systems as those lost in hippocampal amnesia (such as DNMS
tasks; object-in-place tasks, Gaffan (1994b); object-in-scene tasks, Gaffan and Parker
(1996); Murray and Mishkin (1998)) are typically learnt over several trials. There-
fore (amongst other confounding factors) the animals may be depending on trial-non-
specific information (Griffiths et al., 1999), and acquisition could not be considered
analogous to episodic information as usually defined. Griffiths and colleagues pro-
pose that food-storing behaviour that requires memory for the location of the cache,
the identity of the food in the cache and when it was cached, and whether the cache
has been emptied (e.g., in scrub jays, Clayton and Dickinson (1998), see review in
Griffiths et al. (1999)) does provide evidence for episodic-like memory in animal. This
is very reminiscent of Tulving (1972)’s original definition of “episodic” memory as
providing information about the what, where and when of an event. In accord with this,
interference with the hippocampus in food-storing birds disrupts spatial memory for
the location of food (Shiflett et al., 2003).
In sum, the hippocampus appears to be particularly important for the storage
and/or recall of typical detailed episodic or autobiographical information.
3.2.4.2 The use of allocentric spatial information is prevented by hippocampal damage
Morris et al. (1982) first reported that hippocampal lesions led to a pattern of impaired
allocentric navigation and preserved cue- and response-based navigation. This find-
ing has subsequently been replicated many times (e.g., in rats, Morris et al. (1990); Cho
et al. (1999); Czurkó et al. (1997), and birds, Bingham et al. (1990); Ioalè et al. (2000)).
Damage to the dorsal hippocampus is sufficient to produce similar deficits (e.g., Ban-
nerman et al. (1999); Moser et al. (1995); Silva et al. (1998), although see de Hoz (2000)).
Deficits after hippocampal lesions which can most easily be explained by the impaired
use of allocentric information are also found on disparate tasks such as the lattice maze
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(Okaichi, 1996); radial arm water maze (Diamond et al. (1999)); and dry radial arm
mazes (Hunt et al. (1994)).
Closer investigation shows that hippocampal animals are more likely to be im-
paired when the reward site changes frequently so that new locations have to be con-
tinuously learnt, than if the reward site is held constant. Thus hippocampal animals
are particularly impaired when the correct arm on a 8-arm radial maze task varies
from trial to trial (e.g., Olton & Shapiro (1978); Hunt et al. (1994)); or when the plat-
form position (e.g., Steele and Morris (1999)) or start position (Eichenbaum et al., 1990;
Compton et al., 1997; McDonald and Hong, 2000) in a water-maze changes from one
set of trials to the next. This makes sense only if the role of the hippocampus is to
use spatial information or store ongoing information, rather than merely to form a
’map’, as the spatial environment has not changed on these tasks. Similarly, although
the map would be the same, damage to the hippocampus leads to deficits when the
positions that must be distinguished are made more similar, for example, by being
closer together (in rats, McDonald and White (1995); Gilbert et al. (1998); and mice,
Etchamendy et al. (2003)). In accord with this, tasks that specifically require objects
to be associated with particular locations are impaired after hippocampal damage
(in rats, Sziklas and Petrides (2002)). Data from recording studies of hippocampal
complex-spike cells also strongly supports the idea that these cells record associa-
tive information beyond spatial information: direction of travel (Markus et al., 1994;
Gothard et al., 1996), task information (Markus et al., 1995; Wiener et al., 1989; Eichen-
baum et al., 1994; Wood et al., 2000), and changing rewards (Breese et al., 1989; Gothard
et al., 1996; Wood et al., 1999), for example, have all been shown to affect CS cells’ firing
rates.
Hippocampal rats often significantly improve their performance with time on
many apparently “allocentric” tasks, and merely take more trials than controls to
reach criterion (e.g., Eichenbaum et al. (1990); Compton et al. (1997)). However, such
performance is only observed when relatively insensitive measures of learning are
used, and when tasks can be performed to some extent on the basis of non-allocentric
strategies. If quadrant occupancy on a water-maze or arm choice on a multi-armed
maze is used as the dependent variable then animals merely require increased trials
to obtain criterion performance, because less accurate non-allocentric strategies can
support performance on these measures. Probe trials suggest that any improvements
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that occur are due to learning the procedural aspects of the task, cue-based strategies
based on prominent olfactory, auditory or visual cues (e.g., Morris et al. (1982)), utilisa-
tion of odour trails (Means et al. (1992)), response strategies (e.g., Packard et al. (1989))
and/or increasingly accurate path integration strategies (e.g., Alyan and McNaughton
(1999)). When more subtle tests of allocentric learning such as annulus crossings are
used, chance asymptote performance is seen.
The data discussed in section 3.2.2.5 suggests that the hippocampus is not needed
to form a representation of the spatial environment per se. One key difference between
the tasks discussed in that section and the standard allocentric tasks discussed here, is
that here the animals are required to perform a particular learnt response to demon-
strate acquisition of spatial information. An alternative interpretation is that the hip-
pocampus controls the motor/navigation processes themselves – Whishaw et al. (1995)
suggested that the hippocampus might be responsible for “getting there as opposed
to knowing where”. However, this seems unlikely as animals are usually not impaired
with respect to controls on the first trial of a spatial task suggesting that the deficit is in
acquiring information, rather than in motor abilities. It seems more plausible that the
hippocampus is needed to represent associations between what is present, happens
or should be done at different places in an environment (which may be episodic or
stable), with the representation of that environment.
Humans with hippocampal damage also show deficits on spatial tasks, particu-
larly in memory for allocentric spatial information (Holdstock et al., 2000; Burgess
et al., 2001; Kessels et al., 2001). A similar pattern of impairments is seen in remem-
bering neighbourhoods, both real and virtual. Amnesic patients may remember the
broad gist of both real and virtual environments, but are typically unable to be specific
about detailed items in the environment (Rosenbaum et al., 2000).
As would be predicted if the hippocampus plays an important role in allocentric
navigation, functional imaging studies find specific activation of the hippocampus
on tests that tax topographical memory (e.g., recalling spatial routes, Maguire et al.
(1997); recalling landmarks or locations, Maguire et al. (1997); Aguirre and D’Esposito
(1997), mental navigation, Ghaem et al. (1997); performing an immersive virtual nav-
igation task, Maguire et al. (1998a); or recalling environmental knowledge, Aguirre
and D’Esposito (1997)). Interestingly, c-fos imaging studies have shown hippocampal
activation proportional to the allocentric spatial demands of a radial maze task (Vann
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et al. (2000)).
In conclusion, the hippocampus is implicated in associating allocentric informa-
tion with what should be done, or what is present, at particular points in an environ-
ment.
3.2.4.3 “Normal behaviour” may depend on the hippocampus
Lesions to various components of the hippocampal formation and their interconnec-
tions can cause spontaneous hyperactivity in both familiar and novel environments
in rodents (e.g., in rats, Douglas and Isaacson (1964); O’Keefe and Nadel (1978);
Olton et al. (1979); Whishaw and Jarrard (1995); Cassel et al. (1998) and mice, Fran-
kland et al. (1998)). Hippocampally-damaged animals also tend to show stereotypical
motor behaviour in some circumstances (O’Keefe and Nadel (1978), p240); and can
show changes in their behavioural repertoire such as reduced rearing and increases
in running around the perimeter of enclosures (Harley and Martin, 1999); changes
in exploratory behaviour (Whishaw and Jarrard, 1995; Save et al., 1992a,b); changes
in object marking (Harley and Martin, 1999); and changes in eating patterns (Clifton
et al., 1998). Exploratory differences between controls and hippocampals are generally
exacerbated under novel conditions (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978); and lesions enhance
stress and startle responses to unexpected or aversive events (Anagnostaras et al.,
1999). The hippocampus may also be directly involved in regulating hormones, such
as those affecting the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenal axis (e.g., Lathe (2000); Lemaire
et al. (1999)) which might affect general behaviour by changing baseline physiological
stress hormones.
Without further information it is difficult to interpret such post-lesion changes in
terms of a cognitive theory, although O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) proposed that all
such changes reflect impaired spatial novelty processing. These changes in activity
may confound typical tests of “pure” problem solving ability that involve, say, de-
layed responses or performance measurements that depend on an animals’ rate or
speed of responding. Therefore in this chapter emphasis is placed on studies that
have attempted to control for these factors (for example, by measuring heading vec-
tor rather than speed to reach platform in a water-maze, or comparing response rates
to the new baseline of activity). It has been proposed that hyperactivity underlies
many hippocampus lesion-induced deficits. However this cannot be the whole story:
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whilst fornix lesioned rats are initially (e.g., 15-d after lesion) significantly more ac-
tive (and more spatially impaired) than hippocampally-lesioned rats (Whishaw and
Jarrard (1995)), after a 4.5-month recovery period, both groups are equally active, but
the hippocampal group is more impaired on the radial maze (whilst both are equally
impaired on the Morris water-maze, Cassel et al. (1998)). Therefore hyperactivity can
be divorced from task performance.
The visual paired-comparison (VPC) task assesses recognition abilities by assess-
ing spontaneous novelty preferences. VPC studies consistently show that hippocam-
pal damage leads to a decreased preference for looking at new stimuli after short de-
lays (in humans, McKee and Squire (1993); and monkeys, Bachevalier et al. (1999);
Zola et al. (2000), although Gaskin et al. (2003) has reported no impairment in rats on
a novelty-preference paradigm which depends on rats’ natural propensity to explore
novel objects). Thus deficits on the VPC task do seem more profound than that of
other recognition tasks after hippocampal lesions (see section 3.2.2.4). Interestingly,
Baxter and Murray (2001)’s meta-analysis of the extant studies of recognition memory
in monkeys strongly suggests that VPC and DNMS tasks dissociate in terms of hip-
pocampal dependence, with greater hippocampal damage associated with increasing
deficits on the VPC tasks, but with less impairment on the DNMS task. Given the con-
clusions of section 3.2.2.4, it seems likely that it is not the recognition component of
the VPC task that is hippocampally-dependent, but perhaps the “natural” untrained
motivation to explore. In DNMS tasks, animals are trained to make certain responses.
It is currently unknown whether animals on the VPC task can be trained to follow a
’rule’ to orientate and respond to the novel item.
3.2.4.4 Transverse patterning may depend on the hippocampus
Transverse patterning tasks (A+ vs B−, B+ vs C−) are sensitive to hippocampal dam-
age. Close to chance performance is seen on the configural stage despite relatively
normal learning of the non-configural components (in rats, Alvarado and Rudy (1995,
1993) and humans, Rickard and Grafman (1998)). This implies that information is
represented differently in the absence of a hippocampus.
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3.2.4.5 Tasks that depend on explicit sequence information are performed at chance
after hippocampal lesions
Although amnesic patients can show relatively normal levels of implicit sequence
learning (see section 3.2.2.2), more subtle testing on those tasks reveals that the pa-
tients do not acquire higher order information as well as controls (Curran (1997); Hop-
kins et al. (2004)). Many amnesic patients show chance knowledge of the correct order
of word lists, even when recognition tests are used (Mayes et al., 2001; Holdstock et al.,
2002).
Non-human animals may also be impaired on true sequence learning. For exam-
ple, the performance of hippocampally-lesioned monkeys on a delayed-recognition
span tasks is not improved by repeated sequences, in contrast to controls (Beason-
Held et al. (1999) but see Murray and Mishkin (1998)). Like humans, rats have been
shown to implicitly acquire sequence information, but cannot use this information ex-
plicitly (Kesner et al., 2002; Hopkins et al., 2004). Honey et al. (1998) also reported that
rats with neurotoxic hippocampal lesions fail to orient when combinations of familiar
cross-modal stimuli (tone or click and constant or flashing light sequences) are rear-
ranged, although they orient as normal when properties of the visual targets changed.
However, without further information it is unclear whether this results from deficits
in sequence learning, factors such as the cross-modal nature of the information to be
associated, or the fact that learning is indexed by an orienting response.
3.2.5 The acquisition of a few tasks is improved by hippocampal damage
3.2.5.1 Learning egocentric responses is enhanced by hippocampal damage
On some tasks, more than one learning/memory system in the brain can provide a
solution. For example, many spatial tasks can be solved either by learning to make
particular egocentric body turns (which would depend on the caudate putamen) or
by allocentric navigation (which requires the hippocampus). Whether the caudate
or hippocampal strategy dominates usually depends on the amount of training and
the time elapsed since beginning training. However, inactivation of the hippocam-
pus results in caudate-dependent response learning being seen at all stages in training
(Packard and McGaugh (1996); Shroeder et al. (2002)), thereby speeding the develop-
ment of a reponse strategy. The acquisition of several other tasks can be speeded by
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hippocampal lesions. These include performance on a two-way active avoidance task
that requires the animal to return to a place in which it has been shocked (O’Keefe and
Nadel (1978)), and a win-stay radial maze task which requires the animal to revisit the
area from which it has removed food in order to receive another food reward (McDon-
ald and White (1993); Packard et al. (1989)). This suggests that the hippocampus and
other memory/learning systems may sometimes interact competitively.
The fact that the hippocampus inhibits the acquisition or expression of information
in other regions is very important. I examine the question of competition between the
hippocampus and other memory systems in detail in section 6.5.
3.2.5.2 Some tasks may be performed faster after hippocampal damage
Fornix and ventral hippocampus lesioned rats have been shown to be superior on
some measures of learning (such as the latency to find a platform, Bannerman et al.
(1999)). This appears to be dependent on lesion-induced hyperactivity and increased
swim speed under stress (for more information see section 3.2.4.3).
3.3 Summary and conclusions
The data discussed in this chapter clearly shows that the acquisition of different types
of tasks, including those that are traditionally considered to be ’hippocampally de-
pendent’ are differentially affected by hippocampal damage. Several broad conclu-
sions about the effect of hippocampal damage on the acquisition of information can
be drawn:
Skill learning (e.g., mirror drawing, rotary pursuit) is generally unimpaired by hip-
pocampal lesions. However, conditional visuo-motor learning in which subjects must
learn to perform an arbitrary motor movement in response to a visual stimuli is sig-
nificantly slowed after hippocampal lesions. This interesting finding implies that the
acquisition of information that is not predictable or similar to what has gone before
might be particularly dependent on the hippocampus.
Perceptual priming is normal after hippocampal damage. If anything, hippocam-
pal amnesic patients are more affected by changes in the perceptual features of items
than control subjects, suggesting that the hippocampus may usually allow stimuli to
be processed in terms of higher order information. Implicit learning on tasks such as
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word-stem completion, categorisation and sequence learning is generally unimpaired
after hippocampal lesions, although higher-order information may not be acquired
normally. Implicit tests of complex semantic information sometimes reveals relatively
well preserved memory compared to explicit tests. This suggests that part of the prob-
lem after hippocampal damage may be in accessing at least partially intact memories,
rather than due to a complete destruction of stored components of a memory.
Recognition abilities themselves are not usually affected by discrete and complete
hippocampal damage, although partial hippocampal damage can paradoxically lead
to greater deficits. It is possible that delayed recognition memory might be poorer
after hippocampal damage, but the data is currently equivocal. The hippocampus
may normally play a role in the acquisition of recognition memory, even if it is not
essential.
Associative learning about stimuli in the same sensory modality is often unaffected
by hippocampal damage (e.g., learning odour-odour or visual-visual paired asso-
ciates). These tasks are often acquired slowly. Tasks that depend on associating in-
formation from different modalities show mixed effects after hippocampal damage.
The acquisition of cross-modal tasks such as arbitrary visuo-motor learning, learning
face-voice or picture-sound associations is often slowed. However, the acquisition
of some less ’cognitive’ species-specific associative learning tasks (e.g., conditioned
taste aversion learning or visual imprinting) is unaffected by hippocampal damage.
Hippocampal damage also leads to deficits in associating supra-modal spatial or tem-
poral information with other information. The hippocampus therefore becomes more
important for the acquisition of associative information when associations must be
made between more diverse types of information.
The hippocampus does not seem to be required for the formation of a spatial repre-
sentation of the environment per se; but navigation or other behaviour based on allo-
centric spatial representations, or on the arrangement of spatial stimuli in a scene, is
totally prevented by hippocampal lesions. The hippocampus therefore appears to be
necessary for learning what should be done at particular regions in an environment
or scene.
Tasks that are best served by ego-centric strategies may be acquired faster after hip-
pocampal lesions, which suggests that the hippocampus may initially suppress learn-
ing in that system.
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The acquisition of tasks which depend on associating information across a tempo-
ral gap (e.g., trace fear responses, trace eyeblink conditioning) is completely or very
severely impaired by hippocampal damage. Subjects with hippocampal damage also
appear unable to remember sequence information, or acquire implicit high-order se-
quence information even when training is extended. Therefore, the hippocampus may
play a major role in representing high-order sequence information, and/or associating
supra-modal temporal and sequence information with behaviour.
Normal detailed anterograde episodic memories are rarely evident after hippocam-
pal damage. Performance on memory tasks such as remembering a list of words or
a story are also severely impaired in amnesic patients. With very extended day-to-
day exposure over years or decades, new generic semantic information about the world
(e.g., new vocabulary, world events) can be acquired in patients with hippocampal
damage, although detailed information may be omitted. Explicit training on new se-
mantic information in a laboratory situation can lead very slowly and arduously to
the acquisition of a little new semantic information, but any information acquired in
this way is often very inflexible and quickly lost. Such data suggests that the acquisi-
tion of declarative information after hippocampal damage is sensitive to the degree of
repetition of information: one-off episodic information cannot be acquired, whereas
semantic information can be acquired after very extensive exposure. There is some
indication that detailed information is most affected by hippocampal damage.
There is some evidence that the incidental acquisition of information (such as that
involved in episodic learning or acquiring contextual information) is more affected by
hippocampal damage than the acquisition of knowledge about information that is the
central focus of attention. Furthermore, in the absence of the hippocampus, informa-
tion can sometimes only be acquired when stimuli are more prominent than would
be required when the hippocampus is intact (for example, one-trial fear-conditioning
to an object can be achieved without the hippocampus only if the shock is sufficiently
strong). The hippocampus may therefore be more important than other areas for ac-
quiring information that does not appear to be of great importance when it was expe-
rienced.
“Untrained behaviour” such as a tendency to orient to novel items or to make infer-
ences about the relationships between stimulus pairs which have not been presented
together, may be disrupted after hippocampal damage. There has been relatively lit-
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tle exploration of this issue to date, and it is difficult to explore experimentally. One
interpretation of these findings is that ’natural behavioural propensities’ may be dis-
rupted after hippocampal damage. Alternatively, in the absence of the hippocampus,
information might be represented differently and in a way that impedes the discovery
of higher order associations within acquired information.
In general, the hippocampi of different species appear to perform a largely similar
functional role, in that damage to the hippocampus causes deficits on similar types of
tasks in different species, when analogous tests have been devised. However, dam-
age focused on the hippocampus has been reported to lead to deficits for primates but
not rodents on a few apparently similar tasks (e.g., some recognition and conditional
motor learning tasks). This may reflect the relative ease with which intra-regional con-
nections can be made in the smaller-brained rodents compared to primates. Brain size
increases as we ascend the phylogenetic scale, with the number of possible connec-
tions between neurons increasing exponentially as neuron number increases. Larger
brains may be associated with increased cortical specialisation and reduced connec-
tivity between regions (Murre and Sturdy, 1996; Schoenemann, 2001). Therefore if the
role of the hippocampus is to allow the formation of associations between information
that cannot be easily represented by cortico-cortical connections, we might expect it to
be relatively more important for the fast acquisition of complex information in species
with larger brains. Of course, many other factors must be considered, too, as differ-
ent species may acquire apparently equivalent tasks by different mechanisms, and at
massively different rates.
Table 3.3 summarises the effects of hippocampal damage on task acquisition.
3.3.1 The nature of hippocampally-dependent tasks
I conclude that hippocampal damage leads to characteristically different effects on the
acquisition of different groups of tasks. Learning cannot be demonstrated at all on
tasks that use spatial or temporal relational information, although some spatial and
temporal information can be acquired. Memory for detailed information is so impov-
erished that in effect few real episodic memories can be demonstrated. Different types
of semantic tasks are impaired in proportion to their dependence on detailed informa-
tion, or the amount of exposure to information. The acquisition of semantic informa-
tion can be relatively normal after extended lifetime exposure, but laboratory-based
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Acquisition Unaffected Slowed or reduced acquisition
• Learning responses to single cues • Context learning based on single promi-
nent cues
• Associating stimuli within same modal-
ity
• Associating stimuli of different modali-
ties
• Some one-trial cross-modal associations
(e.g conditioned taste aversion, visual im-
printing)
• Tasks that are sufficiently aversive (e.g.
fear conditioning with strong shock)
• Low salience information
• Priming • Acquisition of (non-sensori-percep-tual)
event & fact details
• Well-cued implicit tasks • Incidental learning
• Some slowly acquired tasks (e.g. cate-
gorisation and grammar-learning)
• Semantic information
• Basic timing of periods • Behaving in response to temporal infor-
mation (e.g. trace conditioning, explicit
use of sequence info)
• Recognition memory (short delay)
• Skill learning
No acquisition Improved acquisition
• Behaving in reponse to allocentric spatial
layout
• Egocentric strategies
• Normal detailed episodic memory • (Reaction speed often faster)
• Some material that is tested explicitly
• Tasks that rely on ’natural behaviour’
• Tasks that depend on specific representa-
tions
Table 3.1: Summary of the effects of hippocampal damage on task acquisition.
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semantic learning is very much impaired, even when trials are extended over several
weeks. The acquisition of information about associations between stimuli from differ-
ent modalities is often reduced or prevented, whilst associative learning within one
modality apparently proceeds as normal after hippocampal damage. The acquisition
of low-salience or incidental information is also affected by hippocampal damage.
Tasks that are often considered to be hippocampally-dependent differ fundamen-
tally in their degree of dependence on the hippocampus. Under given conditions
some tasks are obligatorily hippocampally-dependent and only the hippocampus can
form a viable trace that can mediate recall; whereas others are merely facilitated by
hippocampal activity as the hippocampus is merely faster or better at forming traces
than other areas. On these latter tasks, changing the training type, length or intensity
can affect the degree of deficit seen after hippocampal damage. It seems reasonable
therefore to assume that there are both quantitative and qualitative differences in the
learning abilities of the hippocampus and extra-hippocampal areas. In the next chap-





In this chapter I explore the features of a task that make it hippocampally-dependent.
In general, tasks are most likely to require the hippocampus for acquisition if they rely
on the rapid acquisition of information, or if the information to be acquired is highly
complex, unfamiliar or of low salience. The presence of any one of these features alone
is not sufficient to obligatorily implicate the hippocampus in acquisition. Instead, it
is the combination of these factors, taking into account their individual notional posi-
tions on a scale of severity, that determines hippocampal dependency. All other things
being equal, tasks that are learnt very fast, or involve the acquisition of low salience
or high complexity information are likely to require the hippocampus, whereas tasks
that score low are not. Tasks with intermediate scores can be at least partially ac-
quired by regions outside the hippocampus under normal conditions, although the
hippocampus is likely to mediate their performance in an intact brain. Whether the
hippocampus is necessary for normal performance in such cases will depend on the
specific conditions of learning and testing. The acquisition of task-dependent supra-
modal information is however always dependent on the hippocampus; it can be seen
as representing the extreme point on a scale of complexity.
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4.1 Introduction
The rapidity of hippocampal learning and the highly convergent inputs to the hip-
pocampus are widely considered to be key factors underlying the learning capacities
of the hippocampus. However, the data reviewed in the previous chapter shows that
neither the speed of learning nor a requirement for complex associative learning alone
determines the involvement of the hippocampus. This chapter therefore refines and
extends these approaches to understanding hippocampal function.
I start this chapter by outlining what could be called the ’consensus’ view of neu-
robiology relating to memory:
1. The brain consists of relatively independent systems that process different types
of information. All (or nearly all) such systems contain plasticity mechanisms
which modify operations by experience – i.e. all (most) regions store memories.
Multiple such learning systems can be activated simultaneously and in parallel
on different learning tasks, each performing different operations with a subset
of ’active’ data.
2. Perceptual (’lower’) areas are arranged by modality and are relatively self-
contained. Increasingly diverse types of information converge at progressively
higher levels of the brain, through uni-modal, multi-modal, and associational
cortices to the medial temporal areas.
3. Some kind of Hebbian learning scheme is generally assumed, whereby the
strength of connections between neurones, and internal mechanisms within neu-
rones, can change progressively as a function of their coincident activity. Such
changes represent memory.
4. The type of memory stored in an area is likely to be the same as that which is
processed there.
Interestingly, even these very simple and widely accepted ideas about memory
systems often go against the grain of popular consolidation views about hippocampal
function, in which the hippocampus is the ‘gateway’ for storage of information out-
with the hippocampus, and information is initially stored only in the hippocampus.
In terms of the hippocampus, it is widely accepted that:
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1. The hippocampus is one of the areas of the brain that receives information from
the widest range of sources.
2. The hippocampus is capable of more rapid learning than other brain regions.
3. The structure of the hippocampus means that it is more able than other areas
to represent conjunctions between different types of information: hippocampal
complex-spike cells each receive inputs from a wide range of sources, and are
massively inter-connected.
4. Pattern separation is likely to occur most strongly in the hippocampus, so that
traces for similar events would be expected to overlap less there than in other
areas which are arranged more topographically.
Taken together, if we assume that the hippocampus is not fundamentally different
to other areas (although it may differ quantitatively in speed of learning or degree of
convergence, say), this implies that a basic framework for understanding the relation-
ship between memory in the hippocampus and wider brain areas might be as follows.
Presentation of similar events causes largely overlapping activity in areas outwith the
hippocampus, and less overlapped activity in the hippocampus. Fast and strong en-
coding in the hippocampus allows the robust storage of traces of individual events,
which can support the recall of individual traces when cued appropriately, even af-
ter only one or a few encounters. In the cortex, weaker event encoding leads to less
robust traces for each event, which are likely to be too weak to successfully mediate
recall. However, the parts of a trace that overlap in cortical areas on re-experiencing
similar events or items will slowly potentiate, so that in effect a robust representation
of a generic item or event, shorn of its “episodic” (specific event) information might
eventually become available for recall.
Such a scheme could, for example, explain why the hippocampus might be re-
quired for the rapid storage of complex episodic memories, and how the hippocam-
pus could support “episodized” semantic recall after damage to semantic areas. Sim-
ilarly, it would explain how semantic information could get extracted from repeated
exposures to a learning event, why specific event recall tends to become semanticised
over time, and how semantic learning can proceed in the absence of the hippocampus.
However, this basic framework cannot adequately capture data the complex findings
discussed in the previous chapter.
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The hippocampus’ capacity for rapid learning does not really tell us what tasks
should be hippocampally-dependent, although it would imply that tasks that need
to be learnt quickly are more likely to be hippocampally-dependent than those that
are not. In fact, several tasks that can be acquired in one trial are not hippocampally-
dependent, so a capacity for fast learning cannot be the only feature that distinguishes
hippocampal learning from that of other areas. Conversely, some slowly acquired
tasks (e.g., transverse patterning and eye-blink conditioning) generally cannot be ac-
quired after hippocampal lesions.
Other theories have emphasised the role of the hippocampus as a convergence
zone for information from many brain regions (e.g., Teyler and Discenna (1986);
Damasio (1989b); Milner (1989); Alvarez and Squire (1994); Murre (1996)). In such
theories, the hippocampus is usually required to form traces that bind incoming cross-
modal information together, when this cannot be stored in a single neocortical module.
These approaches have been criticised for being under-constrained and merely post-
poning a characterisation of the role of the hippocampus until the nature of stimulus
processing in the cortical modules is better understood (O’Keefe, 1999). Certainly the
hypothesis that the hippocampus is required for the formation of associations per se
does not explain why some apparently cross-modal tasks (e.g. rotary pursuit, condi-
tioned taste-aversion) are not impaired after hippocampal lesions, nor would it predict
that, say, incidental (but not contingent) learning and trace (but not delay) condition-
ing would be impaired. From an anatomical point of view too it would be surprising
if the hippocampus was the only place capable of cross-modal associative learning:
basic sensory information from different modalities appears to be fully integrated by
the tertiary association cortices, and certainly by the entorhinal cortex. Thus general
associative theories of hippocampal function are also in need of refinement.
In the following sections I discuss the factors inherent to tasks that determine how
important the hippocampus is likely to be for the acquisition of that task. I conclude
that a coherent explanation of why particular tasks are hippocampally-dependent re-
quires a consideration of the combined effect of several factors, including the speed
of learning and the complexity of the information to be acquired; but also the salience
and novelty of the information, and its dependence on the default representational
characteristics of the hippocampus.
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4.2 Speed of learning
There is much evidence to support the idea that the hippocampus is particularly im-
portant for the rapid acquisition of information. On many tasks the primary deficit of
hippocampally-damaged animals is slowed acquisition, so that if animals are tested
after the number of trials at which control subjects reach asymptote performance, they
are impaired. Such tasks include arbitrary visuo-motor mappings (e.g., Murray and
Wise (1996)), some configural tasks (e.g., Whishaw and Tomie (1991); McDonald et al.
(1997)), learning face-voice associations (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997)) and recog-
nition memory tasks (e.g., Alvarez et al. (1995); Beason-Held et al. (1999)). Inactivation
of the hippocampus also impairs learning on massed more than spaced trials (Poucet
et al., 1991). Episodic learning (which by definition involves fast one-trial acquisi-
tion) is also impaired after hippocampal lesions (e.g., Scoville and Milner (1957); Clay-
ton and Dickinson (1998)). Lesioned animals perform normally on category learning
(whilst being significantly impaired at remembering exemplars, e.g., Knowlton and
Squire (1993)), and semantic information can be acquired slowly over a lifetime by hu-
mans amnesics with severely disrupted episodic learning (e.g., Kitchener et al. (1998);
Vargha-Khadem et al. (1997); Holdstock et al. (2002)) – such learning must therefore de-
pend on the repetition inherent to categorical and semantic information, that allows
slow learning in the absence of the hippocampus.
However, not all rapid learning is impaired after hippocampal lesions, so the num-
ber of training trials available cannot be the sole determinant of hippocampal depen-
dency. For example, conditioned taste aversion (in rats, Yamamoto (1993)) and visual
imprinting (in chicks, Horn (1998)) do not require the hippocampus for acquisition
even with only one or a few trials. These abilities are present from birth, which is
good evidence that the hippocampus is not the only area that can perform one-trial
learning, since the hippocampus may not be operational at birth (at least in rats, Wa-
ters et al. (1997)). However, these tasks could be said to be ’less cognitive’ than most
of the tasks examined in the hippocampal literature, and perhaps tap species-specific,
relatively hard-wired abilities. It seems plausible that different species have evolved
designated circuitry that bypasses the hippocampus to perform certain valuable learn-
ing tasks such as learning about poisonous foods. This suggests that the hippocampus
need not be required for the rapid acquisition of information that an animal is hard-
wired to acquire.
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Clearly, one-trial acquisition of information can only occur when pre-existing
neural circuitry is very similar to that that is needed to represent current informa-
tion, so that existing neural connections can be enhanced without the need for time-
consuming large-scale ’re-wiring’. Therefore, the capacity for learning on any task
must depend on the number of trials available and on how similar existing representa-
tional structure is to what is required to represent the current task. An innately-biased
“hardwired” learning capacity would result from gross neural patterns that bring rep-
resentations of certain information (e.g., memory for recently tasted food, and feelings
of nausea) together in a way that enhances an ability to learn about associations be-
tween them.
When associations are to be made between information that is represented in geo-
graphically close areas of the cortex, it is more likely that relatively small changes in
existing circuitry that can be effected rapidly will be able to capture the associations
that need to be stored. Therefore the hippocampus will not necessarily be needed for
the rapid storage of information that is represented within geographically local areas
outside the hippocampus, or within areas that are already heavily interconnected (per-
haps as a result of past learning experiences). The rapid acquisition of simple tasks
that depend on learning associations between information from the same modality
therefore need not depend on the hippocampus if the local circuitry is appropriate.
Performance on a given learning problem would be aided if previous experience
with similar items and problems over the lifetime of the animal had led to the de-
velopment of a set of representations (a ’learning set’1) outside the hippocampus that
are similar to what is needed to represent or ’solve’ the task at hand. This would al-
low rapid acquisition of new similar information. This implies that fast learning of
some types of information should sometimes be possible in the absence of the hip-
pocampus after extensive experience with similar tasks, even on tasks whose initial
acquisition might normally depend on the hippocampus. In accord with this, hip-
pocampectomized animals can perform one-trial odour-odour learning after exten-
sive experience with similar tasks (e.g., Eichenbaum et al. (1986); Reid and Morris
(1992)). Similarly, pre-training in the presence of an intact hippocampus can some-
times protect animals from the anterograde learning deficits that would be expected
to occur following interference with the hippocampus (Bannerman et al., 1995; Saucier
1This definition is more general than the sense used in Reid and Morris (1992), for example, in which
a “learning set” refers to abstract strategies developed to solve certain tasks.
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and Cain, 1995; Roesler et al., 1998; Hoh et al., 1999; Moser and Moser, 2000; Takehara
et al., 2003). However, such pre-training would be unable to counteract the effects of
subsequent hippocampal damage on tasks which have a high ongoing demand for
the fast acquisition of new complex information as it would impossible to pre-learn
enough information and to adequately represent it in the absence of the hippocampus.
Therefore, pre-training does not prevent deficits on spatial learning on a water-maze
with delayed testing after 2-h, when the platform moves from day to day (Steele and
Morris, 1999).
In humans it is particularly clear that we “learn how to learn”. Throughout child-
hood and beyond we learn, for example, how the world is structured into hierarchical
categories that share features, and the types of attributes that are likely to be constant
across items (e.g., that hairy animals that bark usually have four legs): this underpins
our adult learning abilities. It is only once we have learnt what kinds of semantic in-
formation are likely to generalise (e.g., if we are told that the capital of France is Paris
today, that it is likely to be ’Paris’ the next time we ask) that generic semantic infor-
mation can be acquired in one exposure. Prior to the establishment of such learning
sets, novel information must be repeatedly experienced in order to establish which are
the generic semantic components, and which are the episodic idiosyncrasies of that
particular presentation of an event.
Some types of tasks consistently involve similar mappings between certain types
of information (e.g. standard visuo-motor tracking tasks involve “congruent” associ-
ations between visual inputs and motor outputs to allow tracking). On the grounds
that the speed and efficacy of responses would be best served by the shortest con-
nections between relevant perceptual and motor areas, it is to be expected that such
information processing would bypass the hippocampus, as indeed seems the case, at
least in the adult once basic tracking abilities are established. It is therefore of great
interest to find that when arbitrary visuo-motor mappings must be acquired (e.g., see
a yellow card – wave your right paw) the speed of learning is hugely impaired by
hippocampal lesions, and performance is close to chance after a number of trials that
results in good asymptote performance in controls (Murray and Wise (1996)). Since
any mapping (whether it turns out to be commonly occurring or not) is arbitrary the
first time it is encountered, this provides indirect support for the idea that the hip-
pocampus is involved when learning sets elsewhere are inadequate and information
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must be acquired fast. The absence of a learning set for a task is effectively equivalent
to that task requiring “arbitrary” mappings with respect to a given animal’s learning
history.
The hippocampus’ capacity for rapid acquisition of information derives not only
from the fact that hippocampal synapses potentiate and depotentiate faster than those
in other areas (Ivanco and Racine, 2000), but also from the way information converges
onto individual complex-spike cells. Information from many sources converges onto
each complex-spike cell so that novel associations can often be registered by single or
already-interconnected neurons. In effect, the hippocampus is built with the potential
to quickly learn about relations between unpredictably-related, and possibly complex,
stimuli. Of course, not every possible association will be easily acquired by an exist-
ing hippocampal structure, and some tasks typically take many hundreds of trials to
acquire even with an intact hippocampus – perhaps in order to extract probabilistic in-
formation or complicated mappings or rules, or to represent certain novel associations
sufficiently strongly. Clearly, the relative facility of the hippocampus for rapid acqui-
sition alone cannot adequately explain why these tasks are hippocampally-dependent.
The hypothesis that the hippocampus is required for fast learning when there is
no established learning set implies that learning early on in an animal’s life would
be more likely to be hippocampally-dependent. This implication is unlikely be true
in its baldest form, since the hippocampus is probably not operational in young an-
imals (Waters et al., 1997). However, since childhood amnesia for specific events is
well documented, it could be argued that fast learning of the type that depends on
the hippocampus in adulthood simply does not occur in the young animal. On the
other hand, periods of high plasticity are well-documented in many regions of the
young nervous system (Kirkwood et al. (1995); Berardi et al. (2000)) so that areas other
than the hippocampus are capable of relatively fast learning in young animals (i.e.
in the period before the hippocampus comes “online”). This would allow learning
sets for commonly encountered task mappings and stimuli to be constructively set up
in young animals. Perhaps part of the hippocampus’s uniqueness is that it loses its
capacity for plasticity with age less precipitously than other brain areas, and comes
online only when ’pre-learning’ has been completed in other regions.
In adulthood, neurogenesis has been reported only in the hippocampus (in ro-
dents, Altman and Das (1965), and humans, Eriksson et al. (1998)) and olfactory cortex
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(Bayer, 1986). There is speculation that new hippocampal memories might be stored in
new neurons. Such a mechanism might underpin quantitative differences in the learn-
ing abilities of the hippocampus and other areas. For example, the high plasticity of
new neurons might allow relatively fast acquisition of new information, and allow the
associations between previously unrelated information to be represented easily. This
may also lead to fundamental qualitative differences in the nature of the information
that can be represented in different areas, after plausible opportunities for learning.
In summary, the blunt assertion that the hippocampus is required when informa-
tion must be acquired quickly is untenable. Several qualifications are required. Firstly,
the hippocampus is only necessary for the fast learning of certain kinds of quite com-
plex information – simple uni-modal information and some kinds of low-order multi-
modal information will generally be relatively easy to represent in regions other than
the hippocampus. Secondly, whether the hippocampus is required for an animal to
learn a task rapidly in a few trials depends on the animal’s learning history, as rep-
resentations for previously learnt information can facilitate the acquisition of new re-
lated information. In other words, the speed with which information can be acquired,
the nature of the information to be acquired, and existing local convergence of infor-
mation cannot really be separated.
4.3 Convergence of information
We have established that the hippocampus is likely to be involved in the fast storage
of many types of information, especially as complexity increases. However, given un-
limited training trials, the hippocampus remains obligatory for the acquisition of tasks
that depend on associating supra-modal information with other information, such as
navigating on the basis of allocentric information and using timing information to
control behaviour. The acquisition of episodic and autobiographical information is
also massively impaired by hippocampal damage. Of course since such information
cannot by definition be repeated, we do know whether such information could be re-
tained after repeated exposure. Typical episodic recall may depend on supra-modal
information, although deficits are observed even when allocentric and temporal infor-
mation are not essential to recall. More generally, episodic information requires the
association of many pieces of unpredictably-related complex information.
It is possible that some sources of information do not converge prior to the hip-
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pocampus in a way that allows the associations that are necessary to the performance
of certain tasks to be discovered or represented. For example, it is widely believed that
in the visual information pathway, there are two segregated streams from the primary
visual cortex (as first suggested by Mishkin et al. (1983)): a dorsal “what” pathway
concerned with object information and a ventral “where” pathway concerned with
location. More extreme views have come increasingly under attack as evidence accu-
mulates for intermixing between pathways (e.g., Goodale and Milner (1992); Merigan
and Maunsell (1993)) and the theoretical “proofs” of the separation are brought into
doubt (Goodhill et al. (1995)). However, object information from the ventral stream is
largely sent to the EC via the PrC, which projects primarily to the anterior and lateral
portions of the EC; whilst visuo-spatial information from the dorsal stream projects
largely to the posterior portions of the EC, via the PHG (Suzuki and Amaral, 1994).
Witter et al. (2000) has recently suggested that even within the hippocampus there
may be largely parallel paths originating in the PrC and post-rhinal cortices, although
communication between these streams seems likely. If the segregation is maintained
outwith the hippocampus, then this would explain why hippocampally-lesioned an-
imals fail to acquire various tasks that require the association of ’what’ and ’where’
with behaviours (’what to do’), even with unlimited training trials.
’What should be done’ in specific spatial locations or at particular times obviously
varies unpredictably from task to task and occasion to occasion. Therefore it would
not be possible to build up a general learning set about how spatial or temporal infor-
mation relates to action. If the hippocampus is required for learning when there is no
established learning set, this would explain deficits on such tasks. Severe impairments
at learning new vocabulary after hippocampal lesions could be similarly explained,
because it is not possible to build up general representations that link phonemes with
meaning. It is also possible that the difficulties faced by patients with hippocampal
damage on explicit recall depend on severing the links between high-level represen-
tations of information (that would tie together the aspects of an episodic event, for
example) and language systems (that may be represented in the left hippocampus).
Abstracting and generalising from specific instances (which is also often impaired in
hippocampal patients) may also depend on the convergence of linguistic and high-
level representations of information.
The MTL is organised as a hierarchy of associational networks (Lavenex and Ama-
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ral (2000)), with extensive reciprocal inter-connections between areas, and extensive
intra-level connectivity. Neuroanatomically, the hippocampus is considered to be at
the top of this hierarchy (as shown in figure 1.2), with information integration and
complexity increasing up the hierarchy. In fact, the whole brain can be seen as a hi-
erarchy of inter-connected ’convergence zones’ (Damasio, 1989b), with progressively
more and more diverse information converging onto regions as one progresses from
the perceptual ’lower’ areas through the uni-modal, multi-modal and associational
cortices to the ’higher’ medial temporal regions. Ivanco and Racine (2000) found the
highest rates of LTP induction and decay in intra-hippocampal pathways and the low-
est in the cortex, with intermediate rates in connections between the hippocampus
and perirhinal and pre-frontal cortices. A learning hierarchy can be envisaged in the
neocortical-hippocampal axis, with increasingly fast learning rates and increasingly
convergent inputs as one progresses from the cortex through the para-hippocampal
areas to the hippocampus. Thus the hippocampus would be expected to be faster
in the acquisition of some associative information than other lower regions, if those
regions have not already developed representations of similar material through pre-
vious learning experiences. This might explain the slowed acquisition of cross-modal
associative tasks that do not depend on supra-modal information (e.g., learning face-
voice pairs) after hippocampal damage. Similarly, since complex semantic informa-
tion such as new vocabulary or memory for public events is unlikely to be sufficiently
similar to any information currently stored, the hippocampus would be implicated in
normal acquisition at the usual learning rate. However, because semantic informa-
tion by its nature is usually repeated, albeit embedded in different one-off ’episodic’
events, areas outside the hippocampus may be able to form traces of this generic in-
formation over many exposures.
As one proceeds up the hierarchy it becomes increasingly easy to bind complex,
unique and diverse traces of details of events into one memory. This might explain
why the hippocampus and MTL regions are particularly important for the recall of
episodic and complex semantic information. However, whether information is consid-
ered to be a specific ’detail’ or is considered to be generic and ’core’ depends, of course,
on the consistency with it occurs with particular other information and whether it is
a necessary component. This in turn often correlates with the number of times that
the information has been encountered. There can be no absolute definition of what is
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’core’ to an event or memory, as it must be defined with respect to instances of that
event, and/or to knowledge and expectations of an individual2. If something truly
novel is experienced only once, it is impossible to know which are the generic core
’semantic’ features and which features were merely incidental to that occurrence of
the event. Since a memory is usually operationally-defined as being episodic on the
basis of the type and number of details that can be recalled, the recall of episodic mem-
ory will be most affected by the loss of detailed information. The data reviewed here
suggests that the recall of such information is mediated disproportionately by the hip-
pocampus. This is not the same as saying that the hippocampus is ’configured’ for
processing episodic information. The way episodic and semantic memory is defined
cuts across several confounding factors such as the degree of detail needed at recall,
and the amount of exposure to information (see section 4.6.2).
In this hierarchical view, hippocampally-based memories will be formed on the
basis of any inputs received, even if there is damage to some of the lower regions;
whilst the recall of existing hippocampally-dependent memories would be affected to
the extent they depended on fragments in now-damaged regions. The dissociation
of episodic and semantic function seen in semantic dementia (Graham et al., 1999)
and of anterograde and retrograde autobiographical memory in visual memory-deficit
amnesia (Rubin and Greenberg, 1998) would therefore be predicted.
In summary, the hippocampus is likely to be involved in the acquisition of complex
information, especially when learning involves task-dependent supra-modal spatial
or temporal information. The acquisition of complex high-order associative informa-
tion will usually involve the hippocampus in the intact brain, but complex information
(apart from that depending on associations with supra-modal information) may some-
times be acquired in the absence of the hippocampus over many training trials. These
trials may be spread over the lifetime of an animal, so that acquisition may occur on a
given occasion after apparently only a few trials.
2For example, if someone is attacked by a person carrying a baseball bat and wearing a green shirt,
the colour of the shirt is likely to be considered irrelevant and unimportant and may well not be reliably
encoded and recalled over time, in contrast to memory for the baseball bat. However, if someone is
attacked several times by different people carrying different implements, but all wearing green shirts, the
core features of such as event are likely to be reconsidered and the shirt colour given more prominence.
If however, the attacked person had noticed on the first encounter that the green shirt was actually a
military uniform, then they might have tentatively ’upgraded’ this feature to a core feature sooner.
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4.4 Incidental and automatic learning
Hippocampectomized animals have sometimes been reported to show deficits in in-
cidental learning such as knowledge about the context on a stimulus-response task.
The acquisition of information about low salience, discrete stimuli is also affected by
hippocampal damage. In many ways, day-to-day episodic memory, which is severely
affected by hippocampal damage, can be considered a paradigmatic example of inci-
dental learning. On a test of autobiographical memory, subjects may recall incidental
details of an event such as the colour of the shirt someone was wearing, or who got on
the bus first, but it is unlikely that there was a deliberate intention to memorise these
incidental details. Semantic information is more mixed in this respect: some might be
acquired incidentally, say whilst passively listening to the radio, whilst other semantic
information may be deliberately acquired through observation or deliberate research.
More generally, hippocampal activation is seen on most if not all tasks, includ-
ing those that are not hippocampally-dependent (such as the random foraging task,
O’Keefe and Dostrovsky (1971); Ranck (1973); O’Keefe and Nadel (1978); delay eye-
blink conditioning, Berger et al. (1983); McEchron and Disterhoft (1997); when watch-
ing a film (Maguire et al. (1996, 1998a)) or sitting at rest with eyes closed, Martin (1999);
Binder et al. (1999)); and tasks whose performance improves after hippocampal lesions
(Eichenbaum et al. (1987); McNaughton et al. (1989)). This suggests that the hippocam-
pus may be automatically engaged on all tasks, and may in some cases be acquir-
ing information that is not necessary to the experimenter-defined task at hand. One
suggestion is that the hippocampus automatically encodes all attended experience as
’snapshots’ of experience (Morris and Frey (1997)). However, Poldrack et al. (2001)
have shown that the hippocampus must be active on a categorisation learning task
at a time when hippocampal damage causes no obvious deficit if learning is to pro-
ceed normally in the later stages of task acquisition. This suggests that in some cases
hippocampal activation might reflect the acquisition of higher-order, more ’processed’
information about experienced events, rather than, or in addition to, merely accumu-
lating snapshots of experienced events.
Putative continuous non-selective storage of ongoing information would raise
questions about capacity. However, the value of information is often not known when
that event is experienced, so it is desirable to encode unfolding information as it occurs
in case later events show its importance. A plausible solution is to retain information
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on the basis of its apparent value: typically, only the most salient or important infor-
mation is remembered well.
If the hippocampus was particularly important for the automatic storage of in-
formation (such as autobiographical events), it would be expected to be particularly
sensitive to the modulation of memory strength and maintenance – as indeed appears
to be the case. The long-term maintenance of memories can be affected by processes
acting at acquisition and/or in a ’critical period’ after acquisition. These modulatory
processes reflect the importance attached by the animal to the information it has ex-
perienced. In general, the degree of hippocampal engagement may be modulated by
gross factors such as global brain state (e.g., theta versus gamma electrical activity,
sleep versus waking) as well as arousal, attention and motivation to learn; these fac-
tors may also influence initial trace storage strength. Furthermore, the hippocampus
has substantial amounts of stress-related glucocorticoid receptors and expresses both
types of receptors unlike most other regions (de Kloet et al. (1999)); many of the neu-
romodulatory substances that are released after stress (e.g., β-endorphin, vasopressin,
adrenocorticotrophic hormone, substance P and cholecystokinin, McEwen (1999)) are
known to act on the hippocampus; and it receives direct projections from the amyg-
dala and the medial septum which are implicated in processing anxiety and alert-
ness. All of these systems (and others) are thought to affect memory storage. In fact,
high levels of stress have been shown to selectively impair hippocampally-dependent
learning (such as spatial versus cued learning, Ohl and Fuchs (1999), and spatial mem-
ory versus navigation to a visible goal on a radial arm water-maze, Diamond et al.
(1999)).
Making incidental stimuli more salient would aid cortical learning through mod-
ulatory processes (and hippocampal learning if it were intact) and potentially ame-
liorate the learning deficits produced by hippocampal lesions on some tasks. Indeed,
the presence of reinforcers has been shown to produce learning in systems other than
the hippocampus (White and Wallet (2000)). Higher foot-shocks on hippocampally-
dependent tasks such as inhibitory avoidance can protect against the usually disrup-
tive effects of interference with synaptic activity in structures such as the amygdala,
neostriatum and thalamus (see references in Cobos-Zapiain et al. (1996)), probably via
the effect of norepinephrine released in response to stressful stimuli (Seidenbecher
et al. (1997)). Interestingly, whilst fear conditioning to a sufficiently aversive stimuli
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can be achieved after experience with only one or a few trials, fear conditioning to less
aversive stimuli takes several trials (Izquierdo and Medina, 1997). Thus we would
expect to see deficits on some incidental tasks after hippocampal damage, but not nec-
essarily find deficits in acquisition when the same information was on the foreground
(in the same way we might predict deficits on fast but not slow acquisition of informa-
tion). I would also predict that after protracted exposure, the cortex would develop
viable traces of incidental stimuli through slow incremental learning processes.
A qualitatively similar pattern of activation in brain areas including the hippocam-
pus is found on tasks incorporating deliberate instructions to memorise stimuli for
later recall or recognition (e.g., Maguire et al. (1998b); Tulving et al. (1994); Nyberg
et al. (1995); Eustache et al. (1995)); and those in which any learning is incidental
and may be evidenced by, for example, an unexpected recall test (e.g., Price et al.
(1994); Bookheimer et al. (1995); Martin et al. (1996); Zelkowicz et al. (1998); Sergent
et al. (1992)). However, intentional learning produces significantly stronger activation
than incidental acquisition, which implies that activity for typical incidental learning
would be low. Similarly, salient stimuli produce greater cortical and hippocampal ac-
tivation than low salience stimuli (Wiggs and Martin (1998)). All other things being
equal, lower activity levels would be expected to lead to weaker trace storage. There-
fore, the fast acquisition and incidental acquisition of information are similar in the
sense that both would be expected to produce relatively weak traces especially in the
more slowly learning cortex. The more robust learning of the hippocampus would
produce relatively strong trace even in response to low levels of activity.
Deficits have sometimes been reported on tasks that depend on learning associa-
tions between interoceptive information (e.g., hunger state) and external stimuli, al-
though again, the data is inconsistent. It seems reasonable to assume that since exter-
nal stimuli are more likely to be causative in a standard learning situation, that inte-
roceptive cues are normally consigned to the ’attentional background’ on most tasks.
Indeed, learning about interoceptive cues takes longer than learning about external
stimuli even in intact animals (Davidson and Jarrard, 1993; Hock and Bunsey, 1998).
Therefore tasks that require attention to internal states might be supported by the hip-
pocampus partly because it can compensate for low activity levels by relatively robust
trace storage. As already discussed, the hippocampus provides a site where novel,
unpredictable associations can be easily registered; this may be important in learning
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about unusual relationships between endogenous stimuli and external events.
Animals with hippocampal lesions perform at chance on tasks such as delayed
visual-paired comparison (VPC) that measures looking-preferences towards novel
stimuli (e.g., Zola et al. (2000); McKee and Squire (1993)), and orienting to changes
in spatial or non-spatial arrangements of stimuli (e.g. Honey et al. (1998)). Although
incidental learning is usually defined with respect to a motivated task, these tasks
can be seen as dependent on incidental learning in that the responses are not explic-
itly trained. In these tests the animal does not “know” what the experimenter wants
from it, thus any behaviour reflects natural behavioural propensities. This is also true
of the more conventional “incidental” studies already discussed. Therefore the hip-
pocampus may be involved in mediating automatic motor responses to stimuli such
as orienting to novelty. Behavioural alterations after hippocampal lesions on tasks that
assess untrained responses to stimuli may reflect changes in the control of responses,
rather than an inability to make the distinctions on which to base responses. Indirect
support for this idea comes from data showing that hippocampal damage leads to
changes in various non-cognitive behaviours (as outlined in section 3.2.4.3). To my
knowledge there is no data on whether rewarding a hippocampal animal for “behav-
ing normally” (e.g. for looking at the novel object on the VPC task) can ameliorate the
so-called “deficit”, so this issue remains unresolved. Animals with compromised hip-
pocampi are also impaired at certain inferential tasks (Dusek and Eichenbaum (1997);
Bunsey and Eichenbaum (1996)) which can similarly be construed as involving unre-
warded incidental learning.
In summary, the hippocampus appears to be important for the automatic acquisi-
tion of information. However, all areas that are involved in information processing are
also likely to be continually registering some trace of ongoing activity. The hippocam-
pus’s importance is especially evident for the acquisition of low salience information,
which probably reflects the relative ease with which robust changes can be made in
the hippocampus compared to other areas. Tasks such as conditioned taste-aversion
and contextual conditioning are not demonstrably affected by hippocampal damage,
although they depend on the initial unreinforced acquisition of information. There-
fore factors other than the incidental nature of the information presented must also be
important, such as the complexity of information required for performance, or test-
ing protocols. The hippocampus is presumably necessary for the storage, incidental
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or otherwise, of associations involving supra-modal information and complex rapidly
acquired information, such as that underlying autobiographical information.
4.5 Representational structure
Much of the preceding discussion refers to issues that cannot really be separated from
the nature of representation employed by the hippocampus. The hippocampus’s cru-
cial role in the acquisition of complex information results largely from the numerous,
disparate, non-topographical inputs to each hippocampal complex-spike cell, their
massive interconnectivity and high synaptic plasticity, and the fact that the hippocam-
pus is the ’top-node’ in a series of associative indexing regions – such factors inher-
ently affect the representations that can be employed by the hippocampus.
If it is assumed that associative conditioning requires a temporal overlap of neural
activities representing the US and the CS, then it is possible that the hippocampus is
required for tasks involving the association of elements across delays because it pro-
vides a mechanism for bridging these temporal gaps. There is some evidence for this
view although it is not conclusive, and several authors have recently proposed varia-
tions on this theme (e.g., Levy (1996); Wallenstein et al. (1998); Lisman (1999); Huerta
et al. (2000)). The hippocampus might play a role in, say, maintaining reverberatory
activity in the earlier of the to-be-associated traces. Alternatively, if the hippocampus
represents aspects of an unchanging physical environment, then it could provide an
indirect associative bridge between information represented at different times in the
same environment.
The hippocampus also appears to play an important role in ’extracting’ high-order
information from repeated presentations of similar information, (for example, on se-
quence learning, Curran (1997) or probabilistic weather prediction tasks, Poldrack
et al. (2001)). This may depend on the hippocampus’s ability to ’oversee’ learning
in other areas, by receiving information about activity in several regions that do not
communicate directly. Fast episodic-type encoding and a role for the hippocampus
in bridging temporal gaps or learning about complex associations that are not imme-
diately evident from observed data, may be incompatible at the cellular level. The
latter tasks require that representations for similar re-presented data are not orthogo-
nalised. However, there is a direct path from entorhinal cortex to CA1 that bypasses
the orthogonalising dentate gyrus, and it is interesting to speculate that this may allow
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a division of labour in the hippocampus.
In humans, the ability to re-represent incoming information in terms of a symbol
system which has its own set of manipulation rules (i.e. language) might also allow
us to go ’beyond’ straightforward statistical relations between stimuli. In accord with
this, the left hippocampus has been implicated in verbal processing (Papanicolaou
et al., 2002), and analogical reasoning activates the hippocampus (Luo et al., 2003).
Recall of a memory depends on providing cues that can trigger recall of parts of a
memory representation, that can then trigger recall of the complete attractor represent-
ing other aspects of that memory. Therefore the ability to recall specific information
depends fundamentally on the cues employed, which interacts with the nature and
robustness of the representations employed. One relatively consistent finding is that
after hippocampal damage, implicitly tested knowledge tends to be better preserved
than explicit on complex recall tasks. In many cases, implicit tests involve cues that
are more similar to those that were present at acquisition. Such cues can therefore act
relatively directly to co-activate many of the areas that were initially engaged in learn-
ing an event, and thereby support the reactivating of attractors. In effect, sufficiently
complex cues that are similar to those originally experienced at learning can act like
high-level indexing traces (such as those in the hippocampus) that are supposed to
co-ordinate the co-activation of fragments in other lower-level areas. This would also
explain why explicit tests that use more cues that are similar to those available at ac-
quisition (such as photographs) produce better performance than those that depend
on, say, verbal descriptions or requests for information. It is the nature of the cues per
se, rather than whether a task is explicit or implicit, that is crucial.
Complex implicit cues would be particularly expected to aid recall in the following
situations: 1) after hippocampal damage for traces whose recall would normally be
mediated by the hippocampus - since the hippocampus is supposed to be the top-
level indexing region; 2) on the recall of older memories in neurologically normal
people where memories have started to fade – since traces appear to decay in a top-
down fashion; and 3) in patients where semantic ’fragments’, or the inter-connections
between them, are breaking down – since such damage would reduce the ease with
which existing attractor networks across the brain could be activated by activity in
particular other semantic regions. These expectations are borne out by the data.
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4.6 Conclusions
A unifying theme underlying this chapter is the relative amount of learning that can be
expected in the hippocampus and the cortex on a given task. On some tasks under par-
ticular learning conditions, only the hippocampus is capable of mediating the acquisi-
tion of information that can support performance on a particular behavioural task; on
others, extra-hippocampal regions may be able to mediate acquisition to some extent.
In general, the hippocampus can learn faster and more robustly for a given event than
the cortex, both in terms of the strength of changes to pre-existing connections, and
the formation of new required associations. Hippocampal and extra-hippocampal ar-
eas are also different in terms of ’wiring’ and default representational structure, and
patterns of afferent information. Thus the hippocampus is usually more able than the
cortex to learn tasks that need to be acquired quickly or depend on learning about
low-salience information; that depend on associations between information that con-
verges on the hippocampus; or that depends on using a representational scheme that
is the hippocampal default (where this is different to that of the cortex). Learning is
also more likely to be hippocampally-dependent when it is arbitrary with respect to
the animal’s learning history, since the lack of an established learning set will place
emphasis on the hippocampal capacities for fast acquisition of new associations.
The hippocampus is essential for the acquisition of: 1) information that involves
associations between high-level abstract supra-modal information and other infor-
mation; 2) information that is learnt rapidly and is highly complex; 3) information
that has been acquired automatically when the information is of low salience and/or
highly complex; and 4) tasks that depend on the default nature of learning or repre-
sentation in the hippocampus, or on natural behaviour mediated by the hippocampus.
Items 2 and 3 refer to combinations of continuous factors such as salience, complexity
and speed of learning. These factors clearly affect learnability, both by the hippocam-
pus and by other areas. A particular instance of such a factor on a learning task could
described by its position on a notional scale that describes how ’extreme’ that instance
is (e.g., from ’very high’ to ’very low’ salience or complexity). It is the combination of
such factors, taking into account their positions on a continuum, that determines the
extent to which the hippocampus is better than other areas for the acquisition of par-
ticular information, and if it is better at all. For example, the high speed acquisition of
low complexity uni-modal associative information does not depend on the hippocam-
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pus, whereas the high speed acquisition of highly complex cross-modal information
does (item 2). Associating supra-modal allocentric information with other informa-
tion (item 1) always acquires the hippocampus and could perhaps be considered to
be at the extreme end of a ’complexity’ scale. In addition, a few tasks may crucially
depend on the inherent representational properties of the hippocampus, such as its
ability to make associations between temporally separated information (item 4).
On some tasks such as learning cross-modal associations, the hippocampus and
closely-related medial temporal regions and tertiary associational cortices may acquire
information that is different only in degree — a stronger, more easily accessible, and
more quickly acquired trace is likely to be set up in the hippocampus in response to
a given event. Since weaker traces are likely to need stronger cuing for successful re-
call, this provides an explanation for the relative flexibility of recall in intact animals:
Without a hippocampus, cues that are more similar to those experienced at acquisi-
tion (i.e., more implicit in nature) are likely to be required for successful recall since
they provide stronger cuing. Implicit cues may also automatically allow for the dis-
ambiguation of associations and thereby negate a requirement for hippocampal-based
incidental learning of context cues.
Tasks which do not obviously require processing of the types of information out-
lined above, but depend on it to differentiate pre-existing associations from those
newly learnt will also obviously be affected.
In summary, the need to acquire information that is complex and multi-modal, that
is incidental or of low salience, that depends on identifying high-order associations,
or that must be acquired quickly increases the probability that the hippocampus is
involved in its acquisition. When several of these factors are combined, or specifically
when the complexity of the information to be acquired is very high, then it is very
likely that the hippocampus is involved in the normal acquisition of such informa-
tion. Areas outside the hippocampus may be able to acquire some such information
with sufficient trials or with different training methods, especially if the information
to be learnt is made more salient, is relatively simple or is similar to what has already
been acquired. This approach therefore provides a way of unifying various aspects of
existing theories that are often treated as competing theories. These proposals both
extend and constrain the predictions of earlier associative memory formulations.
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4.6.1 Relationship to other proposals
Many theories have proposed that the hippocampus is necessary for the acquisition
of a particular ’type’ of information, such as allocentric spatial and/or episodic or
declarative information (see Chapter 2). However, the discussions of this chapter and
of chapter 3 show that the hippocampus is not limited to processing a particular type
of information. I have argued that these ’types’ often merely represent the extreme
end of a continuum of factors that determine whether the hippocampus acquires a
trace that is significantly better in supporting the performance of a given task than
other areas.
Existing general associative theories of the hippocampus would not predict the
specific pattern of findings seen in the previous chapter. For example, recent re-
workings of the associative/relational theory which borrow heavily from sequence
learning ideas (e.g., Wallenstein et al. (1998); Kesner (1998); Lisman (1999)) do not
specifically predict deficits after hippocampal lesions on quickly acquired or inciden-
tal tasks, or on the processing of interoceptive stimuli. Wallenstein et al. (1998) also
acknowledges that it is difficult to accommodate the persistence of conditioned taste-
aversion learning after hippocampal lesions in their proposals. The Arbitrary Visuo-
motor theory (Wise and Murray (1999, 2000)) can potentially capture much of the data
showing slowed learning in animals with hippocampal lesions, but cannot account for
deficits that remain in hippocampal animals after unlimited opportunities for training.
However, Brasted et al. (2003) has gone some way towards addressing these concerns.
Together with Holdstock et al. (2002)’s ideas, progress has recently been made in more
tightly delineating what the hippocampus is ’for’.
Holdstock et al. (2002) have recently put forward the view that “it is the extent to
which information is repeatedly experienced, rather than the kind of information that
may be the crucial determiner of [...] new learning following selective hippocampal
damage”. Whilst I agree that the amount of exposure to material is extremely impor-
tant, Holdstock et al. (2002)’s wholesale switch from a ’type’ to ’speed’ explanation
is far too simplistic. In my opinion, not only do factors inherent to the type of infor-
mation to be learned affect the speed with which it can be acquired; but the speed of
learning intrinsically affects the type of information that can be acquired. In addition,
some specific types of information appear to be dependent on the hippocampus for
acquisition irrespective of the number of trials available.
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4.6.2 Episodic and semantic memory
Generally speaking, the term episodic memory is used to refer to ’personally expe-
rienced events’, whilst semantic memory refers to ’knowledge of the world’ (see also
section 3.2.1.1). It is deceptively easy to understand what is meant by these definitions.
However, are such memories really categorically distinct?
Operationally, episodic memory is usually distinguished from semantic memory
on the basis of 1) the recalled content, such as whether specific event details can be
remembered – episodic recall typically elicits contextual information, whereas seman-
tic recall for facts and vocabulary, for example, does not; and 2) whether the memory
refers to information that was experienced over an extended period of time or refers to
a discrete ’episode’. Clearly, both these factors are continuous. Even if a subject recalls
a full-house of ’what’, ’when’ and ’where’ (which is sometimes considered to be the
hallmark of episodic recall), the actual duration of the event would remain crucial to
a definition. Remembering playing cards with a long-lost aunt for five minutes might
be classed as memory for an episode, whereas remembering playing cards with the
long-lost aunt over a week’s visit would not. This ’content & duration-based’ dis-
tinction gets progressively more fuzzy for the most ’episodic-like’ semantic memories
such as the recall of public events, as recall may depend on similar contextual infor-
mation to that produced on episodic recall (e.g., who was where? at what time? and
what were they wearing?). It is therefore not surprising that amnesic patients with
temporal lobe damage tend to show proportionate impairment of memory for public
events and autobiographical incidents (Kopelman, 2000).
Of course it is possible to artificially ’digitise’ the definitions. For example, it could
be specified that if recall elicits four details or more about an event with a duration of
less than half an hour, then such recall will be designated ’episodic’. Recently there has
been a move towards measuring the number of details recalled, which seems a better
measure of episodic/semantic-ness than a categorical judgement (see section 5.2.4.1),
but this merely underlines the continuous nature of the memories. The level of cuing
employed in a test of memory introduces yet another ’continuous’ factor into memory
recall, as it strongly affects whether a specific episodic memory can be accessed, and
thus how much detail can be recalled about a specific event.
To my knowledge, the only definition of episodic and semantic memory that is
truly categorical refers to subjective consciousness: either a subject decides they have
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a feeling of mental time travel and is therefore defined as experiencing episodic recall,
or does not. Unfortunately, this concept is problematic in several ways. Firstly, the
concept is untestable in non-human animals. Secondly, even in humans, a subjective
feeling of recollection does not guarantee that the memory with which it is associated
is ’real’ or actually happened, so subjective feelings cannot really be used as a index of
’real’ episodic recall.
Leaving aside problems of definition, typical real memories appear to combine
episodic and semantic components to different extents, and may also depend for their
recall on each component to different extents. As already discussed (section 3.2.1.1),
normal episodic memory usually depends on the recall of semantic memory compo-
nents. Indeed, a failure to reactivate appropriate semantic areas can lead to a failure of
’episodic’ recall (Rubin and Greenberg (1998)). Whilst the recall of semantic informa-
tion does not necessarily depend on recalling episodic aspects of memory, episodic in-
formation can enhance the recall of semantic information in normal individuals (West-
macott et al., 2003). For example, when recalling that the Princess of Wales was killed
in a car-crash, memories for where one was when one heard the news might support
further recall of the story details. Furthermore, memories of ostensibly the same ’type’
can consist of specific episodic and generic semantic components to different extents.
For example, recall of ’semantic’ information in patients with semantic dementia refers
more to the patients’ recent experiences that do typical semantic memories (Graham
et al., 1999), whilst ’episodic’ memories in amnesics with hippocampal damage tend to
be more generic and semanticised than typical episodic memories (see next chapter).
It therefore seems practically impossible to separate semantic and episodic recall in
the real world.
It seems much more plausible that real-world memories fall on a continuum of
episodic/semantic-ness. Memories vary continuously in terms of the number, type
and specificity of details recalled, and the extent to which recall depends on informa-
tion that archetypally characterises episodic and semantic recall. A typical episodic
memory is merely a memory at one extreme – of high complexity, specificity and nov-
elty, referring to an event of short duration that has only been experienced once.
Several confounding factors cut across the standard definitions of episodic and
semantic memory. One obvious confound is the level of detailed information usu-
ally required to demonstrate recall of the different categories of memory. To demon-
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strate semantic memory for a public event one would need to recall, say, that Marilyn
Munro fell downstairs getting off a plane; but to recall a similar personal event, not
only would one need to recall that your friend fell down the stairs getting off a plane,
but one would additionally need to demonstrate memory for other aspects of the oc-
casion – for example, that you were on your way to a friend’s wedding, it was cold,
what you thought your friend thought about falling down the stairs, etc. The amount
of complex context-like detail integral to recall is even less for more generic types
of semantic information such as fact or vocabulary recall. Since damage to the hip-
pocampus appears to reduce the amount of detailed information that can be recalled,
irrespective of whether the information is ostensibly spatial, semantic or episodic (see
sections 3.2.3.1, 3.2.4.1 and 3.2.4.2), and since the recall of typical episodic information
inherently requires more detail, hippocampal damage might be expected to dispro-
portionately affect the recall of episodic information on this basis alone.
Another confound is the frequency of exposure to the information: episodic events
are by definition one-off occurrences, whereas semantic information can be abstracted
from many encounters with a similar event or set of features. Again, the evidence
suggests that hippocampal damage particularly affects the rapid acquisition of infor-
mation (section 3.2.3.1), therefore on this basis also, hippocampal damage would be
expected to disproportionately affect episodic recall.
As discussed in section 4.4, on average, typical episodic information is less likely to
have been acquired deliberately than typical semantic information. Therefore, another
likely confound is the intention to learn at acquisition, which is known to affect the
engagement of memory systems.
The key factors that set episodic and semantic information apart are, in many cases,
continuous (see Figure 4.1). That is, episodic information is acquired more quickly
than semantic information, is more detailed, depends on a wider range of information
to demonstrate recall, is more likely to be acquired incidentally, and is more likely to
incorporate supra-modal information such as sequence or spatial information. Stan-
dard definitions of episodic and semantic memory will in many cases overlap with
definitions that relate to the amount of specific detail recalled, or the amount of ex-
posure there has been to information. This arises because by definition higher order
conjunctions of features occur less frequently (or at least no more frequently) than
lower order conjunctions of features. For example, an event such as seeing a mallard
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duck land on water in your local park occurs less often (or at least no more often) than
seeing a bird land on water. However, a consideration of the amount of detail, speed of
acquisition and nature of the learning task more accurately taps into the reasons why
information is hippocampally-dependent, and therefore allows us explain some of the
anomalies in the data that are not captured by assuming that the hippocampus is nec-
essary for episodic learning defined by specific content. Of course, specific instances
of episodic and semantic information might differ qualitatively and quantitatively in
one or more of these aspects.
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Figure 4.1: Simplified diagram of continuous features of the neocortical-hippocampal learning
hierarchy. The learning rate is highest in the hippocampus, and the decay rate lowest (shown),
and the degree of convergence of information similarly highest in the hippocampus and lowest
in individual cortical regions. Recall mediated by the hippocampus is more likely to elicit the
most detailed, specific information; whilst information that can be recalled via lower regions is
progressively more generic and semanticised.
In the rest of this thesis I will use the term ’true episodic memory’ to refer to a
memory for an specific event that is similar to that initially stored, in that it contains a
similar amount of specific detail and refers to a specific event that really happened. In
next chapter I will show that as memories age, they become more semanticised. That
is why it is crucial to strictly define what is meant by episodic information.
Chapter 5
Long-term role of the hippocampus
In this chapter, I examine empirical data on retrograde amnesia after hippocampal
damage. I conclude that information that obligatorily requires the hippocampus at
acquisition (such as the use of allocentric spatial information, or detailed true episodic
information) depends on the hippocampus for the lifetime of the trace, although that
may be less than the lifetime of the animal. The recall of information whose acquisi-
tion is merely facilitated by the presence of an intact hippocampus (such as seman-
tic information or conditional motor learning) may become independent of the hip-
pocampus over time. In general, those tasks whose acquisition is more impaired by
pre-acquisition hippocampal damage show longer periods of retrograde amnesia af-
ter post-acquisition hippocampal damage. It is also clear that old memories tend to be
more generic and less detailed than more recently acquired information.
5.1 Introduction
Retrograde amnesia (RA) refers to the loss of information acquired before the onset of
amnesia. Graded RA is widely reported after hippocampal damage, that is, recently
acquired memories are more affected than older ones (the so-called ’Ribot gradient’,
Ribot (1881)). This pattern of memory loss is traditionally thought to result from the
progressive ’consolidation’ or strengthening of traces outside the hippocampus, which
can mediate the recall of information that was once hippocampally-dependent.
Two major kinds of consolidation processes should be distinguished: local consol-
idation processes that act to strengthen and/or prolong initial short-term connectiv-
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ity changes in the areas initially involved in learning and mediating recall soon after
acquisition; and cross-regional or systems consolidation processes that act to increase
the strength of traces in areas outwith those areas that initially mediated acquisition
of a trace. In the hippocampal literature, it is usually assumed that the hippocam-
pus teaches or directs learning in the cortex, rather than it being under cortical con-
trol, making this type of consolidation an example of systems consolidation. At the
biochemical level, similar mechanisms are assumed to be involved in both types of
consolidation. Many current theoretical proposals lack clarity about the precise mech-
anisms of consolidation, and none provide constraints on a time scale. Most theories
assume some version of the ’indexing theory’, and implemented models of consoli-
dation (e.g., Alvarez and Squire (1994); McClelland et al. (1995); Murre (1996)) tend to
view the hippocampus as initially representing associative links between fragments of
information represented elsewhere, until those regions develop the associative links
themselves.
In this chapter I explore the relationship between the degree to which tasks are
hippocampally-dependent at acquisition, and the extent of retrograde amnesia after
post-acquisition hippocampal damage. Much of the data that I discuss has previ-
ously been presented as support for the standard view that all type of memories that
depend on the hippocampus for acquisition are 1) stored in the hippocampus only
temporarily; and 2) have a similar long-term fate that involves replication outwith
the hippocampus. However, certain standard theoretical assumptions and interpreta-
tions of the data can be questioned; and studies using more subtle testing procedures
have revealed important new findings that strongly suggest that a new theoretical per-
spective is needed. Whilst graded RA undoubtedly occurs on some tasks in amnesia
with an etiology that includes damage to the hippocampus, there are alternative ex-
planations to those given by the consolidation approach. Furthermore, some types of
memory appear to depend indefinitely on the hippocampus.
5.2 Retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage
5.2.1 Empirical issues
There are several key empirical concerns with studies of retrograde amnesia: some of
these challenge the standard interpretation of graded RA.
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Firstly, there are well-known problems in assessing the extent of brain damage, es-
pecially in humans; and a paucity of probable cases of “pure” hippocampal damage.
The relevance and importance of this issue in attempting to correlate RA with damage
to a particular brain area cannot be over-emphasised, especially in humans where am-
nesic subjects often present with imprecise non-surgical damage to the hippocampus
with associated extra-hippocampal damage. In other animals, partial damage to the
hippocampus has been shown to impair function in other intact regions (Baxter and
Murray, 2001); and “invisible” extra-hippocampal damage has been shown to be func-
tionally active in some cases (Mumby et al., 1996). It is therefore to be expected that the
human literature (especially the earlier studies) might be rather misleading at times.
Of course, with careful testing and mapping of lesions, valuable information can be
gleaned even from patients with widespread lesions (e.g., Rosenbaum et al. (2004)).
Most patients who have become amnesic have not had their memory assessed
prior to the diagnosis of amnesia. Therefore, within-subjects methods can rarely be
employed. Tests of human RA for personal events typically rely on asking patients to
recall a few incidents from particular time periods in their lives. Because such events
are necessarily personal, it is difficult to check the absolute truth of such recollec-
tions. Therefore, most studies compare patients’ recollections with those of relatives
or friends. However, in my opinion, the supposedly ’episodic’ memories that can be
recalled and verified under these conditions are likely to be quite different to ’true’
episodic memories, which are detailed, refer to a particular event and have not been
semanticised.
It is generally accepted in the wider field of memory research that memories un-
dergo semanticisation with time. It is almost inescapable that the memories that can
most easily be corroborated and thus used in a study are most likely to be seman-
ticised and least likely to be ”truly episodic”. The existence of strong corroborative
evidence such as testimony from family members, or even photographs or letters, im-
plies that the recalled event is likely to be highly salient to a subject and/or his family
– either at acquisition, or had become so since – and may have been rehearsed1 many
1The psychological term “rehearsal” is often used to refer to repeating information (such as a phone
number) to oneself to hold it in a memory store. This is more strictly termed “maintenance rehearsal”,
whilst “elaborative rehearsal” involves thinking about how the new information relates to previously
stored information. The term is traditionally not used for processes in animals, however, I will use
“rehearsal” to refer to any endogenously triggered reactivation of a memory trace that could change its
subsequent strength.
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times. Such rehearsal of the key points of an important event is likely to produce
even more semanticisation than normal. In the most extreme cases, the content of
memories that can be corroborated may well have been ’negotiated’ since the event to
produce an agreed ’family memory’ that has little in common with the original event.
Furthermore, as only a few memories are measured from each time period, and each
time period may span several years or decades, then patients and controls are likely
to choose only the most salient events. One patient with severe hippocampal damage
has recalled the same few, poorly remembered ’episodic’ events on different tasks and
separate studies over the years (Rosenbaum et al., 2004). The point here is that many
tests that purportedly investigate episodic recall may well be accessing memories that
are very far removed from episodic memories as usually defined, especially for older
memories which are likely to be particularly semanticised. Therefore tests of recent
and remote autobiographical memory may not be comparing like with like.
A related profound problem for retrospective memory studies is equating the dif-
ficulty of test information across time periods. In the majority of extant studies of
human memory, an attempt is made to equate performance levels in the control group
across the recent and remote periods tested (Brown, 2002). Since memories typically
decay over time, this implies that the information evaluated from the earlier time pe-
riods was initially more strongly encoded, presumably because it had greater signifi-
cance at the time. Therefore the remote and recent memories recalled on typical mem-
ory tasks might have been qualitatively even different from the outset.
Despite these concerns, studies of human amnesic patients are invaluable to our
understanding of memory, because vastly more detailed and subtle information about
deficits can be gleaned from the use of verbal and written tests than from mere obser-
vations of behaviour as in animal studies. Animal studies can however circumvent
many of the empirical problems that arise in human studies, as the behaviour of an
animal on a given memory test can be known in advance of a lesion, and the lesion can
be relatively well-controlled and characterised. Specifically, the same known amount
of training can be given at two different time points prior to a lesion and retrograde
memory test, which simplifies the interpretation of any memory gradient observed.
Of course, other issues arise, such as whether there might be an interaction between
the speed of acquisition of information on earlier and later sets of learning trials and
the possible role of the hippocampus in the fast acquisition of information (Murray
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and Bussey, 2001) and the possibility that an animal’s internal “context” is progres-
sively more different to that at learning as time elapses between learning and testing,
which is well-known by psychologists to affect memory performance. Furthermore,
the validity of animal studies that claim to address the role of the hippocampus in
memory have to date often been compromised by the nature of the task employed. As
discussed in chapter 3, many of the tasks that have traditionally been used to inves-
tigate hippocampal function (such as delayed-non-match-to-sample or other recog-
nition tasks), probably do not tap the same resources as those tasks that are most
impaired by hippocampal lesions.
In chapter 3, I concluded that the different tasks that depend on the hippocam-
pus for their normal acquisition depend on the hippocampus to differing extents. For
expositional purposes, I divided these into tasks that are obligatorily hippocampally-
dependent (i.e. tasks that are completely un-learnable without the hippocampus) and
those whose acquisition is facilitated by an intact hippocampus (and are therefore ac-
quired less easily without the hippocampus). In reality there is a continuum of ’hip-
pocampal dependency’ within the latter category, and across both categories: it is very
important to remember that the division is an artificial one. In addition, a few tasks
are actually acquired more easily after hippocampal lesions; and others are apparently
unaffected by hippocampal damage at acquisition. I therefore divide the present dis-
cussion of the effects of hippocampal damage on the long-term maintenance of infor-
mation into the same (continuous) ’categories’ as used in chapter 3.
5.2.2 Information whose acquisition is unaffected by hippocampal damage may
be retained or lost after hippocampal damage
Hippocampal damage has no discernible effect in a great many learning situations
including category learning, priming and some implicit motor tasks. Consequently,
for most such tasks there has been little interest in investigating whether hippocampal
damage affects recall, but the assumption is that it does not.
More generally, whether retrograde amnesia can ever arise without anterograde
amnesia is a contentious issue (see for example, the contrasting reviews of human lit-
erature by Kopelman (2000) and Kapur (2000)). In general there is a poor correlation
between retrograde and anterograde amnesia (Kopelman, 2000), but it is rare that RA
arises without some degree of AA (Poliakoff and Meudell, 2000). I can find no reports
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of retrograde amnesia arising without anterograde deficits after damage limited to the
hippocampus in humans2. There are a few reports of patients who show relatively
normal acquisition and initial retention of new memories, but abnormally fast for-
getting over the following days and weeks (Mayes et al., 2003). However, most such
patients show no evidence of hippocampal damage, but have damage or disruption
in the temporal neocortex.
In non-human animals, one study has reported preserved retention of pre-
operative memories after hippocampal lesions on a forced-choice olfactory discrim-
ination task in which post-lesion learning of new discriminations is normal (in rats,
Jonasson et al. (2004)), in accord with the idea that retrograde memories remain in-
tact if damage does not lead to anterograde deficits. However, retrograde amnesia
without anterograde deficits has been reported after hippocampal damage. For exam-
ple, Gaskin et al. (2003) reported that rats’ retrograde memory was equally impaired
by hippocampal lesions administered 5 weeks or 1 week after training on a novelty-
preference task, but anterograde learning was normal. Intact AA with graded RA has
also been reported after hippocampal damage on Pavlovian fear-conditioning tasks
(Maren et al., 1997; Sutherland et al., 2001)). However, it is known that performance
on this task can be based on several strategies, such as true contextual learning or
cue-based learning, so it is possible that preserved anterograde learning reflects the
acquisition of a different type of information to that lost in RA. This may also be the
case in the previously mentioned studies. Therefore, RA without AA might reflect the
retrograde loss of memories that were hippocampally-dependent at acquisition, com-
bined with an unimpaired ability to acquire information using a non-hippocampally-
dependent strategy. On the other hand, RA without AA might reflect the possibility
that when the hippocampus is intact, it may sometimes mediate performance on a task
even if it is not essential for acquiring the task, and may prevent concurrent learning
in other areas. When the hippocampus is subsequently damaged, information that
it had been instrumental in acquiring would be lost, and an intact alternative system
for acquiring and storing that information ’revealed’. This would imply that learning
may not proceed independently and in parallel in different memory systems on some
2The most widely accepted explanations for occurrences of disproportionate RA are a frontal lobe-
related retrieval deficit (Levine et al., 1998) or a visuo-spatial deficit (Ogden, 1993) that would affect the
recall of visually-based memories, but would allow the storage of new memories without visual compo-
nents. Alternatively, multi-focal damage to low level (semantic) features of memories or the pathways
that connect them into an event might also result in disproportionate RA (Evans et al., 2003).
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tasks, but there may be inhibition and competition between regions. This may occur
in other regions too, as RA without AA has been reported after damage to the rhinal
cortex. Thornton et al. (1997) found that monkeys with entorhinal & perirhinal cortex
lesions that impaired the recall of an already learnt two-object discrimination problem
could learn a new object discrimination task apparently normally.
In summary, it is assumed that on most tasks whose acquisition is un-affected by
hippocampal damage, there is no effect of hippocampal damage on similar retrograde
memories. However, on a few tasks, hippocampal damage leads to a retrograde loss
of information already acquired, but does not prevent new learning on a task. It is
currently unclear whether the information lost is of an identical nature to that which
can be acquired after hippocampal damage.
5.2.3 Information whose acquisition is impeded by hippocampal damage shows
graded retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage
In chapter 3, I concluded that semantic information, simple kinds of spatial informa-
tion, delayed-non-match-to-sample tasks, paired-sample learning, and trace condi-
tioning information could be acquired to varying extents after hippocampal damage.
In this section, I conclude that after hippocampal damage, these types of memories
depend on the hippocampus for their recall for characteristically different periods of
time.
The type of information that is recalled on typical ’episodic memory’ tests also
shows graded RA. I will argue that this largely reflects the increasing semanticisation
of memories with age, although other factors also play a role.
5.2.3.1 Semantic memory
Semantic information is defined as ’general knowledge’ that can be made declarative,
and includes vocabulary, grammar, object information, personal identity information,
public information (such as knowledge of famous events or people) and facts about
the world (such as knowledge about capital cities). Clearly, this is a very broad cat-
egory, encompassing knowledge that is encountered in very different circumstances
and with differing frequencies, and that is constituted by very different types of infor-
mation of different levels of complexity. For example, grammar and most vocabulary
is acquired relatively early in life, is experienced and used continually, and is usually
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learnt through relatively implicit means. At the other extreme, famous events and
personalities might only be fleetingly in the public eye, knowledge about them is con-
stituted by detailed episodic-like information about ’who, where and what’, and such
knowledge may never be used again after its acquisition.
After hippocampal lesions, object identity information (such as that needed to per-
form match or non-match to sample tasks) can often be acquired (section 3.2.2.4); new
vocabulary can sometimes be acquired if the exposure is extended though not if ex-
posure is limited to a few laboratory-based sessions (section 3.2.3.1); and information
about famous events and people can sometimes be acquired if the information is ex-
tremely salient and in the public eye for an extended period of time (section 3.2.3.1).
These different kinds of semantic information that are associated with different pat-
terns and contexts of exposure and require different amounts of detail to demonstrate
knowledge would be expected to be differentially affected by hippocampus lesions.
In accord with this, most studies of retrograde memory in human amnesic patients
have concluded that MTL damage leads to graded retrograde amnesia for semantic
information such as public events, personalities and public faces, but leaves vocab-
ulary, grammar and object identity knowledge intact (e.g., Squire (1992); Schnider et
al. (1995); Verfaellie et al. (1995); Rempel-Clower et al. (1996); Nadel and Moscovitch
(1997); Reed and Squire (1998); Kapur and Brooks (1999); Westmacott et al. (2001)), al-
though Kitchener et al. (1998) reported apparently unaffected semantic memory for all
time periods. That is, memories for different types of semantic information are differ-
entially affected by hippocampal damage. More subtle distinctions may be seen too.
Knowledge of personalities and public faces may show less extensive RA than mem-
ory for public events (Cipolotti et al. (2001)). The most complex or specific memories
thus appear to be the most affected. Cipolotti et al. (2001)’s study is of further interest
because their amnesic patient showed a more extensive and severe loss of memory for
public events than that usually reported and the study specifically limited the public
events tested to those that ’were no longer discussed in public life’. Therefore it is
possible that these events were more like episodic memory in terms of exposure than
tests in other studies.
Taking all these findings together, less well-learnt, less personally relevant, rela-
tively complex semantic information to which there has been little exposure shows
the greatest retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage. The finding that vocabu-
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lary or object identity information (which may be encountered innumerable times and
in many different circumstances) tends to be preserved, whilst knowledge of events
(especially those that were not in the public eye for an extended period of time) is of-
ten impaired, can be explained if semantic memory is affected in proportion to how
many times the information has been encountered or how much relatively specific de-
tail needs to be recalled. For example, if a patient has had little exposure to a “public
event” (perhaps she only saw a politician once on the television), the memory would
‘behave’ more like an episodic memory. There therefore appears to be a correlation be-
tween the severity of the retrograde RA and the ease with which anterograde learning
of such information proceeds after hippocampal damage.
Fewer semantic details about news events are recalled from all periods by amnesic
patients when compared to normals (Nadel et al., 2000). A similar amount of detail is
recalled about self-selected news events from any period tested in both amnesics and
controls (Nadel et al., 2000), in contrast with the normal loss of detail that occurs as
autobiographical memories age. This implies that the non-core incidental elements of
semantic information (e.g., the colour of Kennedy’s shirt when he was shot) may be
lost very rapidly within the first few years after acquisition. This does not rule out
the possibility that relevant episodic traces can aid the recall of recently acquired or
currently relevant semantic information.
5.2.3.2 ’Episodic’ memory
It is well established that graded RA is seen on typical tests of ’episodic’ memory after
hippocampal damage, with older episodic memories relatively preserved compared to
more recently acquired memories (e.g., Ribot (1881); Rempel-Clower et al. (1996); Reed
and Squire (1998); Kapur and Brooks (1999); Schnider et al. (1994, 1995)). However, as
argued by Nadel and Moscovitch (1997), many standard tests of ostensibly ’episodic’
memory are not very sensitive. Until recently, most tests of episodic autobiographical
memory have relied on a 3-point scoring technique introduced by Crovitz and Shiff-
man (1974) – points are obtained for specifying the time and location of an event, and
supplying an ’appropriate’ amount of detail. Therefore this procedure cannot distin-
guish between memory reports with varying amount of detail above the minimum
subjective threshold (Nadel et al., 2000). We cannot therefore be sure that memories
recalled from recent and remote time periods are in fact equivalent, and should not
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assume that the relative preservation of older memories reported on standard studies
reflects the preservation of an identical type of memory to that lost from the recent
period.
Two very fundamental facts about memory are widely accepted in the wider field
of memory research: firstly, that autobiographical information is very unreliable; and
secondly, that memories get semanticised over time. These ideas have not yet really
had much impact in the field of hippocampal research. However, these facts provide
little support for proposing a system that perfectly preserves episodic information
(as seems implicit in Consolidation Theory). On the contrary, the ’failures’ of mem-
ory may reflect an adaptive loss of information, particularly of contextual and source
detail, that would otherwise overwhelm the memory system (Schacter and Dodson,
2001).
Undoubtedly, humans can store accurate detailed episodic information quickly
and on an ongoing basis; and this ability depends at least in part on the hippocam-
pus (section 3.2.4.1). However, equally undoubtedly, such memories are often poorly
retained and are very inaccurate:
• Most episodic information is forgotten very quickly (days, weeks, months), un-
less it is important enough to be recalled before it has decayed.
• Events that are considered to be ’somewhat important’ and are of sufficient per-
sonal interest to be discussed with others, can be completely forgotten, mis-
remembered or confused with other events after only a few weeks (e.g., 44% of
simple diary-recorded events are misremembered after only 1 - 5 weeks (Linton
(1975); Odegard and Lampinen (2004)).
• Even events that are rated as important when they were experienced, or have
high salience in the general population because they refer to culturally signifi-
cant events, can be completely forgotten or mis-remembered (e.g., information
self-rated as important in a diary study can be completely forgotten or confused
with other events, and a memory for ostensibly well-remembered events such
as hearing that Kennedy had died can be completely incorrect (Linton (1975)).
• False memories can be subjectively compelling (Odegard and Lampinen, 2004),
and can occur even for so-called ’flash-bulb’ memories (Neisser and Harsh,
1992). ’Re-experiencing’ a memory is therefore no guarantee of truth.
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• People regularly falsely import information that is suggested to them into
their subsequent ’re-experienced’ memories, and construct appropriate narra-
tives to incorporate such information (Loftus, 1989; Odegard and Lampinen
(2004)). This presumably happens in normal everyday memory as well as in
experimenter-induced situations.
Therefore any episodic memories that are actually retained relatively intact for
long periods are likely to differ in important ways from an average recently-acquired
memory whose fate may well be to be forgotten or mis-remembered.
There is a very small literature looking in detail at the maintenance of information
over decades. With the exception of diary studies (which have received little attention
in the hippocampal field), most investigations of episodic memory depend on the re-
call of a very few memories from one or more periods spanning a number of years,
that can be corroborated. As I suggested in section 5.2.1 it is almost inevitable that such
memories are semanticised versions of the original episodic memories. Little is known
about old episodic memories in normal subjects (Poliakoff and Meudell (2000)), but it
is possible that very few ’true’ episodic memories are retained for longer than ∼2-
years, or at least they might only be accessible with extremely specific cuing. That is,
old ‘episodic’ memories even in normal subjects may consist largely of well-rehearsed
semanticised fragments. If old retained ’episodic’ memories tend to be semanticised
versions of the original memories, and if the hippocampus is particularly important
for the recall of detailed, complex, more truly episodic information, then graded RA
for the ’episodic’ memories typically recalled on episodic tests could result from the
decreased dependency of semanticised memories on the hippocampus.
In summary, typical episodic recall shows graded RA after hippocampal damage.
However, this likely reflects a normal shift to the recall of semanticised information as
memories age. I discuss data on ’true’ episodic recall in section 5.2.4.1.
5.2.3.3 Tasks that show graded RA in non-human animals
The majority of studies of retrograde amnesia in non-human animals have reported
a temporally-graded retrograde loss of information after hippocampal lesions. These
tasks include delayed non-match to sample (Zola-Morgan and Squire, 1990), contex-
tual freezing (Kim and Fanselow, 1992; Anagnostaras et al., 1999; Maren et al., 1997),
and socially transmitted food preferences (Winocur, 1990; Winocur et al., 2001) (for
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reviews see Squire (1992); Squire et al. (2001); table 2/p221, Nadel and Moscovitch
(1997); table 1/p5, Murray and Bussey (2001)). Cue- and vector-based solutions on
a watermaze also show graded RA (Ramos, 1998; Kubie et al., 1999). Hippocampal
lesions also lead to graded RA for trace-conditioning tasks (Kim et al. (1995); Moyer
et al. (1990); Takehara et al. (2002)). Although the acquisition of trace eyeblink con-
ditioning tasks is massively impaired by hippocampal lesions (unless there has been
remote pretraining, Takehara et al. (2003)), a small amount of learning is possible after
hippocampal damage (section 3.2.3.2).
The existing literature suggests that different tasks might show characteristically
different lengths of RA, which may reflect the ease with which they can initially be
acquired.For example, in rats, contextual-freezing tasks that can be acquired in one
session of 7 CS-US pairings, depend on the hippocampus for only a few days af-
ter acquisition (Sachetti et al., 1999); whilst the recall of trace eyeblink conditioning
that requires 9-10 daily sessions of 90 CS-US pairings for acquisition, requires the hip-
pocampus for up to 4 weeks (in rats, Takehara et al. (2003). Whilst this existing data is
suggestive, it is currently too sparse to draw any strong conclusions.
5.2.3.4 Summary
Graded RA is seen after hippocampal damage for information that can be acquired
to some extent in the absence of the hippocampus. In the human literature, this is
documented on tests of semantic learning, non-allocentric spatial recall and semanti-
cised ’episodic’ recall. In non-human animals, graded RA has been reported for most
tasks with the exception of allocentric spatial information. There may be a correlation
between the severity and extent of retrograde memory deficits and the difficulty with
which anterograde learning of such information proceeds after hippocampal damage.
5.2.4 Information whose acquisition is prevented by hippocampal damage
shows flat retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage
In chapter 3 I concluded that complex memories that are acquired quickly (such as
episodic memory) and those that depend on associations between spatial or temporal
information and other information (such as allocentric spatial navigation) can only
be acquired with an intact hippocampus. In this section I discuss data that suggests
that fully detailed and complex memories of these types remain dependent on the
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hippocampus indefinitely: that is, this information shows a flat rather than temporally
graded loss after hippocampal damage.
5.2.4.1 True episodic memory
Typical tests of retrograde memory do not distinguish between memories with dif-
ferent amounts of detail above a minimum threshold (section 5.2.3.2). In order to
overcome this possible confound, Moscovitch and colleagues devised a new scoring
system in which the number of details provided for each cued memory was counted
(Moscovitch et al. 19983). Using this scheme, Moscovitch et al. (1998) found an in-
creased difference in the scores of control and amnesic groups, and that the small
graded RA that is seen using the old scoring technique disappeared. Nadel et al.
(2000) used the new more sensitive technique to assess the cued recall of memories
from 5 periods from childhood to the recent period, and found that any recall of per-
sonal episodes by the amnesic patients was impoverished in detail at all time periods
tested.
Other studies that have used a similar approach have similarly reported a loss of
detail from all periods (Kitchener et al., 1998; Cipolotti et al., 2001; Westmacott et al.,
2001; Rosenbaum et al., 2001, 2004). Subjects with hippocampal damage recall an
equivalent (small) amount of detail about autobiographical memories from all time
periods, whilst control subjects produce progressively fewer details as memories age
(Nadel et al., 2000; Rosenbaum et al., 2004). Therefore for true episodic recall, patients
show a Ribot-like pattern of recall when compared to control subjects. Clearly it would
be wrong to interpret this as suggesting that the non-damaged areas in the amnesics
were more able to mediate the recall of old rather than new memories of the same
kind. As expected given the arguments of the previous chapter, the amount of detail
recalled on semantic tests, such as memory for public events, has been reported to be
similarly reduced at all time points (Nadel et al., 2000).
Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) argued that flat losses extending up to 40-years for
autobiographical information are seen after “hippocampal complex damage” (see ta-
ble 1, p219, Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) for a summary of the relevant papers). How-
ever, with the exception of two of these studies, most patients have wide damage to
3Paper presented at the Brain, Behaviour and Cognitive Science meeting, Ottawa, Canada; discussed
in Nadel et al. (2000).
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MTL structures and 7/13 have additional damage beyond the MTL, so it is difficult to
draw conclusions from these studies about the effect of hippocampal – or even MTL –
lesions. However, a few studies of patients with relatively circumscribed hippocam-
pal lesions do also report a virtually flat loss of autobiographical episodes (Kartsounis
et al. (1995); Rempel-Clower et al. (1996); Cipolotti et al. (2001); Viskontas et al. (2000)4).
Thus the data suggests that it is possible that damage limited to the hippocam-
pus itself and/or its closely related structures leads to the loss of detailed, complex,
supra-modal associative information such as episodic knowledge from all time pe-
riods, although it is premature to implicate the hippocampus alone in the indefinite
maintenance of detailed information. it seems likely that the hippocampus and other
closely related structures play a similar role in the recall of many tasks.
The idea that the hippocampus might be required indefinitely for the recall of de-
tailed information is given some support by the literature on imaging. Several imag-
ing studies have reported equal activation centred on the hippocampus on the recall
of recent and remote material (on verbal questioning about public events and autobi-
ographical events, Maguire et al. (2001a); for mentally focusing on detailed aspects of
events, Ryan et al. (2001); on verbal probing of autobiographical events, Nadel et al.
(2000); on recall of detailed episodic information, Conway et al. (1999); and on strictly
episodic tests when using SPM analysis, Piolino et al. (2004)). However, it is possible
that the activation reflects new encoding. Furthermore, the studies of Maguire et al.
(2001a) and Ryan et al. (2001) had previously re-activated the memories that were sub-
sequently tested, which might confound a comparison of recent and ’remote’ memo-
ries (see section 6.7).
In contrast, other studies have reported more activation centred on the hippocam-
pus on the recall of recent rather than remote memories (for autobiographical memory
retrieval, Piefke et al. (2003); for topographical details of episodic or semantic memo-
ries, Niki and Luo (2002); and for using cue words to recall episodes, Tsukiura et al.
(2002); although Piolino et al. (2004) reported more activation of the hippocampus
on remote versus recent memory on strictly episodic tests when using ROI analysis.)
These findings might be interpreted as support the traditional view, or might equally
plausibly result from memories becoming increasingly generic with time. Niki and
4Viskontas et al. (2000) reported extensive ungraded RA for episodic memories in patients with uni-
lateral temporal lobe epilepsy. However, since unilateral hippocampal damage does not usually cause
such profound deficits, it seems likely that the extensive RA reflects damage to regions in addition to the
left hippocampus.
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Luo (2002) claim that on their study at least, ’a similar amount of detail was recalled
from all time periods’, but unfortunately they did not control for episodic specificity.
Even when attempts are made to control the similarity of the information recalled from
recent and remote time periods, the quality of the mental image deteriorates with time
(e.g., Piolino et al. (2004)), which suggests that the nature of the information recalled
may be different.
Several other studies have reported differential effects for the left and right hip-
pocampus, which may help to explain the contradictory findings. Several studies
have found equivalent recent and remote activity but only centred on on the left
hippocampus, with recent memories causing greater activation than remote in the
right hippocampus (for the retrieval of autobiographical memory, Maguire and Frith
(2003); and for episodic and semantic memories with a spatial component, Mayes
et al. (2004)). Haist et al. (2001) reported greater recent than remote activation in the
right hippocampus on the recall of knowledge about famous people in response to pic-
tures. Different tasks are known to differentially engage the right or left hippocampus,
so perhaps whether flat or graded RA is observed for whole-hippocampus measure-
ments depends on the detailed nature of the tasks employed. Given that many studies
to date have shown preferential left-sided activation in the recall of autobiographi-
cal memories irrespective of the age of the memory (Maguire and Mummery (1999);
Ryan et al. (2001)), this suggests that the regions primarily involved in the recall of
autobiographical memories may be involved indefinitely in recall.
To my knowledge there are no studies of retrograde amnesia in non-human ani-
mals on tests that could reasonably be said to be analogous to human episodic memory
(such as Clayton and Dickinson (1998)’s “what, where, when” caching task).
In summary, true detailed autobiographical memory appears to remain indefi-
nitely dependent on the hippocampus. However, the relative difference between the
performance of controls and patients lessens as the memories age, suggesting that
detailed memory information is normally lost as memories age. Detailed semantic
information, especially that referring to relatively complex and infrequently encoun-
tered information such as public events and personalities, is also similarly dependent
on the hippocampus.
114 5. Long-term role of the hippocampus
5.2.4.2 Spatial information
Like episodic memory, spatial memory in amnesic patients has generally been re-
ported to show Ribot-like graded RA, with remote memories intact (e.g., anecdotally
in HM; Beatty et al. (1987); Teng and Squire (1999); Morris (1999)). However, also like
episodic memory, recent evidence suggests that the spatial memory measured on stan-
dard tests may be abnormal. A recent extensive study of a severely amnesic patient
reported good memory for general layout and major landmarks of the neighbourhood
lived in since a child, but impairments at remembering details of landmarks and less
salient features (Nadel et al., 2000; Rosenbaum et al., 2001). Thus after hippocampal
damage, spatial memories might also be deficient in detail and complexity at all time
periods.
In non-human animals, hippocampal damage has been reported to lead to un-
graded (i.e. complete) memory loss on tasks such as the water-maze (e.g., Bolhuis
et al. (1994); Ramos (1998); Sutherland et al. (2001), for reviews see Squire (1992); ta-
ble 2, p221 Nadel and Moscovitch (1997); table 1, p5 Murray and Bussey (2001)); and
Squire et al. (2001)). Two studies have reported graded RA after hippocampal lesions
on an ostensibly spatial task in a water-maze (Ramos, 1998; Kubie et al., 1999), but the
nature of the residual performance of the task (and new learning) was qualitatively
different — perhaps based on cues or vectors — so residual memory likely reflects the
performance of areas outside the hippocampus. On the surface, these findings differ
from those in humans, where some apparently allocentric spatial memory can be re-
called from early time periods. However, the retrograde memory tests typically used
in human and non-human animals differ in an important way: animals must perform
a given task which they may or may not retain enough spatial information to perform,
whereas humans are often free to verbally report any spatial information they retain.
In other words, behavioural tests in non-human animals typically depend on the recall
of more specific spatial information than verbal recall tests in humans. Therefore the
complete failure of animals to perform specific allocentric tasks acquired in any pre-
lesion period may be analogous to the failure of humans to retain detailed abstract
spatial information; whilst the residual non-allocentric ability for animals to perform
ego-centric or cue-based strategies that show graded RA may be more analogous to
the general non-specific spatial memories recalled in amnesic humans on most tests to
date.
5.2. Retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage 115
Additionally, the nature of the exposure that humans and non-human animals
have to spatial information differs, if, for example, the recall of neighbourhoods in
humans is compared with an animal’s memory for platform position in a water-maze.
Rosenbaum et al. (2001) found that rats that were trained pre-operatively on a maze
task that encouraged the formation of multiple representations were less impaired af-
ter hippocampal lesions than those trained on an invariant version (though they per-
formed worse than controls which performed similarly after both types of training).
This suggests that the ’multiple representations’ training allows areas other than the
hippocampus to gain some ability to mediate recall of spatial information. Such com-
plex environmental exposure is probably more analogous to human spatial learning,
which might also partially explain why humans show graded or generally reduced but
not absent spatial memory after MTL damage; in contrast to the temporally-extended
gradients seen in non-human animals.
Therefore the animal and human data may be consistent: flat RA is seen for de-
tailed or truly allocentric spatial information that is crucially dependent on the hip-
pocampus at acquisition, and graded RA for less detailed spatial information and for
strategies that could be acquired by regions other than the hippocampus.
Knowlton and Fanselow (1998) have suggested that the tasks that Nadel and
Moscovitch have identified as being stored in the hippocampus on the basis of their
ungraded loss after lesion, are in fact dependent on the hippocampus because of on-
line performance demands such as the use of working memory. This proposal is dif-
ficult to rule out experimentally as any inactivation of the hippocampus would be
expected to simultaneously affect both the putative storage site and any ’online pro-
cess’. Furthermore, the proposal might simply equate to suggesting a specific role for
the hippocampus in the fast acquisition of information, such as when the information
required to solve a task changes from trial to trial. However, ironically, anterograde
deficits may be responsible for producing graded RA in some cases, which rather weak-
ens the argument. In a replication of Bolhuis et al. (1994)’s study, Ramos (1998) found
(as did Bolhuis and colleagues), that the retrograde amnesia reduced progressively as
the time elapsed (1, 16, 32 or 64-days) between acquisition of a radial maze spatial
task and dorsal hippocampal lesions, and no lesion-induced recall deficits were found
after 64-days. This result is therefore in accord with traditional consolidation ideas.
However, if the test data to be analysed was limited to an average of the first 5 tri-
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als (compared to the original 18) — which helps to rule out possible contaminating
re-learning over the test — there were no significant differences in retrograde amne-
sia amongst the experimental groups. That is, all lesioned groups (irrespective of the
timing of the lesion with respect to training) were equally impaired. The “graded na-
ture” of the deficit is apparent only with respect to the controls, since they become
increasingly poorer at recall of more distant information, and thus increasingly close
in performance to the subjects with no recall for any period. Furthermore, Knowlton
and Fanselow (1998)’s ’anterograde deficit’ explanation of flat RA is not very parsimo-
nious, as an additional mechanism would then be needed to explain graded RA.
5.2.4.3 Summary
Memory for detailed information which is inherently likely to be relatively complex,
unique, and/or of low salience appears to depend on the hippocampus indefinitely,
irrespective of whether memories are ostensibly spatial, episodic or semantic. Because
episodic memory is usually defined by reference to the number and/or specificity of
the details that can be recalled, episodic memory appears disproportionately affected,
with true episodic memory showing flat RA after hippocampal damage. At present
there is no evidence that supramodal information such as temporal relational and al-
locentric spatial information becomes independent of the hippocampus over time. In-
stead, hippocampal damage appears to lead to an ungraded retrograde loss of usable
allocentric information, with some sparing of less detailed and less specific spatial
information.
5.2.5 The retrograde effect of hippocampal damage on tasks whose acquisition
is improved by hippocampal damage is currently not known
In chapter 3 I identified a few tasks whose acquisition is speeded by hippocampal
lesions. These were mainly tasks whose ’best’ solution is an egocentric strategy me-
diated by the basal ganglia, such as caudate-dependent learning in a win-stay radial
maze task (e.g., Packard et al. (1989); McDonald and White (1993)). On these tasks,
the hippocampus appears to inhibit simultaneous strategy acquisition by other re-
gions. Unfortunately, I can find no studies that report the retrograde effects on mem-
ory for such tasks after hippocampal lesions, so we can only speculate what those
effects might be.
5.2. Retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage 117
5.2.6 Degenerative and non-discrete disorders
So far I have focused on data that relates to patients with the most discrete hippocam-
pal lesions, or where extra-hippocampal damage can be relatively easily quantified.
In general, where there is evidence of damage to the hippocampus, the findings in
neuro-degenerative disorders do not contradict the findings from studies with discrete
hippocampal lesions. For example, in Alzheimer’s disease (AD), lesions start in the
hippocampal, entorhinal and trans-entorhinal regions, before expanding to neocorti-
cal regions. In accord with this, patients with AD generally present with anterograde
episodic memory deficits and then progress to a breakdown of language, to perceptual
and spatial function and possibly to semantic information. In a direct reflection of the
’discrete’ studies already reviewed, patients with AD have commonly been reported
to show a much greater loss of recent autobiographical memory than recent semantic
memory, although there is better remote recall in both cases (Moss et al., 2003); whilst
truly episodic memories appear to be completely lost (Piolino et al., 2003b). Many
brain insults give rise to hippocampal damage, including Korsakoff’s syndrome, Her-
pes encephalitis, hypoxia, vascular disorders, epilepsy etc. In all cases, there is severe
amnesia as expected, but also extra-hippocampal damage (for a review see Kopelman
(2002)).
Amnesia can also result from various insults to the brain that result in little hip-
pocampal damage. Of these, semantic dementia (SD) has received the most attention
from those interested in the hippocampus and its role in memory: it has been sug-
gested that SD is in some ways a mirror-image of medial temporal lobe amnesia. The
major insult in SD is in the infero-lateral temporal neocortex and temporal poles, and
at least initially there is a relative preservation of the medial temporal lobe. Nestor
et al. (2002) has however noted that similar levels of hippocampal atrophy have been
reported in patients with SD and AD that show the typical memory profiles associ-
ated with these diseases. Patients with SD typically show a progressive impairment
in semantic knowledge as the disease progresses, with a reverse temporal gradient so
that more recently acquired semantic information is better retained. Patients initially
remain well-oriented in time, and can learn new (anterograde) episodic events rela-
tively normally for up to 2 years from the onset of disease (Graham and Hodges, 1997;
Graham et al., 1999).
It has been reported that recent autobiographical memories are better preserved
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than remote memories (Graham and Hodges, 1997; Graham et al., 1999; Nestor et al.,
2002; Piolino et al., 2003a,b). Such data can be seen as support for Consolidation The-
ory in that the relatively preserved hippocampus might mediate recall of recently
acquired, but not old, semantic and episodic memories. However, Moscovitch and
Nadel (1999) have argued that this reverse-Ribot deficit largely reflects linguistic and
semantic deficits, as current everyday experience provide progressively fewer rele-
vant cues or vocabulary for older memories. In accord with this proposal, SD patients
can show relatively well preserved memory for all time periods when cued with fam-
ily photographs (Westmacott et al. (2001)5, and anecdotally, Moss et al. (2003)) or with
increasingly specific verbal cues (Moss et al., 2003).
However, it is difficult to explain in terms of Moscovitch and Nadel’s ’semantic
deficit’ hypothesis how increasingly detailed specific verbal cues could aid autobio-
graphical recall in patients with SD (Moss et al., 2003): it seems implausible that more
specific subordinate cues would be more comprehensible to a patient with semantic
deficits. Instead, tasks that provide very specific cues may simply be easier, which
may disproportionately aid the recall of more impaired older memories, perhaps by
directly activating parts of widespread attractors in the fragmenting semantic system.
In accord with this, Moss et al. (2003)’s patient required significantly more cuing of
older memories to achieve the same level of performance as with more recent mem-
ories: an effect which was absent in controls6. Interestingly, Moss et al. (2003) found
a gentle reverse-Ribot graded RA for autobiographical information in IH for inter-
mediate levels of cuing, like those normally reported in SD. They suggested that the
questions asked in standard memory tests (e.g. AMI or modified Crovitz test) repre-
sent intermediate levels of cuing. This finding therefore provides a bridge between
the two sets of findings.
The recall of autobiographical memories has been reported to be impaired com-
pared to controls at all time periods (Moss et al., 2003; Nestor et al., 2002; Piolino et al.,
2003b). Deficits at all time points would be predicted if the recall of hippocampally-
based traces depends on the integrity of the semantic fragments it indexes, as is usu-
ally assumed. Recently acquired memories would be relatively preserved not because
any hippocampal trace alone can mediate recall, but because they will have been
5Unfortunately, Westmacott et al. (2001)’s study had no control subjects, and the criteria for ’episodic’
recall was rather low.
6Unfortunately, in Moss et al. (2003)’s study, the control subjects were not cued in an equivalently
personally-specific way as IH, so the lack of an effect on recall cannot be taken be taken at face value.
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stored in conjunction with fewer subsequently damaged semantic fragments than
older memories, as less time will have elapsed for the disease process to operate in
the semantic areas. The possibility that older memories might generally depend more
on semanticised memories might also lead to the relative preservation of ’episodic’
memories. The relative preservation of the hippocampus would not protect the re-
call of truly semantic memories stored in the fragmenting semantic system, although
it might be able to provide an alternative, more situation-specific method for recall-
ing some semantic-like information. Given questions over the extent of hippocampal
damage even early on in SD (Nestor et al., 2002), autobiographical deficits may of
course reflect hippocampal damage.
5.3 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter I have examined the effects of hippocampal damage on retrograde
memory. Until recently, the established wisdom was that graded RA is seen after MTL
damage for all information that depends on the hippocampus for its acquisition. In-
stead, the following points appear to more accurately sum up the effect of hippocam-
pal damage on existing memories:
• Information that is obligatorily hippocampally-dependent at acquisition shows
a complete or extremely extensive retrograde loss after hippocampal damage.
This includes:
– The unique non-generic details of complex information, whether ostensibly
semantic, spatial or episodic. By definition, true episodic memories will be
most affected by such a deficit, but all memories are affected to the extent
that they depend on such information.
– Information that involves associations between supra-modal information
and other information (such as using allocentric or temporal information).
• Temporally-graded retrograde memory deficits are seen for information whose
acquisition is facilitated by the hippocampus. This includes:
– Most semantic information in humans.
– Typical ’episodic’ tasks – this probably reflects the increasing semanticisa-
tion of older memories.
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– Most tasks tested to date in non-human animals (excluding allocentric spa-
tial tasks)
There may be a correlation between the severity of anterograde learning deficits
after hippocampal damage, and the extent of retrograde memory deficits for
similar information.
• Memory for information whose acquisition is unaffected by hippocampal dam-
age is probably largely unaffected by hippocampal damage. In a few cases, ret-
rograde amnesia is evident after hippocampal damage, but it not clear whether
the same type of information is being acquired before and after hippocampal
damage.
• It is currently unknown how memory for information whose acquisition is im-
peded by an intact hippocampus is affected by hippocampal damage.
These findings are summarised in table 5.1.
Type of information Effect of hippocampal damage on:
Anterograde learning Retrograde memory
Detailed, complex, supramodal e.g.,
true episodic; complex semantic; al-
locentric navigation
Prevented Flat retrograde amne-
sia
Generic, less complex e.g., semanti-
cised episodic; public events; DNMS;
taxon navigation
Impeded Graded Ribot-like ret-
rograde amnesia
Priming, basic skill learning, classical
conditioning
Unaffected No effect?
Ego-centric strategy learning Improved Unknown
Table 5.1: This table summarises the effect of hippocampal damage on anterograde learning
and retrograde recall of information.
Crucially, hints of characteristically different patterns of recall between different
categories of information have been seen even within the same patients. This helps
to rule out explanations in terms of the different methodologies employed in differ-
ent studies. For example, one patient showed a flat loss of detailed episodic informa-
tion about events prompted by photographs, but graded retrograde deficits in naming
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the people pictured in the photographs (Westmacott et al., 2001); and flat RA for au-
tobiographical memories, but graded RA for personal semantics (Rosenbaum et al.,
2004). Another patient showed flat RA for detailed episodic recall, and a trend to-
wards graded RA on recall of famous faces (Cipolotti et al., 2001).
5.3.1 The long-term role of the hippocampus
There is little evidence that memory components that are initially obligatorily
hippocampally-dependent (traces that mediate the recall of spatial, semantic or
episodic supra-ordinate detail) become independent of the hippocampus, at least not
for normal memories. Perhaps this is not surprising. In chapter 3, I strictly defined
obligatorily hippocampally-dependent tasks as those that could not be acquired to
any extent after hippocampal damage irrespective of the type or extent of post-lesion
training. I suggested that on these tasks, the hippocampus was the only area that could
develop representations of the requisite information under the given task conditions
due to its ability to represent complex associative, novel or supramodal information or
to learn quickly. It is possible that the ’endogenous training’ or rehearsal that is posited
to underlie the relative strengthening of traces outside the hippocampus after acquisi-
tion is similarly incapable of supporting the development of traces for such informa-
tion outside the hippocampus; or at least that it remains a very arduous proposition.
Such information would therefore show a flat loss after hippocampal damage irre-
spective of the time elapsed since acquisition, as the hippocampus would be the only
area that could acquire a representation of that information given the extant learning
conditions.
Information that can be acquired to some extent in the absence of the hippocampus
might be able to benefit from endogenous ’training trials’. Graded RA would there-
fore be seen after hippocampal damage on these tasks, if traces that could mediate
recall were gradually built up outside the hippocampus. Tasks that could be acquired
relatively easily after hippocampal damage, might therefore also be expected to show
relatively short temporal extents of graded RA after hippocampal damage, as the nec-
essary traces might also be relatively easily built up outside the hippocampus after
acquisition.
However, on the basis of the evidence reviewed in this chapter, information that
is initially represented in the hippocampus does not appear to be copied wholesale to
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the extra-hippocampal regions. Instead, over time, regions lower in the neocortical-
hippocampal hierarchy may develop representations that are less complete than those
stored at higher levels such as the hippocampus, but that can nevertheless mediate
performance on some tasks. I explore this and related issues in the next chapter.
Crucially, the switch from a dependence on specific to more generic memories (and
therefore the appearance of graded RA) can only occur on tasks that can be mediated
by semanticised ’reduced’ traces, and not on those in which all/some of the details
initially stored remain important to performance.
In chapter 4 I concluded that different types of tasks are hippocampally-dependent
at acquisition for different reasons: some rely on the convergence properties of the hip-
pocampus, others on its ability for rapid learning, and yet others on prolonged delay
activity that allows difficult associations to be formed. It seems that tasks also have
different long-term fates in terms of hippocampal dependency. In the next chapter,
I discuss how the semanticisation of memories, and its interaction with the specific
nature of memory tasks, can inform an overall understanding of the role of the hip-
pocampus.
Chapter 6
Semanticisation and the role of the
hippocampus
In this chapter I argue that information that is obligatorily hippocampally-dependent
at acquisition is indefinitely dependent on the hippocampus for recall. As all mem-
ories tend to decay with time, detailed information may not be maintained for the
lifetime of the animal, although the core ’semantic’ features may be retained outside
of the hippocampus. The graded retrograde amnesia seen after hippocampal damage
on tasks that can be acquired to some extent in the absence of the hippocampus reflects
a qualitative change in the nature of memories recalled from recent and remote peri-
ods. That is, it reflects the semanticisation of memories. Semanticisation of a memory
at recall results from a number of factors including the loss of detailed information, an
increase in the strength of semantic components, or differences in the recall strategies
underpinning the recall of new and old memories. Post-acquisition memory process-
ing is multi-stage and lifelong, and acts to produce semanticised re-representations
of information that can co-exist with more detailed traces. Different information and
even different components of information acquired together may have different fates
in terms of their long-term dependence on the hippocampus.
6.1 Introduction
It is instructive to begin this chapter by considering how the main extant theories of
the long-term role of the hippocampus – that is, Consolidation Theory and Multiple
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Trace Theory – cope with explaining the existing data. In the rest of the chapter I show
that a theory of progressive semanticisation can better accommodate existing findings,
focusing on the data that is most problematic for the aforementioned theories.
6.1.1 Traditional Consolidation Theory
Traditional Consolidation Theory (CT) approaches are motivated by the numerous
reports of graded RA after hippocampal damage, which is assumed to reflect grad-
ual hippocampally-driven consolidation in extra-hippocampal regions. It also rests
on the assumption that the hippocampus is a small limited-capacity store, and that
there is need for hippocampally-supported interleaved learning in the cortex to avoid
catastrophic interference. Further support comes from studies that show that the hip-
pocampus is progressively less active for recall as memories get older, whilst extra-
hippocampal areas become more active (e.g. Bontempi et al. (1999); Piefke et al. (2003);
Niki and Luo (2002)), although not all studies have shown this pattern. Studies show-
ing an off-line replay of activity that was present during learning (e.g., Skaggs and
McNaughton (1996); Qin et al. (1997)), and the neurodynamics of the hippocampus
in different phases of sleep (e.g., Chrobak and Buzsáki (1994); Kudrimoti et al. (1999))
have also been interpreted as circumstantial evidence that the hippocampus might be
involved in replaying information to the rest of the brain.
However, evidence that cannot be easily accommodated by this view is accumu-
lating and several a priori assumptions can be questioned. For example:
• Finding extensive ungraded retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage
(section 5.2.4) implies that the hippocampus may be a permanent storage site
for some information.
• The information recalled in normal individuals from different time periods is
qualitatively different (section 5.2.3.2) – which suggests that memories stored
initially in the hippocampus, and recalled subsequently from the cortex, may
differ.
• Graded RA can also occur after damage to the structures other than the hip-
pocampus, both in the MTL and elsewhere, which implies that the hippocam-
pus/MTL may not be unique in its long-term memory role. (This issue is dis-
cussed further in section 6.3.)
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• The state of activation of a trace rather than memory age per se may determine
whether it is vulnerable to amnestic agents or hippocampal damage. This sug-
gests that the idea that memories become less fragile with time is too simplistic.
(This issue is discussed further in section 6.7).
• Lifelong neurogenesis in the hippocampus makes it questionable that the hip-
pocampus has a limited storage capacity and can therefore only function as a
temporary memory store, especially since capacity is inextricably linked to ques-
tions about the nature of information being stored, which is still open to debate.
• Graded RA has been reported to extend for decades in humans with large medial
temporal lobe lesions. Therefore events from much of our ancestors’ lifetime can
be apparently maintained without the completion of ’consolidation’ which is
supposed to protect memories.
• Hippocampally-driven interleaved learning in the cortex is thought to be neces-
sary to prevent catastrophic interference on memory storage in the cortex. How-
ever, this argument depends partly on the assumption that the cortex stores de-
tailed episodic memories, which can be questioned.
Moreover, ’strong’ interpretations of consolidation theory that supposes that initial
memory storage takes place only in the hippocampus are refuted by large amounts of
evidence showing learning-related changes in the cortex on the initial acquisition of
hippocampally-dependent tasks (Greenough and Bailey, 1988), and by data suggest-
ing that areas other than the hippocampus can initially hold information on learning
tasks when the hippocampus is inactivated (Floresco et al., 1996).
Furthermore, the concept of consolidation is divorced from the nature of the infor-
mation that is putatively ’consolidated’. Therefore, it can provide no insight into the
anterograde deficits that arise after hippocampal damage, or the different durations
of RA reported for different tasks. Whilst this cannot be considered a criticism of the
theory’s ability to explain the existence of RA per se, one would expect AA and RA to
be related and therefore a unified parsimonious explanation of acquisition and reten-
tion would be preferable. Similarly, since the consolidation view explains the Ribot
gradient by proposing the need for a process called ’consolidation’ that is supposed to
make memories less vulnerable to interference, it clearly cannot provide a reason for
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a process that makes memories vulnerable every time they are retrieved as is implied
by the reconsolidation literature (see section 6.7).
In summary, consolidation remains a hypothetical construct, for which conclusive
evidence is lacking. Flat retrograde amnesia can occur after hippocampal damage, as
well as graded RA; and the information recalled from recent and remote periods may
be qualitatively different. This strongly suggests that consolidation needs re-thinking.
6.1.2 Multiple Trace Theory
Nadel and Moscovitch (1997)’s Multiple Trace Theory (MTT) explains the Ribot gra-
dient by proposing a gradual proliferation of traces in the ’hippocampal complex’
(HC)1 as memories are reactivated and rehearsed, that makes partial damage to this
system less likely to lead to memory loss over time. The recall of all autobiographical
memories, whether recent or remote is dependent on the HC, with flat RA resulting
from complete HC lesions. This reflects the permanent role of the hippocampus in
storing spatial contextual components of episodic memory. In later versions of MTT it
was made stated that hippocampal-neocortical connections could contribute to the ex-
traction of semantic information to be stored in the neocortex, although how episodic
trace proliferation leads to graded RA for semantic information is never spelt out. Pre-
sumably this would provide a second consolidation-like mechanism that could gener-
ate graded RA in the model without reference to multiple traces, although this is not
made explicit. Thus, MTT can accommodate findings of flat and graded RA after com-
plete and partial HC lesions respectively. Furthermore, imaging and activation stud-
ies showing equal MTL activation on the recall of remote and recent autobiographical
memories (e.g. Maguire et al. (2001a); Conway et al. (1999); Piolino et al. (2004)) can
easily be accommodated.
However, other data is problematic for MTT.
• Apparently complete lesions of the hippocampus have been reported to produce
graded RA (for spatial information in rats, Winocur et al. (2001); Squire et al.
(2001) and for episodic, semantic, and spatial information in humans, Teng and
Squire (1999)), whereas MTT would predict graded RA only for partial lesions.
1In Nadel and Moscovitch’s terminology the ’hippocampal complex’ effectively refers to the whole of
the medial temporal lobe, and includes the hippocampal formation, the entorhinal cortex, the perirhinal
cortex and the parahippocampal gyrus, and sometimes the amygdala too. Confusingly, the implemented
computational model of MTT refers only to the hippocampus (Nadel et al., 2000).
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• Partial hippocampal lesions are sometimes more detrimental to memory func-
tion than complete lesions (Baxter and Murray, 2001); whereas in MTT, partial
lesions should allow better recall performance than complete lesions.
• Flat and graded RA have been seen in the same patient depending on the task.
Since the extent of RA in MTT is supposed to depend on the degree of damage
to the ’hippocampal complex’ then this result directly contradicts MTT.
• If trace replication is supposed to increasingly protect memories from partial
hippocampal complex damage, then replicated traces in the hippocampus must
be largely non-overlapping2. Therefore the reactivation of existing traces and the
putative laying down of a new one would not be expected to interfere, although
this is what the reconsolidation literature appears to imply (section 6.7).
• One of the few consistent findings in the re-consolidation literature is that the
processes occurring at initial ’consolidation’ are different and more laborious
than those occurring at ’re-consolidation’. This is very difficult to explain in
terms of MTT, as the processes occurring at each reactivation – that is, new learn-
ing of non-overlapping traces – should be very similar.
• Data suggesting a change in the locus of recall from the hippocampus to else-
where over time (e.g., Izquierdo and Medina (1997); Frankland et al. (2001); Bon-
tempi et al. (1999)) is problematic for original versions of MTT, although it is
unclear whether later versions of the theory allow for this if the information is
not truly autobiographical.
• Similarly, a qualitative change in the nature of information recalled over time
(see previous chapter) is not explicitly predicted by MTT, although may possibly
be accommodated by later theoretical stances.
• Graded RA extending for decades cannot be easily accommodated by MTT, es-
pecially since Nadel and colleagues (2000) interpret their simulation results as
implying that traces should best be replicated only a few times.
As with CT, there is little attempt to relate MTT proposals to the hippocampus’s
anterograde role, although MTT does make a distinction between the fate of autobi-
2MTT qualitative theory and the implemented model do however appear to differ in the degree to
which replicated traces overlap, see Nadel et al. (2000).
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ographical and semantic memories as regards the hippocampal complex. It is also
not clear that such massive redundancy (each reactivation of a trace resulting in the
storage of a new unrelated trace) is either plausible or beneficial. From a theoretical
point of view, the idea of using truly random orthogonal traces to represent the same
information is a little problematic, too, as it is not clear what they would ’mean’.
In summary, the idea that graded RA reflects trace proliferation in the ’hippocam-
pal complex’ is difficult to defend. Not only is there empirical evidence to the con-
trary, but the idea that the development of multiple physically-separate traces under-
lies graded RA remains hypothetical, and conclusive evidence is lacking.
6.1.3 Semanticisation theory
I believe it is time to seek an alternative to both Consolidation theory and Multiple
Trace Theory. Like Nadel and Moscovitch I believe that some memories do remain
dependent on the hippocampus for the lifetime of that information although not nec-
essarily for the lifetime of the animal. In accord with Consolidation Theory, I agree
that the neural substrate that is necessary for recall of some tasks can change over time.
However, I believe that the existing data points to a new understanding which we
might call ’Semanticisation Theory’, which has not hitherto been worked out in much
detail. In order to distinguish my proposals from the assumptions of related ideas
embedded in other work (e.g.Rosenbaum et al. (2001)) I dub my views ’Gingell’s Se-
manticisation Theory’ or GST. In this view, different types of information, and even
different components of information that were acquired at the same time, can have
different fates in terms of maintenance by the hippocampus, and on whether and how
other regions take over recall of this information.
GST shares some tenets with CT, but they differ fundamentally in several ways.
Firstly, in GST, memories whose recall can be mediated by non-hippocampal regions
are qualitatively different to those whose recall is necessarily mediated by the hip-
pocampus. Graded RA after hippocampal damage results not from a hippocampally-
driven consolidation process which gradually teaches the cortex the same information
that was initially held by the hippocampus, but largely from a change in the nature of
memories that are recalled from earlier periods. Secondly, in GST, the recall of non-
semanticised memories can depend on the hippocampus or MTL for as long as those
traces are retained. GST is also significantly different to MTT. Most obviously, trace
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proliferation in the hippocampus plays no part in GST’s explanation of graded RA
after hippocampal damage. GST also explicitly connects the long-term fate of a trace
in the brain to the nature of the task, a feature lacking in both CT and MTT.
The nature of the information recalled in normal individuals from recent and re-
mote time periods is qualitatively different. In my opinion, this is fundamental to
understanding the long-term role of the hippocampus and leads to a coherent expla-
nation of the extent and nature of RA after hippocampal damage. In normal individ-
uals, recent memories of all types tend to be more detailed, complex and ’situated’
than remote memories, and there is a tendency for remote memories to be semanti-
cised or ’tend toward the norm’. Patients with hippocampal damage tend to produce
memories from all time periods that are more generic, less specific and less detailed
than normals, for both typical semantic memory (e.g., knowledge of geography, Nadel
et al. (2000)) and for unique events Nadel et al. (2000); Rosenbaum et al. (2004)). Flat RA
for true (detailed) episodic information therefore arises straightforwardly because the
hippocampus is needed indefinitely for the recall of detailed, complex, supra-modal
information. Graded RA on memory tests after hippocampal damage can arise for
several reasons, including ’process-related’ reasons such an increasing dependence on
semanticised memories for older information; as well ’methodological reasons’ such
as matching control performance on recent and remote memories, which effectively
guarantees that recent and remote memories were qualitatively different from the out-
set.
Semanticisation of a given memory can result from the operation of several mech-
anisms including the normal decay of the details of memories, the relative or absolute
enhancement of semanticised representations and the use of different memory recall
strategies. I discuss these in section 6.2. In section 6.3 I argue that instead of a unitary
hippocampal or MTL long-term memory processing system, there may be a series of
regions that represent progressively more semanticised information. Semanticisation
can also provide an explanation for the very long gradients of RA seen in human am-
nesic patients (section 6.4). Whilst it is implausible that a consolidation process should
last for an organism’s lifetime, it seems reasonable that memory could be continually
re-organised and re-represented in order to make it more generalisable and to preserve
the key important features even as detailed information decays. At a given time, mul-
tiple representations of different degrees of complexity and specificity may be avail-
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able to mediate performance depending on the exact demands of a particular task
(section 6.5). The realisation that the details of episodic information tend to remain
dependent on the hippocampus for as long as they are retained, rather than being
transferred to extra-hippocampal areas, also renders moot arguments about the ne-
cessity for a hippocampal mechanism that supports interleaved learning (section 6.6).
Similarly, the idea that memories are continually being re-represented and progres-
sively more robust semanticised traces being formed, can provide an understanding
of why memories appear to undergo similar processes when they are recalled as they
do when they are initially stored (section 6.7), an explanation which eludes existing
theories.
6.2 Graded retrograde amnesia results from the semanticisation
of memories
There is little evidence to support the idea that memories are retained for long periods
of time with an undiminished ability to mediate recall. Instead, memories and com-
ponents of memory are often forgotton, with the most specific detailed information
usually being lost first. Specific memories therefore become more like average generic
memories over time: this is termed semanticisation. Semanticisation of a memory at
recall results from the relative decrease in the trace strength of detailed information
compared to more generic information. This might occur because of 1) a decay of the
detailed information; and/or 2) a relative or absolute increase in the strength of the
semantic traces; and/or 3) from a change over time in the recall strategy employed to
access memories as they age. I examine these possibilities in turn:
6.2.1 Decay of detailed information
On free recall tests, normal people produce many more details about recently ac-
quired autobiographical memories than remote memories (Nadel et al., 2000; Rosen-
baum et al., 2004). This normal decay of detailed information would in itself contribute
to the semanticisation on average of autobiographical memories. Since hippocampal
amnesic patients, show poor (but equivalent) recall of details about personal episodes
from all periods back to childhood (Nadel et al., 2000; Rosenbaum et al., 2004), am-
nesic patients are more impaired with respect to controls in the recent period on the
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recall of true detailed episodic information. This relative effect could contribute to the
appearance of graded RA, depending on the test procedures used in a given study.
Existing data is limited, but suggests that even at the most remote time period,
the performance of amnesics and control subjects on the recall of episodic details does
not completely converge (Nadel et al., 2000; Rosenbaum et al., 2004). Therefore, some
detailed information may be retained by the hippocampus/MTL throughout life in
normal people.
6.2.2 Increased ability of semantic traces to mediate recall
Learning-related processes in the cortex are well-documented and there is a growing
recognition that areas outside the hippocampus can learn independently, albeit more
slowly (see section 3.2.3.1). Therefore, one possible way that semantic information
might build up in the lower levels is from continued re-exposure to real-world events
containing repeated features. Over time, areas outside the hippocampus would be-
come more able to mediate recall of re-experienced generic information. Therefore
older memories that are more dependent on generic information at recall would be
less affected than recent memories by hippocamal damage.
By definition, each real-world episodic event (which may however incorporate re-
peated semantic fragments) will not be re-experienced, and therefore true episodic
representations could not be strengthened by this mechanism. It has been argued that
if episodes could be re-experienced (for example, by replaying a video, Holdstock
et al. (2002)) then cortical regions could build up a trace of such episodic information.
Whilst repeated exposures to an event might increase the strength of some aspects of
the memory representation, I would stress that this does not necessarily mean that
the non-hippocampal regions are acquiring the same information as that stored in re-
sponse to a true episode. The aspects of an episodic event that can be captured on
film are only a subset of what constitutes an episodic event – each time the film is
viewed, another ’true’ episodic event is occurring that incorporates the viewers cur-
rent thoughts and feelings, expectations, recent experiences, attention paid to parts of
the film, etc. These more transient truly episodic details will never be captured by the
slower-learning cortex. There may be no fundamental logical reason why such infor-
mation could not eventually end up being represented in the cortex, if events could be
accurately replayed to the cortex over a very long period of time, but such a learning
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scenario is practically impossible.
This does not mean that the hippocampus and other higher levels never help the
lower levels to acquire information that they would not realistically be able to ac-
quire by themselves. For example, extra-hippocampal areas alone can initially medi-
ate normal learning and performance on a probablistic weather-prediction task, but
the absence of the hippocampus impairs later performance (Poldrack et al., 2001). The
hippocampus may act as a scaffold to direct learning that occurs elsewhere on incre-
mental tasks that are learnt over multiple trials. However, it is important to note that
with the hippocampus’ help, the extra-hippocampal areas develop representations of
information that have been extracted from several trials, rather supporting learning
about event-specific information.
Another possibility for increasing the strength of semantic traces is that the re-
activation of traces stored at higher levels in the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy
could support learning at the lower levels, by orchestrating the offline co-activation
of ’semantic areas’ that might then strengthen shared connections. This is the mech-
anism usually posited to underlie consolidation. However, I do not believe that such
rehearsal can support a complete replication of information from one level to the next.
Different versions of an event would be recalled using traces stored at different lev-
els in the hierarchy: memory recall mediated by traces stored at lower levels will be
progressively more semanticised than those stored at the higher levels. There is no
wholesale transfer of detailed episodic information to the cortex.
Replay-aided learning or rehearsal by definition occurs on the basis of the recalled
memory, rather than in response to a real event. Overt recall that can be measured is
notoriously unreliable (see section 5.2.3.2), and there is no a priori reason to believe
that ’endogenous rehearsal’ should be any more reliable. The neural environment (in
terms of recent activity, intended action, circulating hormones, co-activation of other
information etc.) will be different each time a trace is reactivated, which will also affect
what is recalled, as well as how any reactivated information is re-stored. Therefore it
is likely that only the core elements of a memory will be reliably reactivated at each
replay trial, and therefore only those elements will be enhanced/retained over time.
As already noted, there can be no absolute definition of what is ’core’ to an event
or memory, as it must be defined with respect to instances of that event, and/or to
the knowledge and expectations of an individual (section 4.3). Broadly speaking, core
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features can be seen as the key semantic features of a memory that must be present
if recall of that information can be said to have occurred. For the recall of events, it
is most likely to be these (if any) features that are reliably recalled each time, whilst
incidental features (such as shirt colour, who got on the train first) are inconsistently
recalled. Therefore any rehearsal-driven memory storage would be expected to dis-
proportionately benefit the most important semantic elements, even of specific autobi-
ographical episodes. Furthermore, since information represented in the higher levels
of the hierarchy decays at a relatively faster rate than information elsewhere, details
may well be lost before they can be replicated. In addition, given ’wiring constraints’
it is likely to be relatively more difficult to develop traces for novel complex detailed
information in regions outside the hippocampus, which also implies that on average,
the details of events are likely to be less reliably replicated than the generic aspects.
Figure 6.1 sums up these ideas. In Figure 6.1a, a memory is laid down initially
most robustly in the hippocampus, but also in the cortex. In the lowest cortical re-
gions, long-range connections between cortical regions do not reliably register new
associations. Immediate recall via hippocampal traces results in the recall of the most
detailed information (Figure 6.1b). Immediate cortically-mediated recall may elicit
some information, especially if the recently-acquired information is similar to infor-
mation already stored, because such related information will be easier to register in
the slow-learning cortex. However, such information may be fragmentary and only
locally robust. For all memories that are retained and do not decay immediately, fewer
details are available as a memory ages. Recall via the hippocampus will however al-
ways elicit the most detailed information even though parts of the hippocampal index-
ing trace or the cortical fragments representing details of exemplars may deteriorate
(Figure 6.1d). Cortical traces for the core features may become more robust over time
through re-exposure to similar information embedded in different events, or attractor-
based endogenous replay (Figure 6.1e), although in many cases the improvement in
cortical recall may only be relative to hippocampally-mediated recall.
6.2.3 Change in recall strategy
Another possible source of semanticisation is that different recall strategies might be
used to elicit recall for recently and remotely acquired memories. If asked to recall a
specific event from the last week, information ’springs to mind’ relatively easily be-
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(e) Later recall via NC: semanticisa-
tion through cortical learning
Figure 6.1: Diagram of memory acquisition and long-term development. HC = hippocampal
component, NC = neocortical component.
cause recall can be cued by currently relevant features of one’s life. However, if asked
to recall something from twenty years ago, the search must be focused using personal
semantic knowledge (what age would I have then? Was I at university? Which uni-
versity? Where was I living? etc.) until the recall of a salient incident is triggered.
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Increasing evidence shows that memories are often created (not merely re-created) at
recall, and that an estimate of the plausibility of a possible personal event may be
based on personal semantic information (Odegard and Lampinen, 2004). This im-
plies that the recall of older or currently less salient autobiographical events might
be based on ’guesses’ about what might reasonably have happened. Such a strategy
would therefore contribute to the progressive semantication of older recalled memo-
ries, and tend to shift older memories towards a norm. If more detailed and specific
cues are provided as recall cues (e.g., a photograph of the event in question) then re-
call would depend less on personal semantic memory. Therefore, the search strategies
used for recent and remote memories might be more similar, and the relative degree
of semanticisation of the older memories recalled might be reduced.
A related possibility is that there is a change in the balance of ’competitive power’
between neural regions over time, so that the recall of older memories tends on av-
erage to be mediated by regions further down the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy.
This is perhaps merely another way of saying that the memories at higher levels might
decay faster than those at lower levels. However, I return to the issue of competition
between regions and the co-existence of multiple traces in section 6.5.
6.2.4 Episodic and semantic memory revisited
In section 4.6.2 I argued that episodic memory was best seen as an extreme point on
a continuum of memory types. In the previous chapter, we saw that memories tend
to become more semanticised over time, in that the most specific details are lost, and
progressively fewer details are recalled when a particular memory is recollected. That
is, archetypal ’episodic’ memories may tend to be recalled in a semanticised form as
time progresses. Above I discussed in detail the possible mechanisms underlying the
semanticisation of memories. Loosely speaking, the repeated presentation of similar
events allows the gradual build-up of a trace in the cortex of the repeated core (se-
mantic) parts of the event, which will be largely shorn of the non-repeated episodic
detail. Semantic traces will thus tend to build up over time as the rate of decay is rel-
atively low in the cortical areas. The hippocampus will retain the most detailed traces
for their lifetime. Semantic information ultimately derives from exposure to episodes
since all experience of the world unfolds in episodes, but does not necessarily depend
on a functioning episodic learning system that allows the demonstration of the recall
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of each such individual episode.
The ’uniqueness’ and specificity of memories reflects the amount of detail known
about the entities involved (i.e. information about specific exemplars), and/or infor-
mation about the combinations of entities involved, which may themselves be proto-
typical or specific. Semanticisation of information could therefore result from a loss
of the higher traces that co-ordinate the recall of increasingly unique conjunctions of
fragments, or from a change in the ’content’ of the fragments from specific to proto-
typical. In terms of the neocortical-hippocampal representational hierarchy proposed,
information about the combinations of fragments to be co-recalled will tend to depend
on the higher regions, whilst the representations of exemplars may come to depend
on the lower regions. Exemplars, such as the next-door neighbour’s cat ’Cynthia’,
can be repeatedly experienced, therefore a representation of that specific cat can be
built up through real-world experience. Such learning throughout life leads to the
development of a range of information about entities from relatively specific to more
generic, for example, representations of Cynthia... of Persian cats... of cats generally...
of mammals etc.
On the other hand, specific events of which exemplars are part cannot be re-
experienced in the real-world, and therefore representations of features of specific
episodes cannot be built up in the same way. However, different types of events can
be re-experienced allowing the development of ’scripts’ ranging from the specific to
the more generic, for example, representations of what is involved in walking a dog...
or, more specifically, taking the next-door neighbours’ dog for a walk... or what is
likely to ensue when the next-door neighbours dog sees Cynthia etc. The whole sys-
tem might therefore be considered to form a continuum from generic semantic infor-
mation to progressively more more specific episodic representations (as suggested by
Figure 4.1).
All other things being equal, traces stored in the hippocampus will decay very
rapidly after initial acquisition, whilst traces stored in the cortex will be relatively sta-
ble. Episodic traces stored in the hippocampus will initially be relatively very strong,
but in normal circumstances will decay very fast: most inconsequential episodic infor-
mation appears to be largely lost within days of the experience. Any retained detailed
information is likely to remain dependent on the hippocampus for its lifetime. A weak
trace of some of the novel components of an episodic event might be retained in the
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cortex, especially when this information can be easily represented in the existing ar-
chitecture (usually because it is relatively similar to what has gone before). Any such
episodic information will be very weak and probably fragmentary, and be unlikely
to be accessible without very specific cuing; but relatively stable over time. Semantic
information stored in the lower regions is relatively stable.
6.3 Semanticisation is a multi-stage process
Proponents of traditional Consolidation Theory originally proposed that all structures
of the medial temporal lobe (MTL) namely the entorhinal and perirhinal cortices, hip-
pocampal formation and parahippocampal cortex, plus the fornix, worked together
as a single functional unit in the consolidation of memories (e.g., Alvarez and Squire
(1994); Squire and Alvarez (1995)). However, recent evidence undermines the idea
that the MTL plays a unitary role in long-term memory.
It is now largely accepted that different MTL structures make specialised contri-
butions to anterograde learning and memory. For example, the perirhinal cortex (PrC)
has a larger role in recognition memory (as indexed by DNMS tasks) than other areas
(Suzuki, 1996; Murray et al., 2000), and does not contribute to spatial memory (Ag-
gleton et al., 2000); whilst the entorhinal cortex (EC) contributes to object recognition
memory (but less than the PrC) and to some spatial tasks (although less that the hip-
pocampus, Suzuki et al. (1997); Aggleton et al. (2000)), and in some cases perform these
functions apparently normally in the absence of other MTL structures. One would
therefore expect different MTL structures to make distinct and perhaps independent
contributions to the long-term maintenance of information, too.
Indeed, the steepness and extent of the graded RA seen after damage to MTL struc-
tures depends both on the region, and on the information being tested. For example,
in rodents, recall of a one-trial step-down inhibitory avoidance task depends on the
entorhinal cortex for more than 30-d (Quillfeldt et al., 1996) and the parietal cortex
for more than 60-d, with intra-parietal CNQX (an AMPA-receptor antagonist) only
partially effective at causing amnesia at 90-d (for reviews see Izquierdo and Medina
(1997); Ambrogi-Lorenzini et al. (1999)); recall of context- or tone-freezing in rats re-
quires the hippocampus for more than 1.5-h, the basolateral amygdala for up to 2 days
and the perirhinal cortex for 8 days (Sachetti et al., 1999); and recall of trace eyeblink
conditioning requires the hippocampus for up to 4 weeks ( in rats, Takehara et al.
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(2003) and mice, Takehara et al. (2002)). Other species show a similar pattern, for ex-
ample, in Rhesus monkeys, recall of a two-object discrimination problem depends on
the hippocampus for less than 4 weeks, but on the rhinal cortex for at least 16 weeks
(Thornton et al., 1997). This strongly suggests that different MTL structures have at
least partly independent long-term roles, and that they become redundant in a fixed
order.
Graded RA has occasionally been reported after damage to non-MTL structures
such as the mamillary bodies, thalamic nuclei, substantia nigra and prefrontal cortex
(Winocur, 1990; Aggleton and Brown, 1999). Therefore, we must also conclude that
whatever mechanism underlies the production of graded RA after a lesion, it is not
unique to the MTL. Furthermore, different patient groups with different brain dam-
age, show characteristic differences in the nature and extent of graded RA, which also
implies that graded RA is not caused by a single mechanism.
The ’unitary MTL’ view of consolidation has clearly been superseded. Instead,
the data outlined above shows that for tasks that show graded RA after hippocampal
damage, individual regions in a series of regions (including structures in the MTL) are
required for recall for different periods of time after acquisition, and that they become
redundant in a predictable sequence. The hippocampus appears to become redundant
first, followed by the EC, and then other areas such as the PrC and the parietal cortex.
For each type of task, the relative importance of different regions appears to change,
as does the length of time that regions are required.
It is commonly suggested that the hippocampus acts as a ’scaffold’ or ’indexing
system’ (Teyler and Discenna, 1986) that can co-activate traces stored in cortical re-
gions. However, the evidence outlined above suggests that this proposal should be ex-
tended at least to other areas in the MTL. This suggestion is close in spirit to Damasio
(1989b)’s concept of ’fragments’ and ’convergence zones’ throughout the brain. In sec-
tion 4.3 I introduced the idea of a ’neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy’. The aforemen-
tioned regions do indeed become redundant in the order predicted by this hierarchy,
with flat retrograde memory loss usually reported for non-MTL structures, especially
those lower in the hierarchy. In this view, the hippocampus is unique in its scaffolding
role mainly because of its unique position at the top of the neocortical-hippocampal
hierarchy, rather than because of qualitative differences in function; although its high
plasticity and information convergence makes it distinct from other MTL structures in
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other ways too.
Of course, different structures in the MTL specialise in processing different types of
information and/or performing different functions, and are not distinguished solely
on the basis of the complexity of the information they represent and the speed with
which they acquire it. The perirhinal cortex is implicated in learning about conjunc-
tions of visual features and memory for objects (Murray et al., 2000); the parahip-
pocampal gyrus in memory for landmarks and contexts (Owen et al., 1996); and the
hippocampus in memory for spatial locations (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). Damage to
each of them leads to a complete loss of the type of information that they process.
However, these regions could also be seen as representing increasingly specific infor-
mation, from identity-free landmarks, through objects, to objects in particular places.
6.3.1 Scaffolding and inter-regional information transfer
There is substantial evidence for changes in neocortical structure as a result of learning
occurring over weeks or months after training. For example, exposure to an enriched
environment or to certain tasks leads to increases in dendritic length and synapse
number in the relevant cortical areas (for a review see Greenough and Bailey (1988));
and somato-sensory and sensory cortical maps can reorganise and contract or expand
after experience with certain sensory tasks or after lesions or sensory deprivation (see
any neuroscience text e.g., Shepherd (1994); Kandel et al. (1995)). However, there is
only scant direct evidence that the hippocampus or other areas in the hippocampal-
neocortical hierarchy are necessary for the post-training changes in cortical traces that
governs their time-dependent ability to mediate recall (although such data should be
crucial to a defence of Consolidation Theory).
After the initial acquisition of information, memory-related processes do com-
monly occur sequentially in different regions, as might be expected if changes in
a lower region depended on input from a higher region. However, the most well-
documented of these are are relatively short-term memory-related processes (extend-
ing for minutes or hours3) which are therefore of a different order to the extensive
3For example, the timing of the onset of the initial NMDA-dependent phase of memory in the hip-
pocampus, EC, and parietal cortex is sequential, starting immediately and extending for a few minutes
in the hippocampus, starting 30-min after training in the EC, and after 60-min in the parietal cortex
(Izquierdo and Medina (1997)). The sequence and time courses for impairments are similar (but not
completely coincident in all areas) to those caused by the PKA inhibitor KT 5720 (Bernabeu et al. (1997);
Izquierdo and Medina (1997); Ardenghi et al. (1997)).
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periods of retrograde amnesia previously reported (days, weeks and months in ro-
dents and non-human primates, and years in humans), and could not explain that
phenomenon. Additionally, some studies have reported no obvious sequence4.
In terms of evidence that regions higher in the hierarchy might support learn-
ing at lower levels, one preliminary study found that the changes in total dendritic
length seen after enriched experiences in the occipital lobe were reduced by dam-
aging the hippocampal formation before the environmental manipulation, although
this task did not in fact require the hippocampus for acquisition (Sutherland et al.,
1993). Miyashita and colleagues found that ibotenate lesions of EC/PrC in monkeys5
disrupted the development of the code for paired associates in IT neurons – that is,
the paired associates fail to elicit significantly correlated responses in the IT cells of
the lesioned animals – without impairing the non-learnt response to each visual stim-
ulus (Miyashita et al, 1994; Miyashita et al., 1998). Thus it is possible that cells in the
PrC/EC acts as a coincidence detector for representations of the paired associates, and
then act a scaffold for the IT neurons to develop these responses. This sparse evidence
therefore suggests that higher areas in the neocortical-hippocampal axis might support
learning in lower levels, although the evidence remains far from conclusive.
As I have already indicated (section 6.2.2), information that is initially represented
at one level is not generally completely replicated at a lower level. When a higher area
becomes redundant for the performance of a given task, it is because a ’sufficient’
amount of information to perform the task can be recalled via the lower regions, not
because all the information that was initially represented in the higher regions has nec-
essarily been transferred wholesale to the lower regions. Given the well-documented
learning capacities of the cortex and other areas, it is likely that much of the informa-
tion represented there is determined by those regions, rather than imposed on them
by the hippocampus. Since the neocortical cells that originate projections to the PrC
and PH cortices are not necessarily the same cells in particular cortical regions that
receive the feedback connections (unpublished observations, (Lavenex and Amaral,
4For example, there is no obvious sequence for the induction of LTP in dorsal hippocampus, entorhi-
nal and parietal cortex and amygdala, Walz et al. (2000)). There is also evidence for repeated waves of
consolidation in areas that may correspond to gene expression and new protein synthesis (for review see
Abel and Lattal (2001)), suggesting that these processes do not necessarily depend on a simple sequence
of regional engagement.
5Bilateral lesions of the PrC/EC cortices would impair the monkey’s behaviour on the pair-association
task (Murray et al. (1993)). So the PrC/EC is lesioned unilaterally, and the anterior commisure is cut at
the beginning of the experiment.
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2000)), it is unclear how the hippocampus could re-impose particular cortical patterns
on the cortex without aid from the cortex through, say, local already-stored attractors
or synaptic tagging mechanisms. Since networks of neurons bear information in activ-
ity patterns by virtue of their connectivity and history of activation, it is also difficult to
see what a pattern imposed by the hippocampus would “mean”. Furthermore, there
is unequal reciprocity between regions in the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy, so it
seem unlikely a priori that information could be ’transferred’ in a similar fashion be-
tween all regions. For example, there are far fewer efferent projections from the PrC
to frontal cortex than vice versa; more connections from the the superior temporal sul-
cus to the PrC than vice versa; and relatively few connections from visual areas V4
and TEO to the PrC, although the PrC sends widespread projections to these areas
(Lavenex and Amaral, 2000).
The reconsolidation literature suggests that regions that have become redundant
for the recall of a given memory become necessary again for recall for a period after
that memory has been recalled. This implies that a one-way sequential redundancy
of regions in the putative hierarchy might only occur if a memory is not triggered by
real-world events again after acquisition. I discuss this further in section 6.7.
6.4 The temporal extent of graded retrograde amnesia
Graded retrograde amnesia extending for days, weeks, months or years has been
found after specific brain damage in all species tested to date. The temporal extent of
graded RA is traditionally assumed to reflect the time needed to build up or ’consoli-
date’ representations outwith the hippocampus. However, there is no a priori reason
for assuming that molecular changes underlying memory representations cannot be
made more quickly than the typical periods of RA observed.
The length of graded RA usually seen after hippocampal damage increases from
rodents to primates. RA has been reported to extend for days or weeks in mice, rats
and rabbits; weeks or months in monkeys; and years, decades and whole lifetimes in
humans. One explanation for an increase in the length of RA across species is that it
reflects the increase in brain size across species: in larger brains, the structural changes
outwith the hippocampus that would be necessary to re-represent the information
initially stored in the hippocampus may be more onerous and hypothetically more
time-consuming (see e.g. Murre and Sturdy (1996); Dash et al. (2004)).
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Graded RA in humans has been reported to extend for decades in some cases,
which is a contentious issue for traditional Consolidation Theory and variants such
as MTT. As pointed out by Nadel and Moscovitch (1997), it seems unreasonable that
a consolidation process should extend for nearly the whole lifetime of our ancestors,
given that consolidation is supposed to overcome the twin constraints of a limited
capacity hippocampus, and the supposed necessity of interleaved learning to safely
store long-term memories. Unfortunately, Nadel and Moscovitch (1997) do not explain
why trace replication in the hippocampus should plausibly take a lifetime either, and
their simulation results imply that limited replication would anyway be more plau-
sible (Nadel et al., 2000). It is theoretically possible that the very long RA in humans
may be related to brain size as suggested above, as human brains are disproportion-
ately larger (2 - 3 times) than one would expect for a primate of human body weight
(Gilissen and Simmons, 2001), which might create a step-like difference in the time
taken for putative ’consolidation’ processes. Specifically, larger brains may be associ-
ated with increased cortical specialisation and reduced connectivity between regions
(Schoenemann, 2001), and it also been suggested that human brains might necessar-
ily employ more energy efficient non-synaptic transmission mechanisms (Bach-y-Rita
and Aiello, 2001) which might be associated with some as-yet-unknown slow ’consoli-
dation’ processes (although it might equally well be associated with a reduction in the
need for time-consuming long distance synaptic re-wiring relays). However, what-
ever the explanation, the value of such an extended memory reorganisation scheme
would remain unclear.
The length of RA in man is apparently of an entirely different order to that of other
primates (i.e. years and decades rather than weeks or months), which may suggest
additional qualitative differences between the processes underlying graded RA in hu-
mans and other animals. One possibility is that the recall of fundamentally different
types of information is being compared. If, for example, recent and remote memories
in humans depend to different extents on truly episodic and semanticised traces, then
the measured memory gradient in humans would reflect the combined recall gradi-
ents of more than one memory system. The information typically required to demon-
strate good performance on the behavioural tests employed in animal studies is often
quite specific (e.g., the performance of a specific action at a particular place in response
to a particular cue) and may necessarily depend on non-semanticised non-generic in-
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formation, whereas a dim recollection of some pieces of information about where one
lived might be counted as recall on human retrospective verbal tests. Semanticisation
(which in animals canbe thought of as a tendency for memories to become progres-
sively more generic and less context-specific over time), may be just as common in
non-human animals as humans, but the point here is that the memory tests typically
employed in different species may differ in the sensitivity to this factor.
In the semanticisation view, as time progresses after acquisition, memories that
are important enough to be remembered or rehearsed may be reactivated, allowing
parts of the memory trace to be strengthened, possibly in a process akin to that envis-
aged for ’consolidation’ in the traditional view. However, as reactivated memories are
never reactivated ’perfectly’, only the core elements will be strengthened. Therefore,
the long periods of time involved in graded RA (on those tasks for which it occurs)
do not reflect a process that is necessary for the preservation of memories per se (be-
cause important complex memories will be retained indefinitely by the hippocampus),
but reflects the building up of different, more generic representations that can inde-
pendently mediate recall on some tasks, and that may have applicability to a wider
range of situations than the original very specific event memory. New relationships
between semantic information can be discovered over time. Building up such a store
of reliable, generic information over a lifetime seems adaptive, especially given that
the higher level highly convergent binding zones that co-ordinate the recall of higher
order information are progressively more localised, and therefore progressively more
prone to discrete brain damage. Indeed, the hippocampus itself is notoriously prone
to many kinds of brain damage which likely relates to its high capacity for plasticity.
Although existing studies of humans are difficult to interpret and compare (Spiers
et al., 2001), a few general statements can be made about the length or completeness
of RA: episodic recall is more affected than semantic recall; recall is more affected
than recognition; more detailed episodic and semantic information is more affected
than less detailed information; and more specific semantic information is more af-
fected than information with more general applicability to which there would have
been greater lifetime exposure. Similarly, in other animals, the length of RA after
hippocampal damage depends on the task. In rats, for example, graded RA after
hippocampal/MTL damage extends up to 2-d (Winocur et al., 2001) or 5-d (Winocur,
1990) for socially transmitted food preference in rats, up to 4-wks for contextual fear
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conditioning (Kim and Fanselow, 1992), and several months or indefinitely for place
navigation (Ramos, 1998; Kubie et al., 1999; Sutherland et al., 2001). This suggests that
any putative hippocampal ’consolidation’ process must interact with the nature of the
task. In the semanticisation approach, differences in the length of graded RA between
tasks reflect tasks’ differential sensitivity to the degree of episodic/semantic-ness of
the information required at recall (with tasks depending on more specific informa-
tion showing longer gradients after hippocampal damage), or differences in the ease
with which certain kinds of information can be represented by regions other than the
hippocampus.
Squire and colleagues have suggested that larger MTL lesions lead to more pro-
found amnesia (Rempel-Clower et al., 1996). However, very selective lesions some-
times apparently produce severe amnesia, leading others to conclude that the location
and the completeness of a lesion are more important than its overall size (Spiers et al.,
2001). The current proposal can accommodate both these ideas. Recall depends on lo-
cally convergent ’index traces’ stored at various levels in the neocortical-hippocampal
hierarchy and throughout the brain. Larger MTL lesions will destroy progressively
more such indexing traces for a given memory leaving fewer areas within the MTL
that are able to recall any semblance of the original information. Very selective lesions,
if they target regions which contain large concentrations of these bindings traces will
have very profound effects on memory, especially if whole traces are destroyed leav-
ing no partial traces to aid the recall attempts mediated by the remaining brain. On
average, more discrete lesions will have a more profound and generalised effect on
memory when they target regions higher up in the neocortical-hippocampal hierar-
chy, especially if the information to be recalled is relatively complex, because such
regions represent increasingly specific information.
Morris (1999) has noted that the severity of RA damage appears to be related to the
extent of cortical damage, too. Since recall mediated at a higher level in the hierarchy
cannot proceed without activating appropriate components at lower levels, the extent
of cortical damage should correlate with memory impairments irrespective of the age
of a memory, if the cortical areas damaged contain fragments of a given memory. Dis-
crete lesions at progressively lower levels of the hierarchy will have a less global effect
on general memory, but may prevent the recall of specific memory components such
as visual information.
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6.5 Regional redundancy and trace decay
The data reviewed in the previous section suggests that over time, the areas that are
necessary for the recall of a particular trace may change. However, this does not nec-
essarily imply that the relevant traces in the areas that were previously required for
recall have been lost, and indeed I am not aware of any studies that demonstrate the
loss of hippocampal traces. In this section I explore the possibility that traces at each
level in the hierarchy are retained at least for some time after that area has become
redundant for a particular task (as indexed by lesion studies), and that these traces
may continue to be involved in normal recall.
A series of studies by Packard and colleagues suggest that on at least some tasks,
hippocampal traces are retained even when the mediation of recall has switched to an-
other area. A cross-maze task, which requires a rat to learn the position of a consistent
reward at the end of one arm, can be acquired either by a place (say, “turn to the west”)
or response (“turn to the right”) learning mechanism. After seven days of training,
saline-treated rats show predominantly place learning, and after another seven days
training, they show predominantly response learning (Packard and McGaugh (1996);
Packard (1999)). Lidocaine injections into the dorso-lateral caudate putamen (dl-CP)
leave place learning intact at day 8, but block the expression of response learning at
day 16 so that animals continue to express a ’place response’. In other words, neu-
ral inactivation of the dl-CP has uncovered the redundant, but intact, hippocampal
trace. Clearly, such training differs from putative endogenously-driven consolidation
or semanticisation6), but the findings underscore the possibility of multiple co-existing
viable traces. To my knowledge, there is no direct evidence that hippocampal traces
are lost over time. Admittedly, given the proposed asymmetrical nature of recall in
higher and lower portions of the neocortical-hippocampal axis for ’consolidated’ ma-
terial (i.e. recall mediated via the higher areas additionally depends on reactivating
traces in the lower regions, but not vice versa) this would be difficult to investigate
6Two important questions about the cross-maze task that would help us understand how these find-
ings fit with the retrograde memory literature remain unanswered. Firstly, there are no studies of ret-
rograde amnesia in the plus-maze task. Secondly, once a place response is initially established, it is not
known whether animals will switch eventually to a response strategy merely with the passage of time.
Such data could shed light on the consolidation/semanticisation issue, specifically on the question of
whether what is initially learnt by the hippocampus is ’transferred’ wholesale over time to other regions,
or whether extra offline ’training trials’ due to endogenous rehearsal allow other regions to learn their
own region-specific solution to a task.
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empirically. Packard’s studies also clearly demonstrate that whilst there may be par-
allel learning of the same task by both hippocampus and CP, the ’solutions’ that these
different systems find are different. The fact that the CP-based reponse strategy is
used when control has switched from the hippocampus implies that the information
initially acquired by the hippocampus is not transferred or taught to other areas, at
least in this case.
Interestingly, there is evidence to suggest that learning in these competing mem-
ory systems can be controlled with intra-regional glutamate injections (Packard, 1999;
Packard and Teather, 1999), which implies that there may be biological mechanisms
for managing the development of and access to multiple traces. The amygdala can
modulate the separate types of memory mediated by the hippocampus and caudate
nucleus (Packard and Cahill, 2001), both directly via efferent pathways, and indi-
rectly by mediating the effects of drugs and hormones. Emotional state can determine
the relative use of memory systems – blocking or damaging the amygdala prevents
the typical stress-induced impairment of hippocampal learning. Additionally, the re-
moval of cholinergic input to the hippocampus enhances the selection of place strat-
egy in a water-maze task (Bizon et al., 2003). Furthermore, the instructions given on
a probablistic weather-prediction task (whether to focus on learning pairs of stimuli,
or to give classification judgements on each presentation for which feedback would
be given) lead to changes in the relative activity of the MTL and basal ganglia in hu-
mans (Poldrack et al., 2001). Several other factors favour the develop of place- over
response-strategies including the use of correction methods and massed rather than
spaced training. Therefore it seems plausible that for a given task, multiple traces that
could mediate recall might co-exist, and that the most currently useful trace could be
selected or enhanced as appropriate.
We currently do not know what determines which area dominates recall when
more than one viable trace exists. The simplest scenario would be one in which there
is competition between regions for control over effectors, with the ’strongest trace’ –
in some as-yet-undefined way – winning. It would then be easy to explain the find-
ings I have just outlined: glutamate injections into, say, the caudate putamen might
aid the development of traces that ultimately becomes stronger than the individual
episodic traces stored in the hippocampus. For tasks on which the hippocampus be-
comes redundant over time without any new training, the relative strength of traces
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outwith the hippocampus might be increasing because the hippocampal trace de-
cays faster and/or because extra-hippocampal trace strength is increasing in absolute
terms, and/or due to changing use of recall strategies (as discussed in section 6.2). Ac-
tive processes may also play a part: the level of metabolic activity in the hippocampus
of control animals is higher than that of animals that had been exposed to spatial train-
ing 25-d earlier (Bontempi et al., 1999; Maviel et al., 2004), suggesting that the reduction
of hippocampal activation might depend on active inhibitory processes from the areas
that have come to mediate recall, rather than simply a reduction in recruitment.
6.6 Interleaved learning and semanticisation
It is widely accepted that the cortex may need the hippocampus to teach it in order
to avoid catastrophic interference. However, this potential problem would be amelio-
rated if detailed episodic traces are not transferred to the cortex from the hippocam-
pus.
Catastrophic interference arises in neural networks because weights that have been
trained on earlier unrelated inputs get overwritten by later information. The cortex is
divided into anatomical/functional regions that are relatively isolated from each other
(especially in the lower areas) and information is mapped topographically, so that
similar representations will map to a similar set of cells thereby reducing the over-
writing of old weights by significantly different information. Because similar traces
will be represented by similar patterns of activity, at recall one would expect some
“confusion” between closely related traces. However, if the cortex is specialised for
storing semantic information — that is, information that is common to all occurrences
of the same type of entity or event — and is not primarily a long-term store for unique
episodic memories then, as suggested in chapter 3, recalling the “overlapping” ele-
ments across similar traces (rather than exemplars per se) is exactly what is needed.
In other words, if the cortex represents semanticised traces, and not truly episodic
events, then the potential problem of catastrophic interference will automatically be
limited. There would be no reason why the cortex could not store information without
a hippocampal teacher.
The information stored in the hippocampus is relatively more specific and less
overlapping than that stored in the cortex, and is acquired more quickly; which would
be expected to lead to high levels of interference. However, the more fully-distributed
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sparse representations found in the hippocampus intrinsically reduce interference, as
even apparently similar inputs to the hippocampus will be orthogonalised. The ’place
cell’ recording literature suggests that similar events may be represented very differ-
ently in the hippocampus, depending on the animal’s intentions, recent experiences,
and exact behaviour at the time of acquisition (Markus et al., 1995; McEchron and
Disterhoft, 1999). It is usually assumed that catastrophic interference is avoided by
the hippocampus because it is a temporary memory store. In the semanticisation
approach, although detailed memories are dependent on the hippocampus for their
lifetime, most detailed information is assumed to decay relatively quickly, so in this
scheme also, the hippocampus could be considered to be a temporary store for most
of the information it initially stores.
As already noted, neurogenesis continues into adulthood in the hippocampus.
Furthermore, new neurons are stabilised when hippocampally-dependent tasks are
learnt (Gould et al., 1999). Therefore, it is possible that there is a unique memory stor-
age mechanism available in the hippocampus (and olfactory system) – namely, that
new memories are stored in new neurons – which would also reduce interference be-
tween memories. It may be that memories that are salient enough to be stored for
the long-term in the hippocampus have sequestered and stabilised highly plastic new
neurones for their storage. (On the other hand, adult neurogenesis may simply be a
repair mechanism for a highly plastic brain region.)
6.7 Reconsolidation and semanticisation
Memories are typically sensitive to disruption by various agents such as electrocon-
vulsive shock or protein synthesis inhibitors for a limited period of time after initial
acquisition. An accumulating body of evidence suggests that if old memories (whose
continued existence is no longer affected by such agents) are reactivated they are then
vulnerable to amnesic agents again, as if they require new consolidation or ’reconsol-
idation’ (e.g., Misanin et al. (1968); Mactutus et al. (1979); Robbins and Meyer (1970);
Judge and Quartermain (1982); Nader et al. (2000); Przybyslawski and Sara (1997);
Przybyslawski et al. (1999)). That is, it may be the state, rather than age, of a memory
that determines its susceptibility to disruption. The biochemical processes initiated
after the retrieval of old memories appear to be rather similar to those occurring after
initial acquisition, although re-consolidation seems less laborious than consolidation
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in several ways7.
Recent work on the hippocampus extends these findings. Land et al. (2000) found
that 30-d after training on a signalled avoidance task whose acquisition is facilitated by
an intact hippocampus, when standard lesions to the dorsal hippocampus no longer
affect memory, memory is impaired if animals are exposed to the experimental con-
text before the lesion. Similarly, Debiec et al. (2002) reported that rats that had re-
ceived hippocampal infusions of anisomycin (a protein synthesis inhibitor) or hip-
pocampal lesions, after exposure to the context in which they had learnt an obligato-
rily hippocampally-dependent context-fear association, showed a large drop in fear
memory. This loss of memory was seen at all acquisition-reactivation intervals tested,
even when the test and infusion occurred 45-d from initial acquisition, at which time
contextual fear memories are apparently unaffected by hippocampal lesions.
The implication is that 1) even when memory traces are ’consolidated’ and have
completed initial protein synthesis-dependent processes, protein synthesis is neces-
sary for their continued maintenance after reactivation; and 2) even when memories
that were initially hippocampally-dependent have been established outside the hip-
pocampus, reactivated memories depend on an intact hippocampus for their contin-
ued expression. That is, re-consolidation appears to occur both in local circuits and
cross-regional connections.
Milekic and Alberini (2002) have however reported a gradient of memory vul-
nerability with systemic anisomycin causing memory deficits when administered af-
ter a reactivation trial on an inhibitory avoidance task at days 2 and 7, but not days
14 and 28. However, it is interesting to note that Milekic and Alberini (2002) used
systemic administration of anisomycin, whereas the studies reporting a flat gradient
used hippocampal lesions (Land et al., 2000) or high doses of intra-hippocampal ani-
7In both cases, the amnesia induced by interference is time-dependent (Mactutus et al. (1982); Przy-
byslawski and Sara (1997); Przybyslawski et al. (1999)); and both processes require the integrity of
NMDA receptors, β-adrenergic receptors and protein synthesis mechanisms, and are affected by ECS.
However, there appear to be several differences. For example, the time window for interfering with
re-consolidation may be shorter than that for initial consolidation (Mactutus et al. (1982); Judge and
Quartermain (1982); Przybyslawski and Sara (1997)); reactivated (but not new) memories may recover
spontaneously ( Mactutus et al. (1982); Judge and Quartermain (1982), but see ?); the onset of RA for
disrupted new and reactivated memories may be different — Mactutus et al. (1982) reported 24-h and
4-h, respectively; and re-consolidation and consolidation may be differentially vulnerable to different
amnesic agents (Mactutus et al., 1979; Przybyslawski et al., 1999). Retraining is also relatively easy af-
ter interference with reconsolidating memories: Przybyslawski and Sara (1997) found that rats regained
previous performance with a minimal number of retraining trials, even when training was massed in
one session, and on the difficult version of the task.
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somycin (Debiec et al., 2002). It is therefore possible that an incomplete blocking of
hippocampal protein synthesis (which would be more likely with systemic adminis-
tration) could underlie the apparently graded vulnerability to protein-synthesis in-
hibition, even if protein synthesis demands were present, though decreasing, at all
intervals.
In the semanticisation view, the Ribot gradient may reflect the semanticisation of
memories, and reconsolidation may be the mechanism by which cortical memories be-
come semanticised. Each experience that triggers the recall of related memory traces
may allow the ’sub-traces’ that represent the semantic aspects that are common to
these traces, and the associations between them, to be enhanced. As material becomes
more familiar, fewer large-scale learning-related neuronal changes will be needed at
each reactivation or re-exposure, as the repeated information will be largely similar
to that already represented. It therefore seems reasonable that older memories and
stronger memories (such as those resulting from exposure to three rather than to one
footshock) must be exposed to longer reminder trials than more recent or weaker
memories if reconsolidation is to be triggered (as reported by Suzuki et al. (2004)),
because it would be adaptive to retain well-established or important memories. (The
use of the same short reminder trial for all ages of memory, might also explain the ob-
served lack of reconsolidation for older memories seen in Milekic and Alberini (2002)’s
study.)
Mechanisms acting at reconsolidation appear to allow the wholesale up- or down-
regulation of trace strength on the basis of the co-occurring degree of arousal (Sara,
2000). This would allow the strength of traces of already acquired information to be
significantly changed in one trial even if it had taken many trials to acquire; perhaps
in response to new information about already acquired knowledge. When a memory
is recalled, reconsolidation may generally act to enhance trace strength. This would
selectively arrest the natural decay of memories that have recently been recalled, and
that are therefore known to be currently relevant. Reconsolidation might also make a
memory trace more retrievable by virtue of it becoming associated with an increasing
number of learning situations. Of course, explaining reconsolidation solely in terms
of adding new second order information would not predict the loss of old information
(Nader et al., 2000), although it is possible that the whole trace needs to be put into a
labile state for modifications to be made. The semanticisation approach thus motivates
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a reason for re-consolidation: each reactivation of a trace allows the content of given
traces, and the associations between them to be built-up, lost or modified, allowing
the development of semantic stores.
Hippocampal traces for similar events necessarily index overlapping traces in the
lower cortical regions that represent generic features of the events, in addition to link-
ing in traces for the unique features of a given specific occurrence of the event. When
the hippocampus is intact, a trial that depends on the recall of even well-established
generic/semantic information probably additionally (1) triggers recall of many other
related traces in higher parts of the neocortical-hippocampal axis that reflect more
specific instances of the occurrance of that generic information – even though such
information would be redundant for performing the current task; and (2) triggers the
storage of new information by the hippocampus about that reactivation event, which
again indexes those established generic/semantic representations. Assuming some
form of attractor dynamics, it is plausible that together the nodes in these activated
representations could form a reverberating attractor, and that interference with any
component of that attractor (such as that caused by hippocampal lesions) might inter-
fere with the re-establishment of components elsewhere in that attractor. Hippocam-
pal damage might thereby disrupt the successful re-storage of traces elsewhere in an
attractor of which it is again part.
Another possible explanation for the effect of hippocampal damage on tasks that
had become independent of the hippocampus is that a damaged or abnormal hip-
pocampus might output information that interferes with or overwrites existing useful
cortical traces. In accord with this, partial hippocampal lesions have sometimes been
reported to be more damaging than complete ones. Empirically, we do not currently
know whether interference with protein-synthesis outside of the hippocampus after a
reactivation trial in the absence of the hippocampus leads to a loss of hippocampally-
independent memory: this is clearly a key question.
In conclusion, both the age and the state of a memory determines its susceptibil-
ity to interference after reactivation. Because memories tend to be semanticised over
time, an old semantic memory will be less likely to undergo large-scale alterations on
reactivation because on average there will be less ’left to learn’ about the relevant se-
mantic components of the new experience. Therefore post-reactivation learning will
be relatively less affected by the inhibition of protein synthesis. A failure to register
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any new information would also be less evident. On the other hand, the more recently
a memory has been reactivated or stored, the more vulnerable it will be to interfer-
ence, as it will be put in a labile state to enable modifications to be made. Age and
state interact with factors such as the nature of the information being stored and how
similar it is to what is already stored, as well as its salience, the amount of times it has
already been recalled and current arousal levels, which can all affect the nature and
extent of consolidation and reconsolidation processes.
Whether post-reactivation interference with the hippocampus affects memory also
depends both on age and state of the memories evoked. A typical old semanticised
memory that has not recently been re-experienced will be unaffected by hippocampal
damage, however any remaining trace of details of that event will be hippocampally-
dependent and therefore affected by hippocampal loss irrespective of recent mem-
ory reactivation. Clearly, recently acquired episodic memories will be dependent on
the hippocampus, and therefore susceptible to hippocampal damage. Semanticised
memories that have recently been recalled in the presence of an intact hippocampus
will be affected by subsequent hippocampal damage or interference, perhaps because
control of recall switches to the now impaired hippocampus, or because a damaged
hippocampal trace interferes in some way with traces stored elsewhere in the brain to
which it is connected. This ’age-and-state’ view can be contrasted with the traditional
view, which sees consolidation as a one-way process that can be completed for a given
a memory.
6.8 The long term role of the hippocampus
In this chapter I have explored data and arguments illuminating the role of the hip-
pocampus in the long-term maintenance of memories. In my opinion, neither Consol-
idation Theory nor Multiple Trace Theory can adequately explain this data. Instead,
a view I have dubbed ’Gingell’s Semanticisation Theory’ (or GST) provides a more
satisfying account. In this section I sum up the key points of this proposal.
6.8.1 Key features of Gingell’s Semanticisation Theory
Any learning event causes activation throughout the brain from the sensory tranduc-
ers to higher regions. In GST when a learning event occurs, traces are laid down
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throughout the neocortical-hippocampal axis. These traces form an attractor with both
horizontal (within regions, and between connected regions at the same level) and ver-
tical components (between different levels in the neocortical-hippocampal axis). Neu-
rons at the hippocampal end of the hierarchy are potentiated most per event, receive
massively convergent inputs, are heavily inter-connected, and are not arranged topo-
graphically; so they are therefore most able to represent novel associations. Effectively,
after one (episodic) presentation of information, only the hippocampus will contain
a robust trace of the unique, detailed and complex associations that typify episodic
memories. Episodic events might leave a weak trace in areas of the cortex that were
involved in experiencing them, but because there is incomplete horizontal connectiv-
ity between cortical areas, the episodic trace would be fragmentary at the cortical level
and unlikely to be able itself to mediate recall. Extremely precise cues that effectively
act to co-activate different but largely unconnected areas of the cortical trace might in
a few cases be able to elicit some cortical recall of parts of such an episodic trace.
At the cortical ’lower’ end of the hierarchy, strong traces gradually build up for
the generic ’exemplar’ fragments that are common to many experiences or rehearsals.
A complete loss of information from certain modalities would result from damage
to individual lowest regions. Intermediate levels in the neocortical-hippocampal axis
register information on a continuum from generic to specific. Of course, memories
differ in ways other than their generic/specific-ness, and different regions in the hier-
archy ’specialise’ in the processing and representation of different types of information
at the different levels of complexity.
Each presentation of an event, even if it is very similar to an event previously expe-
rienced, will cause a new event trace to be laid down in the hippocampus. Whilst the
cortical regions indexed by a hippocampal trace for similar events will be largely over-
lapping, the actual hippocampal representation of each index may be rather different,
due to the more profound effect of subtle differences in the real-world presentation
of even relatively similar events on the pattern of activity in the hippocampus, and
internal orthogonalising influences. Most such hippocampal traces will decay very
quickly.
Each level in the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy can act as a binding zone for
the co-recollection of traces stored at a lower level. Recall mediated by the highest
regions therefore has the potential to elicit the most detailed and complex trace reacti-
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vations, by indexing the most numerous and unique associations. Whether a reduced
representation stored at a particular lower level is sufficient to mediate recall on a
specific task (i.e. whether deficits will be seen in task performance after damage to a
region higher in the axis, such as the hippocampus) depends on the complexity and
nature of the information needed to perform the task.
6.8.1.1 Decay and modulation
The detailed, complex, supra-modal traces that are stored in the hippocampus remain
hippocampally-dependent for their lifetime, which may be much less than the lifetime
of the animal. Without further intervention, traces of recently acquired information
will begin to decay soon after acquisition, albeit at widely different rates in different
regions: decay is fastest at the top of the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy. Most
day-to-day episodic information (what did that women on the bus this morning look
like? exactly how much did lunch cost on Tuesday?) is lost automatically and quite
quickly if it is not salient when experienced, or made so by subsequent events soon
after its acquisition. Even semantic information to which we have extended exposure
(e.g., school learning) will be forgotton within 3 - 5 years if it is not learnt well, al-
though if adequately encoded it may end in ’permastore’ and be retained relatively
undiminished for 50 years (Bahrick, 1984).
There are, however, many factors that modulate the strength of initial storage,
and the subsequent fate of a trace. As noted in section 4.4, the hippocampus may
be particularly sensitive to the modulation of the maintenance and trace strength of
information automatically laid down there. In exceptional learning situations that are
associated with very high activity in systems that mediate the effects of stress (e.g.,
the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, or the sympathetic nervous system), traces
of an event appear to be laid down more robustly than usual throughout the whole
neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy, with an abnormally unprocessed sensory nature
in the cortex. Extreme cases may produce the so-called ’flash-bulb’ memories of post-
traumatic stress disorder.
6.8.1.2 Graded retrograde amnesia depends on the semanticisation of memories
The hippocampus and other regions necessarily store different kinds of information on
exposure to the same event, even when a non-hippocampal trace is built up through
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endogenously-driven rehearsal rather than re-exposure to similar events. The learn-
ing rate and information convergence in an area fundamentally affects the kind of
information that can be stored under given conditions. For repeated information, ac-
quisition can proceed as outlined in the ’basic model’ in which overlapping generic
aspects of similar events or entities that are mapped topographically in the lower re-
gions are strengthened.
Tasks that can be performed on the basis of relatively semanticised or generic in-
formation may become progressively less dependent on the hippocampus. Several
possible factors contribute to the appearance of graded RA after hippocampal dam-
age, but the most important mechanistically is that over time, recall of a memory elicits
more semanticised information which does not depend on the hippocampus for recall.
Several factors (that were discussed in detail in section 6.2) contribute to semanticisa-
tion:
• Loss of detailed information
• Development of semantic traces
– May result from ongoing exposure to real-world events containing repeated
features.
– Offline learning or attractor replay may enhance the semantic components
of memory. Only the core elements will be reliably reactivated across re-
activations, and therefore only those elements will be enhanced and/or re-
tained over time.
• Change in recall strategy The recall of older memories depends more than recently
acquired memories on generic past memories. In humans this means a search
through personal semantic information, and on knowing what one might plau-
sibly have done.
Semanticisation should not be understood solely as a process by which memo-
ries are ’diminished’ through a loss of information. An ongoing process throughout
life that allows extraneous detail to decay from the memory stores; but also supports
the development of representations of useful, relevant and more generalisable seman-
tic information; identifies associations between such information; and enhances trace
storage of such information in lower regions, would clearly be of great value. Further-
more, as already noted, the hippocampus and other higher regions can fundamentally
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change what is represented in other areas: the hippocampus’s ability to bridge tem-
poral gaps and to oversee learning in several unconnected areas allows it to to make
associations between information that other areas could not make alone in a typical
learning situation.
6.8.1.3 When does semanticisation occur?
In the view of most Consolidation Theorists, the spontaneous activation of hippocam-
pal traces of events during sleep or other offline periods is the main mechanism or-
chestrating memory consolidation in neocortical circuits (Marr, 1971; Buzsáki, 1989;
Squire and Alvarez, 1995; McClelland et al., 1995)), perhaps by providing an increased
number of ’learning trials’ to support slowly developing synaptic reorganisation (Mc-
Clelland et al. (1995)). A similar mechanism could theoretically underlie the partial
replication of information from higher to lower cortical levels as suggested by GST.
However, the literature focusing on the effects of sleep on memory performance
is both vast and contradictory. The majority of studies have focused on rapid eye
movement (REM) sleep, perhaps because it is electrically most like the conscious
state. However, a recent review concluded that REM deprivation (REMD) studies
are approximately equally divided between those that do and those that do not show
a disruptive effect on learning/memory (Vertes and Eastman, 2000), and that the time
windows for REMD effects where they exist are extremely variable (Smith, 1996).
In fact, slow-wave sleep (SWS), rather than REM sleep, is probably a better can-
didate for replay-aided memory processing, as the strongest coherent hippocampal
reactivations (or sharp waves) occur predominantly in SWS (Penttonen et al., 1997;
Kudrimoti et al., 1999). During a sharp wave, the dynamics of layers II & III of the
EC may allow large ensembles of hippocampal neurons to alter the synaptic connec-
tivity of neocortical circuits (Buzsáki (1998); Chrobak et al. (2000)); plasticity in the
hippocampus is low (Leonard et al., 1987), returning to its normal waking level during
REM sleep (Bramham and Srebro (1989); Leonard et al. (1987)); and most growth hor-
mone (a promotor of protein synthesis) is released during SWS (Hobson and Steriade
(1986)). Taken together, this might create good conditions for information transmis-
sion from the hippocampus to the neocortex (Chrobak and Buzsáki (1994)).
Several studies have shown that cells in CA1 that were co-active when acquiring a
task also tend to fire together in SWS sleep immediately after task acquisition (Wilson
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and McNaughton, 1994; Skaggs and McNaughton, 1996; Qin et al., 1995, 1997). Fur-
thermore, traces of two separate experiences can appear together in the same record-
ing session after trace acquisition (Kudrimoti et al., 1999), which suggests that rein-
statement is not solely dependent on the persistence of certain memory traces. The ’co-
herent’ replay of pairs of cells in the hippocampus and other parts of the neocortical-
hippocampal axis has also been reported (Kudrimoti et al., 1999; Qin et al., 1997; Shen
et al., 1998), in accord with the idea that the hippocampus co-ordinates activity in
other regions. However, although seductive, the proposal that neocortical consolida-
tion necessarily involves hippocampal reactivation and recoding has not been verified
(Sutherland and McNaughton, 2000). On the basis of current evidence it is plausible
that there is no single (hippocampal) site of origin for “replay”. Cortical replay might
therefore arise (at least in part) due to local attractor properties in the cortex, and not
exclusively through being driven by the hippocampus; and the reactivation of hip-
pocampal (and other MTL) patterns might in turn (at least partially) serve processes
internal to those regions. Of course, when sufficient activation occurs in any one area,
coherent activation throughout the whole of an attractor spanning the neocortical-
hippocampal axis might be expected, if the neural-transmission environment allowed
it.
In at least some cases, the learning improvement that occurs during REM sleep
is only that which would have occurred if the animal had stayed awake (Karni et al.,
1994). Therefore it is possible that any recoding that occurs in the waking state also
occurs during sleep. Similarly, the sharp wave oscillations characteristic of SWS can
occasionally occur during quiet wakefulness or type II behaviour (Vanderwolf (1969))
which includes eating, drinking and grooming, but not active exploration. Kudrimoti
et al. (1999) found that there is a comparable dependency of replay patterns on prior
experiences both in an alert motionless state and SWS, thus sleep itself is not necessary
for memory trace reactivation. The strong hypothesis that there is a learning process
exclusive to sleep has not yet been satisfactorily demonstrated. The difference may
merely be quantitative – during sleep there are fewer competing inputs, and therefore
on average perhaps more opportunities for reactivating extant attractors and/or mak-
ing learning-related changes. To date, reconsolidation has only been demonstrated
after real-world reminder triggers, so the evidence for post-acquisition memory mod-
ification processes specific to the awake state is in fact more robust.
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In GST, the semanticisation and recoding of memories could plausibly occur as
a result of any process that results in trace reactivation, whether due to recall trig-
gered by specific real-world events, conscious ’free-wheeling reminiscence’, or uncon-
scious reactivation during different brain states. It seems reasonable that there would
be quantitatively and qualitatively different re-structuring processes occurring dur-
ing these different reactivation processes, both in terms of the extent and location of
trace modification, and perhaps also of the nature of the relationships uncovered and
modified between known information. Exposure to real-world information should be
the dominant force in any biological memory system. It is possible, say, that the re-
activation of memory attractors results in changes in trace strength only outside the
hippocampus in certain stages of sleep (perhaps to different extents for trace compo-
nents at different levels in the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy), whilst conscious
recall or re-experiencing might additionally lead to trace strength changes in the hip-
pocampus, and the laying down of new episodic information. Such proposals remain
speculative until definitive data is available. However, at present in GST, memory-
modification processes occurring on re-experiencing an event, and after reactivation
of existing traces, are both similarly assumed to result in the strengthening of overlap-
ping parts of existing traces.
6.9 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has focused on understanding the role of the hippocampus in the long-
term recall of information. Broadly speaking, tasks that are obligatorily-dependent
on the hippocampus for their acquisition remain indefinitely dependent on the hip-
pocampus for recall. There is no evidence that detailed context-specific episodic mem-
ories are transferred to the cortex, or that task-dependent allocentric information can
become independent of the hippocampus. Tasks whose acquisition is merely facili-
tated by the hippocampus, on the other hand, may become independent of the hip-
pocampus over time. However, the information recalled as the neural basis for recall
changes is qualitatively different.
The change in nature of the information recalled from different periods results
from a semanticisation of memories. Semanticisation reflects the increasing involve-
ment in recall over time of areas representing more generic information. This may
result from the loss of hippocampally-dependent detailed traces, an increase in the
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ability of semantic regions to mediate recall, or a difference between the strategies
used to elicit old and new memories. Figure 6.2 schematically summarises the con-
tribution over time of the hippocampus and cortex to the recall of a typical episodic
memory. Since the information recalled by the hippocampus and the cortex is always
qualitatively different, the red hippocampal lines represent the recall of detailed infor-
mation, whereas the blue semantic lines represents the recall of semantic information.
Initially the hippocampus dominates overall recall and many details can be recalled;
























Figure 6.2: The cortex takes over the recall of memories as they age. The cortical ability to
mediate recall may improve (a) absolutely, or (b) only relative to the hippocampus.
Most information stored in the hippocampus is lost very quickly. This initial infor-
mation is rarely measured in neuropsychological studies requiring the recall of specific
important events. Information that is maintained for longer periods by the hippocam-
pus still decays, albeit at a slower rate. Let us suppose that the information that is
retained and that may be recalled on typical tests starts at the values represented by
the asterisk (subfigure 6.2a). Then the loss of detailed information over time in nor-
mal subjects would be represented by the portion of the hippocampal line to the right
of the asterisk. In contrast, typical episodic memory tests that do not control for se-
manticisation effectively measure combined hippocampal and cortical output. Stud-
ies measuring the recall of true episodic information find flat retrograde amnesia after
hippocampal damage, as this information is always dependent on the hippocampus.
In subfigure 6.2a there is an absolute increase over time in the cortex’s ability to
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mediate recall. Subfigure 6.2b shows a decreasing cortical recall ability over time.
Cortical recall could also be equivalent at all time points. In all cases, the net effect is a
relative increase in the ability of the cortical areas to mediate recall over time compared
to the hippocampus. Current empirical data does not tell us which of these scenarios
is correct.
Different regions throughout the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy acquire infor-
mation in parallel on a given learning task. Traces at each level support the acquisition
and recall of information that is different in type, and that may be able to support recall
on a given task to different extents. After the initial acquisition of some tasks, these
regions become redundant in sequence from highest to lowest. The proposed seman-
ticisation and freeing of specifically hippocampal dependency may progress down
through the hierarchy. If a given region has become redundant for recall, it does not
necessarily imply that the trace stored at that level has decayed. Indeed, multiple
traces of different levels of complexity and specificity may be retained for different
purposes; and may tend to be accessed under different cuing conditions. Different
tasks have different representational requirements in terms of the type and complexity
of information stored and recalled. This not only governs which regions are necessary
at storage, but also whether regions can then become redundant and how long this is
likely to take.
Semanticisation may generally act to identify and preserve the most important
features of memory, and perhaps re-store them in a form that makes them more ac-
cessible. Most context-specific information is unimportant and represents noise in the
identification of important world regularities. Reconsolidation may reflect the pro-
cesses of semanticisation. When information that is related to ongoing real-world
events is recalled, semanticisation processes may act to arrest the normal decay of
these still relevant traces, enhance components that are common to the reactivated
traces and traces for the new information, and make links between other aspects of
active traces. The temporal extent of retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage
reflects semanticisation, rather than a process by which information initially stored in
one area is transferred to another.
In GST, semantisation could theoretically occur in any situation involving the re-
activation of memory traces. This would include the exposure to semantic and non-
context-specific information that underlies normal learning in the awake state; and
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the presumed reactivation of related information thought to occur on exposure to
known cues in reconsolidation studies. The importance of offline learning perhaps
during sleep remains to be conclusively demonstrated; as does a central role for the
hippocampus in any such replay.
In a recent paper, Meeter and Murre (2004) identified several key findings relating
to the long-term role of the hippocampus, and provided a table listing explantions
offered by CT, MTT and a semanticisation approach (p22). Table 6.1 similarly sum-
marises the explanations offered by GST for these important findings.
6.9.1 Relationship to other proposals
GST shares some features with consolidation theories and with the Multiple Trace
theory. The points of overlap and disagreement have been spelt out in some detail in
section 6.1. In brief, like CT, GST proposes that some memories become independent
of the hippocampus over time. However, in GST, the memories recalled via the hip-
pocampus and via other areas are qualitatively different. Like MTT, GST proposes that
some memories remain indefinitely hippocampally-dependent; although trace repli-
cation plays no role in GST explanations.
My proposals share a central assumption with the Complementary Learning Sys-
tems approach (O’Reilly and Norman, 2002), namely that there is not a strict division
of labour between brain systems. Differences in the basic functional features of the
hippocampus and cortex, such as the degree of topographical mapping or orthogonal-
isation and the speed of learning, lead naturally to differences in their relative ability
to perform particular tasks. However, they perform overlapping functions.
Milner (1989)’s views are also highly relevant to GST. Milner drew a distinction
between quickly potentiating ’soft’ synapses in the hippocampus; and ’hard’ corti-
cal synapses that are little affected by single bursts of activity, but hold changes al-
most indefinitely once they have been made. He suggested that occasional reactiva-
tions throughout the whole assembly would refresh soft synapses and increment hard
ones. Later related views posit an ’indexing’ role for the hippocampus (Teyler and
Discenna, 1986), implying that the role of the hippocampus in a memory assembly is
distinct from that of other components. Whilst it can be useful to think in terms of
a hippocampal indexing function (and indeed I have used the term throughout the
thesis), it obscures the similarity in the role of all the connections in the neocortical-
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Finding Explanations offered by GST
Graded RA after H damage Older memories progressively more semanticised
Ungraded RA after H damage ’Obligatory’ memories tested
RA for semantic information i) Recent episodic memories may support seman-
tic recall. ii) Episodic and semantic memory not
categorically distinct
Semantic dementia Recent episodic memories depend on fewer old
semantic fragments
More H activity for recent
than remote memory
’Facilitated’ recent memories are more dependent
on H than remote
H activity same for recent and
remote memory
i) ’Obligatory’ memories tested. ii) Storage of new
H trace
Sequential regional redun-
dancy, Izquierdo et al. (1997)
Progressive semanticisation of information
Reversible blocking of H im-
pairs retention, Reidel et al.
(1997)
Interference with maintenance of trace in H
Deficient LTP in cortex pro-
duces faster forgetting, Fran-
kland et al. (2001)
Information cannot be stored in cortex
Immediate blocking of
NMDA receptors in CA1 im-
pairs later memory, Shimuzu
et al. (2001)
Interference with maintenance of traces in H
Table 6.1: Summary of explanations offered by GST for some of the key findings relating to the
hippocampus and retrograde amnesia as outlined by Meeter and Murre (2004). H = hippocam-
pus. ’Facilitated’ memories are those whose acquisition is aided by the presence of an intact
hippocampus. ’Obligatory’ memories are those whose acquisition is obligatorily-dependent on
the hippocampus.
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hippocampal assembly. This may have contributed to the idea that the hippocampus
is necessarily the prime initiator of offline learning.
Clearly, GST also shares tenets with other semanticisation approaches. Cermak
and O’Connor (1983) first noted that episodic memories become more fact-like and
less event-like over time, but this idea has received surprisingly little attention. Nadel
and Bohbot (2001) have recently focused on the idea that remote and recent memories
are qualitatively different, and that recall mediated by the hippocampus and by other
areas is qualitatively different. However, they have not yet incorporated these ideas
into MTT.
The most detailed approach to semanticisation to date is that of Rosenbaum et al.
(2001). Rosenbaum et al. (2001) argue that spatial detail and autobiographical informa-
tion (because of its dependence of spatial context information) is indefinitely depen-
dent on the hippocampus. In their view, semanticisation is a loss of context depen-
dency in a relational sense. This contrasts with GST in which semanticisation results
from a loss of the least robustly stored detailed specific information, or the least reli-
ably reactivated information; which includes but is not limited to spatial contextual
information. Rosenbaum states that ’as [semantic memories] become increasingly in-
dependent of context, extra-hippocampal regions are required for their recall’ (p190,
Rosenbaum et al. (2001)). This implies that recall is initially mediated by the hippocam-
pus alone; and that information is then transferred to the cortex. This constrasts with
GST which posits the involvement of the cortex in recall mediated by the hippocam-
pus, and independent learning and semanticisation over time in the cortex. Rosen-
baum and colleagues indicate that the initial memories ’break down’ in some way, but
do not suggest a mechanism by which semanticised representations might be built
up. Thus GST extends these ideas by showing how semanticised traces might come to
dominate recall through enhanced learning of repeated generic information and the
automatic loss of detailed information from the hippocampus.
Chapter 7
A simple model of episodic and
semantic learning
In this chapter I report on simulations with a neural net model that provide a ’proof
of concept’ for the ideas presented in other chapters. The focus of investigation is on
how the different hippocampal and cortical components of the model interact with the
acquisition of random ’episodic’ events, and with ’semantic’ events that share features
with other events.
The findings provide clear support for the idea that episodic and semantic infor-
mation can be usefully construed as representing positions on a continuum of memory
types distinguished by speed of learning and the amount of specific, multi-modal de-
tail needed to demonstrate recall. Support is also found for proposals on the relative
importance of the hippocampus and cortex in the rapid acquisition of information and
the acquisition of complex multi-modal information; and the effect of existing knowl-
edge on new learning. Another key finding is that whilst recall for all events is initially
dominated by the hippocampus, the cortex takes over as a memory ages. However,
recall via the cortex is more robust for generic semantic components of events, and is
progressively poorer for the ’episodic’ details. Thus older memories become semanti-
cised. Replay-aided learning also primarily benefits semantic sub-components at the
expense of non-repeated elements.
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7.1 Introduction
Many of the distinct functional features of the hippocampus and cortex result from
trade-offs between systems designed for learning specifics and for extracting gener-
alisations. The hippocampus is optimised for the rapid incidental encoding of de-
tailed, novel, high-order information. Similar incoming information is represented in
orthogonalised hippocampal traces which preserves specific information and reduces
the brain’s over-riding tendency to be biased by already acquired information. There
is a wide consensus that the sparse dentate gyral inputs to CA3 may orthogonalise
inputs to produce minimally overlapping representations for different episodes; and
the recurrent connections of CA3 may provide a powerful auto-associative memory.
The cortex on the other hand learns slowly and incrementally on exposure to in-
formation, and information is mapped topographically, so that repeated exposure to
information leads gradually to the strengthening of traces for repeated generic ele-
ments. The slow learning rate protects important well-established information from
being disturbed without sufficient ’evidence’ that such information has really been
superseded. At progressively lower regions of the cortex, direct long-range connec-
tions or chains of connections are increasingly uncommon and difficult to form anew.
Local cortical areas can however acquire new information about locally represented
associations relatively quickly.
Several widely accepted ideas about the nature of information processing in the
hippocampus and cortex inform my model. Many of these assumptions are shared
with standard consolidation theories, and with MTT (see also Nadel and Moscovitch
(1997)’s list, p223). Other key features derive naturally from GST (bracketed items
indicate theories sharing the given view; CT = consolidation theories, MTT = Multiple
Trace Theory, GST = Gingell’s Semanticisation Theory):
1. The hippocampus rapidly and automatically encodes all experienced/attended
information. (CT, MTT, GST)
2. The cortex automatically encodes all experienced/attended information, though
less robustly than the hippocampus. (some CT, MTT, GST)
3. Information is encoded sparsely and non-topographically in the hippocampus;
and topographically in the cortex. (CT, MTT, GST)
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4. A hippocampal trace acts as an index to neocortical neurones representing infor-
mation acquired in the same episode. (CT, MTT, GST)
5. The entire hippocampal-neocortical ensemble constitutes the memory trace for
an episode. (some CT, MTT, GST)
6. The detail of memories is lost very quickly unless a memory is deemed impor-
tant and receives robust encoding (GST).
7. Memory reactivation (however it is triggered) reliably activates only the core
components of memory, and leads to the relative strengthening in cortex of core
memory components, i.e. semanticisation (GST).
8. Repeated experiences with similar real-world information similarly benefits cor-
tical traces representing overlapping semantic sub-components (GST).
9. Semanticisation and the extraction and re-representation of progressively more
generalisable information is an ongoing process not tied to the acquisition of
particular new memories (GST).
The neural network model presented in this chapter incorporates these features,
and shows that certain characteristics of memory and learning arise from these fea-
tures. In brief, the neural network model consists of (1) an input ’cortical’ component
which maps information topographically and learns at a low rate, and forms associ-
ations between locally represented information more easily that long-range associa-
tions; and (2) a smaller, more quickly learning, ’hippocampal’ component that stores
orthogonalised traces with equal facility for all information. The processing units in
the model, or ’nodes’, represent highly abstracted neurones or groups of neurones. At
training, a set of patterns are presented to the cortical layer and learning takes place
in the several different weight sets throughout the net. After each training trial, par-
tial patterns are applied to the cortical layer, and the performance of the net and its
sub-components at pattern completion is tested.
The net is fully connected, although sparse connectivity is more biologically plau-
sible. In similar nets, the level of connectivity has been found to have little effect on
the pattern of results observed (e.g., Murre (1999)). It does however affect capacity
which is not the focus of these simulations. Patterns in the hippocampal component
are sparser than those in the cortical component in accord with known biological facts,
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but this feature has little effect on the pattern of behaviour seen. A k-winners-take-all
strategy models the effect of inhibition between units in a layer.
My model thus belongs to a well-established class of models of hippocampal-
cortical interaction. The main difference between my simulations and others is in
the nature of the training and testing employed, and in the way the data is analysed
and interpreted. Random episodic events and different types of semantic events that
share features are applied to the net. Although there is nothing inherent to a single
instance of an event that can distinguish it from events of other types, the net comes to
distinguish different sub-components of information over training. Recall for episodic
and semantic information, and for recently acquired and older information, becomes
differentially dependent on the hippocampal and cortical components.
The simple model provided makes minimal assumptions, and cannot provide
quantitative fits to empirical data. However, the findings clearly support the plau-
sibility of proposals put forward throughout this thesis.
7.2 Network architecture
The model is implemented within a connectionist framework, based on a simple as-
sociative net. Input layer L1 – ’the cortical component’ – consists of several sections,
each with the same number of units. L2 – the ’hippocampal component’ – consists of
one section of units, whose size is less than the total size of L1 (see Figure 7.1). The
model is highly abstracted from any “real” biological system, but sits squarely within
the Cognitive Modelling tradition, in which a few simple input/output units arranged
in layers can be said to represent cortex and hippocampus.
Recurrent connections within sections of L1 represent local connections within as-
sociative cortex, whilst recurrent connections in L2 represent connections within the
hippocampus. Connections between sections in L1 represent long-range connections
between cortical regions. The interconnections between units in L1 and L2 represent
connections between cortical regions and the hippocampus, such as those through the
parahippocampal regions.




   recurrent L1 weights     
recurrent L2 weights
inter L1−L2 weights
Figure 7.1: Basic 2-layer net. The net is fully connected, with four separate sets of weights
as shown. For clarity, only a few connections are shown in the figure; and the weights are
asymmetrical despite their representation.
7.3 Implementation of the model
Activation rule
To compute the binary valued activation (Yi) in a node i, firstly calculate the raw acti-





X jwi j (7.1)
where X j is the binary activation value of node j, wi j is the connection weight from
node j to node i, and n the number of nodes sending inputs to yi via wi j.
The binary activation Yi is then:
1 if yi is one of the k highest valued members of [y1,y2,y3...yN ]
0 otherwise
where N is the number of units in a section.
There is therefore no fixed threshold for activation, and inhibition is simulated
using a k-winners-take-all arrangement.
The values of k1 (for sections in L1) and k2 (for the single section in L2) are fixed at
the beginning of training.
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7.3.1 Training phase
All weights are initialised to a small random positive value between 0 and 0.1.
There are 4 sets of weight matrices: W1 (for connections in sections in L1), W11 (for
intra-sectional connections in L1), W12 (for connections between L1 and L2), and W2 (for
recurrent connections within L2). Each of the weight matrices have their own learning
(λ) and decay (δ) rates. These are fixed at the beginning of training, and conform to
the following order in the main simulations, unless otherwise specified.
λ2 ≥ λ12 > λ1 > λ11 (7.2)
δ2 ≥ δ12 > δ1 > δ11 (7.3)
Each set of weights is trained independently. Training of the weights in W1 and W11
proceeds on the basis of the training pattern applied to L1.
For each training event applied to L1, a random pattern is generated in L2 with k2
active units. W12 is trained on the basis of the associated activity in L1 and L2. W2 is
trained auto-associatively on the pattern in L2.
Learning rule
The learning rule is a simple Hebbian rule, with global weight decay.
Weights connecting co-active units are incremented. Forgetting is simulated by
reducing all non-co-active connection strengths on each time step. The learning-
associated change on each time step in a weight connecting units i and j (∆wi j) is
equal to:
∆wi j = λ(1−wi j)YiYj −δwi j(1−YiYj) (7.4)
Equation 7.4 ensures that weights are kept within the interval [0-1].
7.3.2 Test phase
In the test phase, a partial pattern is applied to L1. A partial pattern is generated by
switching d randomly chosen nodes that were active in the stored pattern from 1 to 0.
The degree to which this partial pattern is completed by passing the pattern through
the various sets of weights is then assessed. Units that are active in a test pattern are
clamped at 1, and are always selected. Error is measured by computing the Hamming
distance between the recalled pattern and the desired pattern.
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Recall from W1: Raw activations in L1 are calculated on the basis of W1, and the k1
most active units per section are set to 1 with other units set to 0.
Recall from W11: Raw activations in L1 are calculated on the basis of W11, and the k1
most active units per section are set to 1 with other units set to 0.
Recall mediated by W1 and W11 combined: is found by summing the raw activation
arrays produced by each set of weights, before digitising them by setting the k1
most active units in each section to 1, and the others set to 0.
Recall mediated by W12: depends on propagating activity from L1 to L2 via W12; set-
ting the k2 most active units in L2 to 1 and the others to 0, and propagating
activity back to L1 via W12. The k1 most active units per section are set to 1, the
others set to 0.
Recall mediated by W2 and W12 combined: W2 weights cannot be tested indepen-
dently of W12 for their ability to support recall in L1. The combined recall elicited
from W12 and W2 initially proceeds as for W12, resulting in a raw activity pattern
in L2. This pattern is auto-associated using W2, to create a new pattern of raw
activation values in L2. The k2 most active units are chosen in L2, and recall
proceeds as above for W12.
Whole net: The raw activations in L1 produced from the combined performance of
W1 & W11, and from W2 & W12 (as detailed above) are summed; the k1 most active
units per section are set to 1, the others set to 0.
7.3.3 Modulation of learning
Memory modulation in the model notionally models the effect of systems that increase
arousal concommitant with experiencing an event or that act before an event trace has
decayed to increase the initial strength with which an event trace is encoded. Memory
modulation is engaged in the model by increasing the value of λ in one or more weight
set for a sub-set of training event types. For ease of comparison with other presented
data, memory modulation applies to either all episodic or all semantic information,
rather than to a sub-set of such events.
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7.3.4 Offline learning
When off-line learning is engaged in the model, it occurs after each training trial. The
number of events to be trained offline after each training trial (p) and the number of the
most recent patterns over which these events are to be selected (r) is fixed. A training
event is randomly selected from the r most recently presented patterns. The L2 pattern
associated with this training event is activated, and activity allowed to propagate to
L1 via W12. The k1 most active units in the raw activation array in L1 are set to 1, and
the others set to 0. W11 weights are then trained on this pattern as for a normal training
trial. (Note that this pattern may not be one of those originally trained.) This off-line
training process is repeated p times.
7.3.5 Training and testing schedule
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Figure 7.2: Training and testing schedule
7.3.6 Representation of events
A key feature of this model is the distinction that is made between episodic and se-
mantic training events, as experience with events accrues.
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Training items
All training items are represented by binary strings of size nm, with k1m active units,
where n is the number of units in a section in L1, m is the number of sections in L1,
and k1 is the number of active units in a section in L1.
There are two types of training item:
• Episodic items are represented by randomly generated strings. Items 1a and 1b in
Figure 7.3 are examples of possible episodic events.
• Each semantic item belongs to a category of semantic events. A fixed and sub-
stantial proportion of a pattern in a category is identical with all other instances
of that category. In the majority of simulations presented in this chapter, 2/3rds
of the pattern is shared. The other ’variable’ units are randomly generated for
each instance of that category. In figure 7.3, items 2a and 2b are instances of one
semantic category (and overlap on the first 3 sections) whilst items 3a and 3b are
instances of another semantic category (and overlap in sections 1, 2 and 4).
Two parameters are needed to specify the population of semantic events – the
number of different categories of semantic event, and the number of instances of
each presented to the net.
The ‘episodic’ item 1b in figure 7.3 could in fact also be identified as an event from
the same semantic category as items 3a and 3b. This illustrates an important point:
in this model there are no inherent differences between episodic and semantic events
that are evident in a single pattern. All semantic information arrives in an ’episode’.
What defines an event as episodic or semantic is whether there are many other similar
events with substantially overlapping portions of activity. Thus if items from the same
semantic category as that of items 3a and 3b were presented to the net along with item
1b, then item 1b could be considered to be a semantic item. If only events from the
semantic category of items 2a and 2b were presented to the net, item 1b would be
considered to be episodic.
Using a different conceptualisation, each presentation of an instance of a semantic
event from the same category is effectively the re-presentation of the same event, but
with some random noise. The pattern of activity in each episodic event, on the other
hand, is not related in any predictable way to that of any other episodic event.











Figure 7.3: Examples of training and test items to be presented to L1. For easy visualisation the
ones and zeros of the binary strings are represented here as black or white squares respectively.
1a and 1b show different possible episodic training events. 2a and 2b show possible semantic
training events in the same category of semantic event as each other, as do 3a and 3b. Test
events are formed by deleting active units from a given training event. 1ai shows a possible test
item associated with the training item in 1a. Items 2ai-iii are possible test events associated
with the semantic event shown in 2a. Test event 2ai shows a test event where all the units
omitted are from the “episodic” (non-overlapping) part of the semantic training event, 2aii shows
a test event where all the units omitted are from the “semantic” part of the semantic training
event; and 2aiii shows a test event with a mixture of semantic and episodic units omitted.
For simplicity, in the simulations presented the variable ’episodic’ part of a seman-
tic item is confined to a single section.
Test items
Test items are created by deleting d active elements from a given training pattern, so
there are k1m−d active units in a test pattern.
Either all d elements are deleted from one section, or d/2 elements are deleted from
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each of two sections. There are therefore five possible types of test item, which are
labelled to show (i) whether the event is Episodic or Semantic and whether (ii) deletions
occur in a variable (var) or repeating semantic (sem) section. Note that episodic events
have variable sections only. This labelling convention is used in the figure legends.
• The deleted units in episodic test events can come from either:
1. The same section – Episodic/var
2. From two different sections (e.g. item 1ai) – Episodic/var var
• The deleted units in semantic test events can come:
1. From the same variable section (e.g. item 2ai) – Semantic/var
2. From the same semantic section (e.g. item 2aii) – Semantic/sem
3. From one variable and one semantic section (e.g. item 2aiii) – Semantic/sem
var
7.3.7 Parameter values
After initial explorations, size- and activity-related parameter values were fixed (see
Table 7.1). These ‘standard values’ are used in simulations except where otherwise
stated. Approximately 80 training events are presented to the net on each of the main
simulations1. The basic pattern of findings is similar across a wide range of parameter
values. These values allow the phenomena of interest to be observed in a reasonable
run-time.
7.3.8 Visualising the data
This code was written in the Matlab Programming Language, and simulated using
Matlab Version 6.5.1.199709, Release 13 (The Mathworks, Inc).
In the graphs presented in this chapter, the x-axis plots the number of training
trials intervening (ITT) between an event’s initial presentation to the net for training,
1Test items come in multiples of twos (episodic items) and threes (semantic items) to ensure that
equal numbers of the different types of test items are presented in the test phase. As one new test item
is presented each time a new training event is presented to the net, there must be an identical number of
training and test items. Therefore, depending on precise combinations of episodic and semantic events,
and semantic types and instances of events, the total number of training events may not be precisely 80,
although it is always at least 80.
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Parameter Value
Number of units in L1 (nm) 40 units x 3 sections = 120
Number of units in L2 30 units x 1 section = 30
Number of units active in pat-
tern in L1 (k1)
10 x 3 sections = 30 (25% of units)
Number of units active in pat-
tern in L2 (k2)
4 x 1 section = 4 (13% of units)
Number of nodes omitted to
create test items (d)
4 (either 4 in one section, or 2 each in
2 sections)
Learning rates [λ11λ1λ12λ2] [0.01 0.1 0.6 0.9]
Decay rates [δ11 δ1 δ12 δ2] [0.001 0.05 0.3 0.8]
Number of training events – if episodic only: 80
– if semantic only: sc=9, si=9
– if mixed: episodic: 44; sc=5, si=9
Table 7.1: Parameters used in the main simulations presented in this chapter, unless otherwise
stated. sc = number of categories of semantic event; si = number of instances of each semantic
category.
and being tested. Therefore, low ITT represents ’recent memory’ and high ITT refers
to ’remote memory’.
The y-axis plots the performance of components of the net in completing partial
L1 patterns. Performance is calculated as the number of nodes d omitted to form a test
pattern minus the error, which is half the Hamming distance between test and target
pattern. Percentage performance is calculated by dividing performance by d, and
multiplying by 100. Some of the axes were mistakenly labelled in terms of absolute
performance and some in terms of the percentage performance. However this does
not affect the shape of the lines plotted.
The performance of different sets of weights can be tested separately (with the
exception of W2, as noted above), or in combination. Sub-plot captions indicate the
weight set(s) producing the plotted performance. I refer to the combined performance
of W11 & W1 as the ’cortical component’; and of W12 & W2 as the ’hippocampal compo-
nent’. Hippocampal plots can be considered to represent the ability of the hippocam-
pus to mediate recall without help from the cortex, and the cortical plots represents
7.4. Findings 177
the cortex’s ability to mediate recall in the absence of the hippocampus. A comparison
of such plots at a particular ITT value thus reflects the relative contribution that each
component is making to the recall of particular types of information at that time-point
after acquisition.
The graph legends refer to the five different types of testing events enumerated in
section 7.3.6. I shall refer to the pattern of units within a single section of a training
event as a sub-pattern. Each Episodic/var test item tests recall of a random sub-pattern
that was acquired in association with other random sub-patterns. Each Episodic/var
var item tests recall of two random sub-patterns that were acquired in association with
random sub-patterns in other sections. Semantic/var items test recall of a random sub-
pattern that was paired at acquisition with sub-patterns that repeat across different
training patterns. Semantic/sem items test recall of a sub-pattern that repeats across
different training items, and that was acquired in association with another repeating
sub-pattern and a random sub-pattern. Semantic/sem var items tests the recall of a
random sub-pattern and a sub-pattern that repeats in different patterns, that have
been acquired in association with another repeating sub-pattern.
7.4 Findings
7.4.1 Control data
I first examine the standard deviations of error in the model, and explain the rationale
for truncating the x-axis for the data plots.
7.4.1.1 Standard deviation of error
Events are presented sequentially, and recall for all events is tested after the presenta-
tion of each event. Each training event is associated with a single test item of a given
type (one of 2 types for episodic training items, and one of 3 types for semantic items).
Therefore, the maximum number of times that test items of a given type can be tested
is the total number of training items minus the position of presentation of the first
training item associated with a test item from that event type. If, for example, the first
presentation of an episodic event associated with an ’Episodic/var’ test item was on
training trial 6 and there were 80 training trials, these test items could contribute data
points only up to ITT = 74. Only the first training item can be tested the maximum
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Figure 7.4: a & b: Standard deviation of error when learning and decay rates are zero. c & d:
Standard deviation of error on a typical run.
number of times, and therefore only this type of event will contribute a data point for
the maximum ITT value. Therefore, the standard deviation of error rises with increas-
ing ITT, as the plotted values are averaged over progressively fewer data points (see
figure 7.4, all sub-figures); and drops to zero at different ITT values for different event
types (Figure 7.4a & b show this most clearly).
Standard deviation of error will be low on a simulation involving learning if
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weights are performing well, as there will be no error (e.g., Figure 7.4d, ITT = 0).
For this reason, there is an interaction between standard deviation and the different
types of weights and test items when learning is allowed (compare Figure 7.4c & d;
and compare the different test types within Figure 7.4d). In general, standard devia-
tion is highest for ’Semantic/sem’ items when acquired and tested by the W12 weights.
This arises because similar overlapping sub-patterns in L1 are associated with random
patterns in L2; and the learning and decay rates are relatively high in these weights.
In the main data plots reported in this chapter, the x-axis is truncated at half the
maximum ITT because the increasing variance in the data at high ITT makes the means
of these data unreliable.
7.4.1.2 Performance with no learning
















































Figure 7.5: Recall performance with no learning. For this set of parameters, expected chance
performance is approximately 0.66 for items in which units are deleted from only one section.
As expected when there is no learning in the model, that is, when λ and δ are
zero in all weights, performance on test items is close to chance for all weight sets
(Figure 7.5).
The probability of correct unit choice is higher for test items in which units are
deleted from only one section. Therefore ’Episodic/var var’ and ’Semantic/sem var’
items show lower chance performance on average than other test items (Figure 7.5).
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7.4.2 Learning and decay rates
These simulations investigate the effect of globally changing λ and δ values in all
weights.
7.4.2.1 Changing learning and decay rates
The absolute and relative values of λ and δ in a given weight set affects immediate
recall performance on a pattern when ITT = 0, how quickly performance deteriorates
on a trace after initial acquisition, and the slope of performance deterioration as ITT
rises. Figure 7.6 shows the effect of globally changing learning and decay rates.
When both λ and δ are high, events can be stored very robustly, and remembered
accurately for a short period of time; by both the hippocampal and cortical compo-
nents. That is, there is good performance at low ITT (subfigures 7.6a & 7.6b). Per-
formance drops rapidly as ITT increases, because δ is high and stored information is
quickly lost. Performance on the different types of test items is similar in all sets of
weights.
With intermediate λ and δ, initial performance at low ITT may not be perfect be-
cause new traces are not made sufficiently distinct from existing traces (subfigures 7.6c
& 7.6d). The ability to recall recently acquired information interacts with the nature
of the weight matrices underpinning recall (compare different performance values at
ITT = 0 in subfigures 7.6c & 7.6d; and 7.6e & 7.6f). Information is lost at a slower rate
(that is, the deterioration in performance follows a shallower gradient, compare sub-
figures 7.6a& c; and b & d at low ITT), with overwriting playing a relatively greater
role in memory loss than when δ is very high.
When sparser patterns are stored in the net at intermediate λ and δ rates, perfor-
mance drops off less quickly as ITT increases (compare subfigures 7.6c & 7.6d, with
subfigures 7.7a & 7.7b) because overwriting is reduced.
At very low λ and δ, recently stored events are not much more likely to be remem-
bered than older events, as initial performance is close to chance, and decay is very low
(subfigures 7.6e & 7.6f). Close to chance performance is seen for event recall mediated
by the ’hippocampus’; and cortical recall is good only for semantic sub-patterns.
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Figure 7.6: Learning and decay rates equal in all sets of weights. In (a) & (b) all λ = 0.9 & all δ
= 0.9; in (c) & (d) all λ = 0.1 & all δ = 0.1; and in (e) & (f) all λ = 0.01 & all δ = 0.01.
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Figure 7.7: Performance drops off less quickly when sparser patterns are stored in the net. All
λ = 0.1; all δ = 0.1. k1 = 4; k2 = 2; d = 2.
7.4.2.2 Memory performance in hippocampal and cortical components
Figure 7.6 shows very clearly that even when λ and δ take the same values in all areas,
hippocampal and cortical components behave very differently.
The most obvious feature is that the performance for different types of test item is
more separated in the cortical component than the hippocampal component (compare
subfigures 7.6c & d, and e & f). This arises because in the hippocampal component,
similar L1 patterns are represented by orthogonalised L2 patterns, whereas informa-
tion is mapped topographically in the cortical component. Overwriting by later pat-
terns in the hippocampal component is always detrimental to performance, as there is
no consistent relationship between elements of patterns representing different events.
However, overwriting in the topographically organised cortical component can lead
to better performance on the repeated semantic sub-patterns of events, as more robust
representations build up for these features.
The initial performance at ITT = 0 reflects the combined effect of the recent learning
trial (i.e. the most recent event for which ITT = 0), together with previous accumulated
learning. Therefore this value is also affected by the degree to which overwriting is
destructive or constructive.
The different weight sets also contain different numbers of connections, which par-
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tially determines their susceptibility to overwriting.
7.4.2.3 Learning and decay rates: conclusions
The values of λ and δ interact with the nature of weight sets in hippocampal and corti-
cal components to produce characteristically different patterns of recall behaviour. In
general, high λ and δ support good immediate recall peformance, but poor long-term
retention; whereas low λ and δ support relatively poor initial performance, but better
long-term retention.
Memory studies have established that the hippocampus can acquire complex
episodic information rapidly, but that such information decays rapidly; whilst the cor-
tex cannot support robust one-trial learning of episodic information, but can gradually
build up information about regularities of the world with time. In order to capture
such behaviour, the cortical component of our model should produce a pattern of be-
haviour similar to that of subfigure 7.6e – that is, it should employ low λ and δ; whilst
the hippocampal component should produce behaviour similar to subfigure 7.6b or d
– and employ high λ and δ.
Preliminary investigations show that the general patterns of behaviour observed in
the model are robust under a wide set of parameters, if λ and δ are higher for weights
in the hippocampal component than in the cortical component. As the purpose of this
model is to provide a ’proof of concept’ rather than to exhaustively explore the range
of possible λ and δ values, I have simply selected a set of λ and δ values that follow
the pattern laid out in equation 7.3. The values indicated in table 7.1 are used in all
simulations, unless otherwise stated. I in no way wish to imply that these values are
the ’best’ or the most realistic.
7.4.3 The role of different sets of weights
Broadly speaking, the weight matrices associated with the hippocampal component
(W12 &W2), and with the cortical component (W1 & W11) behave in a similar fash-
ion. This is unsurprising because the cortical matrices both have low λ and δ, whilst
the hippocampal matrices have much higher λ and δ; and whilst learning in cortical
weights reflects associations within an L1 pattern, hippocampal learning reflects asso-
ciations between the L1 pattern and a random L2 pattern. Many of the subfigures pre-
sented in this chapter plot the combined performance of the hippocampal component
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and of the cortical component, rather than individual performance of the associated
weights.
However, there are subtle differences in the performance of different weight ma-
trices within the hippocampal and cortical components and in the role they play in
supporting the acquisition and retention of different kinds of information. Figure 7.8
shows the contributions to performance mediated by each weight set on a typical run.
This figure provides reference data for plots later in this chapter.
7.4.3.1 Recurrent connections within the hippocampus (W2)
The ability of W2 weights to support pattern completion in L1 depends on the integrity
of weights in W12. Therefore, increasing trace storage strengths or reducing forget-
ting or overwriting in W2 alone has little effect on L1 pattern completion performance.
(These factors do affect pattern completion within L2, but L2 pattern completion is not
directly explored here.)
W2 acts to ’clean up’ the raw activity pattern created by W12 in response to the
application of a partial test pattern to L1. Because W2 weights (and the associated W12
weights) show a rapid loss of information, this ’clean up’ adds a very sharp recency ef-
fect to the hippocampus’s performance, allowing perfect immediate recall even when
the bi-directional W12 connections alone produce only 50% correct performance (com-
pare subfigures 7.8d & e).
7.4.3.2 Connections between the hippocampal and cortical component (W12)
W12 weights bi-directionally link the cortical and hippocampal component. W12 can
therefore act indirectly to support associations between information stored in sepa-
rate sections of the cortex. However, because λ and δ are high in W12 this associative
information is available only transiently.
Because W12 learns associations between L1 training patterns and random L2 pat-
terns, W12 representations benefit from repeating semantic sub-patterns only through
chance associations that co-opt weights that have already been used in the represen-
tation of that sub-pattern.
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(c) Intra-L1 and recurrent-L1 weights

















































(e) Inter-L1-L2 and recurrent-L2 weights





























Figure 7.8: Performance on a typical simulation using standard parameters
186 7. A simple model of episodic and semantic learning
7.4.3.3 Connections between different cortical sections (W11)
Performance mediated by W11 weights shows the lowest recency effect (that is, perfor-
mance at low ITT is not much better than that at high ITT), and the greatest separation
of performance for different types of test items (subfigure 7.8b). Both features result
from low λ and δ, as weights cannot robustly store one-trial information but can grad-
ually increment over time on exposure to repeated sub-patterns.
The ’constructive interference’ due to repeated exposure to semantic sub-patterns
interacts with δ and the conditions of testing to determine whether an increase, de-
crease or flat maintenance of performance for given test types is seen over the course
of a simulation for W11-mediated recall.
7.4.3.4 Recurrent connections within sections of the cortex (W1)
W1 weights associate units within individual cortical sections. Because sub-patterns
are auto-associated without noise in W1, semantic learning of local sub-patterns is
very good. However, W1 performance also shows a pronounced recency effect due to
overwriting and decay (subfigure 7.8a). The W1 weight matrix contains relatively few
connections compared to the other matrices, increasing its vulnerability to destructive
overwriting.
W1 weights cannot register associations between sub-patterns occurring in differ-
ent cortical sections. Clearly, if the partial pattern presented at testing entirely lacks
active units in one of the sections, recall mediated via W1 will produce chance per-
formance for that section. Subfigure 7.9a shows such behaviour: W1-mediated per-
formance is at chance for test items in which d = k1 for test items in which units are
deleted from only one section. Subfigure 7.9c & d shows normal patterns of recall via
W11 weights and the hippocampus when d = 10. Subfigure 7.9b shows typical recall
when d < k1 for reference.
7.4.3.5 Whole net
Recall performance for the net overall is dominated on average by weights that con-
tribute most strongly to raw activations in L1. Generally speaking, for recently ac-
quired information, the hippocampus contributes most to whole net output. As a
memory ages, cortical weights take over recall (subfigure 7.8f).
7.4. Findings 187
























(a) Recall via recurrent-L1 weights
























(b) Recall via recurrent-L1 weights
























(c) Recall via intra-L1 weights

























Figure 7.9: Local cortical connections cannot support associative recall of information repre-
sented in distant cortical sections. (a), (c) & (d): No partial pattern in one of the sections of
cortex at testing (i.e. all local units deleted at test), d = 10; (b): Partial pattern in all sections at
testing.
7.4.3.6 The role of different sets of weights: conclusions
Many differences in the behaviour of the hippocampal and cortical components with
respect to episodic and semantic events can be traced back to a component’s relative
tendency to separate patterns or to topographically map similar information. Recall
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performance for different test items is relatively more similar in the hippocampal com-
ponent, as repeating semantic sub-patterns are represented in the hippocampus by
randomly chosen patterns. In contrast, incremental learning leads to improving recall
performance for semantic sub-patterns in the cortex.
Additionally, cortical learning distinguishes between local and long-range cortical
associations, whereas the hippocampus is equally able to represent associations be-
tween any two nodes in L1. The rapid acquisition of associations between information
represented in different areas of the cortex is therefore hippocampally-dependent, al-
though the cortical component can acquire such information slowly. Local connections
can acquire associations between locally represented information relatively quickly.
The choice of λ and δ enhances the a priori learning characteristics of
hippocampally- and cortically-associated weights.
7.4.4 Learning different kinds of information
In these simulations, I examine recall performance for episodic and semantic events
separately. Interleaving episodic events with semantic events effectively adds noise to
the learning of semantic events, although this has little effect on the recall of episodic
events (not shown). I also show how the model captures proposals on the relative
importance of the hippocampus and cortex in the fast acquisition of information (dis-
cussed in section 4.2) and the aquisition of locally-convergent information (discussed
in section 4.3).
7.4.4.1 Acquisition and maintenance of episodic information
Figure 7.10 shows recall performance for episodic items alone. The hippocampal re-
gion shows very good one-trial learning of this novel random information, with high
performance when ITT = 0; but rapid decay of such information to chance.
In contrast, the cortical component shows poorer performance in initial recall of
such information; but the rate of decay is lower so that at high ITT, a little of this
information can still be recalled via the cortex. That is, as a memory ages, the cortex
takes over the recall of ’episodic’ information, although progressively poorer pattern
completion (i.e. fewer details) are recalled over time.
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Figure 7.10: Recall performance on episodic information.
7.4.4.2 Recall performance on semantic information
A population of semantic training events is specified by the number of different cate-
gories of events and the number of instances of each. Figure 7.11 shows the effect on
performance of presenting different populations of semantic training items to the net.
When a few types of semantic events with many instances of each are presented
to the net, cortically mediated recall of semantic sub-patterns is very good (subfig-
ure 7.11a). Since forgetting is low, robust representations for the overlapping semantic
sub-patterns can be developed over time in cortical regions on exposure to different
instances of the same category of event. ’Semantic/sem’ items benefit the most as
pattern completion is tested only within a semantic sub-pattern; ’Semantic/sem var’
items benefit approximately half as much as they test pattern completion for a se-
mantic sub-pattern and a random sub-pattern; and the random sub-patterns tested in
’Semantic/var’ do not benefit at all. Since earlier test trials cannot benefit from the
subsequent repetition of overlapping information, the first test of a repeated semantic
sub-pattern is not necessarily going to produce the highest performance. This explains
the increase in average performance seen for Semantic/sem items as ITT initially in-
creases in subfigure 7.11a.
As the number of categories of semantic event increases and there are fewer in-
stances of each category (figures 7.11 a & b; c & d; e & f), interference (overwriting)
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Figure 7.11: Recall performance for semantic information. (a) & (b) Semantic categories: 3;
instances: 27 (c) & (d) Semantic categories: 9; instances: 9, and (e) &(f) Semantic categories:
26; instances 3.
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between weights representing one semantic sub-pattern and those representing an-
other is greater. In addition, on average there will be more trials intervening between
re-exposure to repeating sub-patterns, so forgetting will be greater. These factors off-
set the gains from re-exposure to the same sub-patterns, and leads to a slight loss
of semantic information in the cortical component as ITT increases (subfigure 7.11c).
However, the very pronounced performance benefit for semantic over random infor-
mation is retained, due to low forgetting and slow incrementation of weights across
learning trials. The benefit of repeated learning is also indicated by the reduced gra-
dient of performance decay as ITT rises for items with semantic sub-patterns.
When semantic events are derived from many categories and contain few instances
of each, performance in the cortical component becomes progressively more similar
for each type of test item (subfigure 7.11e & f), and progressively more like the recall of
episodic information (compare subfigure 7.11e and subfigure 7.10a). If there was only
one instance of each category, events would effectively be random episodic events, as
they would not share sub-patterns with other traces except by chance. In accord with
this, performance on the ’Semantic/var’ items deteriorates in all cases at a similar rate
as that seen for episodic information, as only recall for the random sub-pattern is being
tested.
Recall performance mediated by the hippocampal component is relatively simi-
lar irrespective of whether there are many repeated instances of a given category, or
only a few. Recall is similarly initially very high for all test items, followed by a very
rapid loss of all information as ITT increases (subfigures 7.11b, d & f). The variance
on ’Semantic/sem’ items is highest in the hippocampal component, especially when
there are few categories of events. A relative improvement for ’Semantic/sem’, and to
a lesser extent ’Semantic/sem var’ events is seen as there are more instances of cate-
gories, but this is less evident than in the cortex. This results from the chance re-using
of weights already used to represent information about a given semantic sub-patterns.
7.4.4.3 Convergence of information and associative learning
In section 4.3, I concluded that associative learning within one modality was not
hippocampally-dependent, cross-modal learning between different types of informa-
tion was facilitated by the hippocampus, and learning associations between supra-
modal information and other information was obligatorily hippocampally-dependent.
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I also suggested that there was a hierarchy of learning areas from the neocortex,
through the MTL areas, to the hippocampus that can learn and represent information
of different complexity and acquire it at different rates.
Although the ’hierarchy’ implemented in my model consists of only two regions,
these distinctions can be seen in the behaviour exhibited by it. Let us posit that each
section in the model’s cortical component represents a cortical module in the brain
that processes information about a particular modality. Associative learning within
one modality can be performed by W1 weights in the absence of the hippocampal
component. For example, in subfigure 7.9b, W1-mediated pattern completion within a
section (i.e. the association of locally represented information) is good. Associations
between information in two modalities cannot be performed by locally projecting W1
weights (as we have seen, subfigure 7.9a), and W11 cannot mediate recall of such infor-
mation without extensive experience (W11-mediated pattern completion is good only
for sub-patterns that are repeated across different training events, subfigure 7.8b). The
hippocampal component is thus responsible for supporting acquisition of cross-modal
(cross-sectional) information at the normal speed of acquisition (good recall at low ITT
for ’Semantic/sem var’ and Episodic/var var’ associations, subfigure 7.8e): acquisi-
tion would be slower in the absence of the hippocampal component.
In accord with the data discussed in chapters 3 and 4, in the absence of the hip-
pocampus the acquisition of associations between information that is not represented
in local cortical regions requires more learning trials (compare 7.8c & e). Sufficiently
complex cues that effectively provide partial patterns in poorly connected sections of
the cortex (compare subfigures 7.9a & b) lead to better recall, as they reduce the de-
pendence on long-range cortical connections. In addition, previous learning affects the
ability of the cortical connections to acquire information in a given number of learning
trials, although it has little effect on hippocampal learning (compare subfigure 7.8b &
e at low ITT).
7.4.4.4 Speed of acquisition of information
In section 4.2, I argued that the fast acquisition of complex, novel information was
generally hippocampally-dependent. The acquisition of random episodic informa-
tion in the model is necessarily one-trial, whereas semantic sub-patterns may be ac-
quired over several trials. Only the hippocampal component is capable of supporting
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good recall of one-trial random novel information, even for immediate recall (compare
episodic recall in subfigure 7.8b & e). The hippocampus supports good one-trial learn-
ing for the ’episodic event’ of which semantic repeated information is a part. Such
learning might support episodised ’semantic’ recall in conditions such as semantic
dementia in which long-range cortical connections are breaking down. Local cortical
connections can support some recall of one-trial random information (subfigure 7.8a),
although as we have seen this is only for locally represented information – perhaps
for visual features of a specific object.
Recall performance for a recent experienced event reflects the combined effect of
the recent learning trial together with previous accumulated learning. For weights
with lower δ, such as those associated with the cortical component, performance pro-
gressively reflects information about all previously encountered information. Because
all training events are treated similarly by the net at acquisition, any difference in the
recall performance of different types of test item at ITT = 0, must reflect the extent to
which previously acquired information can aid recall performance of the most recently
presented event (subfigure 7.8a & b). Therefore, a particular level of performance in
W11, such as the good recall of semantic information at ITT = 1, in fact results from
slow incremental learning over several trials.
That what is already known affects recall performance for subsequently presented
events is trivially true in the model, because the sub-patterns to be recalled are identi-
cal across a sub-set of test items. However, it is clear that the model would also support
faster acquisition in W11 of new associations that were similar though not identical to
information already established (not shown).
7.4.4.5 Learning different kinds of information: conclusions
These simulations provide clear support for the idea that episodic and semantic in-
formation can be seen as points on a continuum of memory types. Episodic memory
refers to the most quickly acquired, most complex novel information, whereas items
in the broad category ’semantic memory’ fall on a continuum from episodic-like, to
very generic and simple information. Infrequently presented semantic information is
treated progressively more like episodic information by the model; progressively less
detailed episodic-like information is treated progressively more like semantic infor-
mation.
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More generally, learning associations between multi-modal information repre-
sented in different sections of the cortex requires the hippocampus, unless there are
many learning trials. Less complex information can be acquired by local cortical re-
gions. The hipppocampus is also generally more important for the rapid acquisition of
information, especially when information is truly novel and cortical learning cannot
take advantage of related pre-existing information represented in cortical weights.
The model initially treats each unfolding event the same – laying down a strong
event representation in the hippocampus, and weaker one in the cortex. The hip-
pocampus always supports the best recall of the complete, detailed, original traces;
although a small amount of information for any memory is retained in the cortex be-
yond its complete decay from the hippocampus. However, recall for different types
of information becomes differentiated with exposure to repeating sub-patterns. With
experience, the cortex builds traces for generic semantic information, which tends to
dominate recall for old information. The robustness of representations of semantic
information in the cortex depends on the extent to which there has been re-exposure
to the repeating elements. Thus, the ’neural basis’ for recall of memories tends to
segregate along the lines of the amount of detail required at recall and the amount
of exposure to information, rather than on a ’category-distinction’ between episodic
and semantic information. Repeated exposure to information has little effect on hip-
pocampal performance.
7.4.5 Modulation of learning
The standard λ and δ values employed in the model lead to very fast decay of in-
formation from the hippocampal component. Similarly, most episodic information
probably decays rapidly in real life. If, notionally, the ITT values are considered to
represent years since the acquisition of information, the data would imply that most
detailed episodic information that is recalled via the hippocampus is lost in approxi-
mately 1-2 years, a figure supported by neuro-psychological studies. However, clearly,
some episodic events are remembered longer than others, and in my opinion any such
detailed episodic information is retained in the hippocampus.
Preliminary investigations showed that modulating storage in W2 alone did not
much affect hippocampal memory performance, since recall from these weights de-
pends on W12 weights. Therefore modulation was applied to both W2 and W12 in sim-
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ulations investigating the effect of memory modulation in the hippocampal compo-
nent. In order to more clearly demonstrate the effect of increasing learning rates in
these weights, λ2 & λ12 and δ2 & δ12 were reduced from their high standard values
(although they remain much higher than in the cortically-associated weights). New
reference graphs are therefore provided (subfigures 7.12c, and 7.13c).
Increasing λ2 & λ12 slightly improves the initial recall of the information whose
storage is modulated, and extends the period for which this information is retained in
the hippocampus (for episodic information, compare subfigures 7.12a & c; for seman-
tic information, compare subfigures 7.12b & c). However, this improvement is at the
expense of very much poorer initial performance for the non-modulated information
stored in the hippocampus (see same graphs). The degree to which the performance
of non-modulated information is impaired reflects the extent of overwriting of the
non-modulated weights by the large modulated weights. When the net is trained on
sparser patterns, the difference between performance at ITT = 0 for episodic and se-
mantic information is reduced, and the gradient of performance decay as ITT rises
is reduced (data not shown). The large oscillations seen in the recall of semantic in-
formation when semantic learning is modulated in the hippocampus, arises from an
exaggeration of the effect of a chance re-using of weights that have already been used
to represent information about a semantic sub-pattern.
In the brain, modulation of hippocampal storage probably occurs to a greater ex-
tent than memory modulation in other areas. However, arousal levels and the various
putative memory modulation mechanisms may also affect storage in cortical regions,
too. When memory modulation is applied to W11 weights, recall performance for the
modulated memories is again enhanced at the expense of non-modulated information
(for episodic information, compare subfigures 7.13a & c; for semantic information,
compare subfigures 7.13b & c). However, strongly storing episodic information in the
cortical component has a particularly detrimental effect on the recall of incrementally
acquired semantic information (subfigure 7.13a).
7.4.5.1 Modulation of learning: conclusions
Enhancing the initial storage of a sub-set of traces in either the hippocampal or cor-
tical components impairs the retention of all other information. The robust storage
of episodic items in the cortex particularly disrupts the extraction of generic semantic
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Figure 7.12: Memory modulation in the hippocampal component. (a) For the storage of episodic
information, modulated λ2 and λ12 = 0.5. (b) For the storage of semantic information, modulated
λ2 and λ12 = 0.5. (c) Reference data for non-standard parameters: λ = [0.01 0.1 0.2 0.2]; δ =
[0.001 0.05 0.1 0.1].
information. This implies that storing episodic and semantic information in the same
nodes may be incompatible.
However, caution should be applied in extrapolating from this model. The brain
consists of many layers in addition to the two layers modelled here. I have suggested
that there may be a hierarchy of memory with information of increasing complexity
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Figure 7.13: Memory modulation in W11. (a) For the storage of episodic information, modulated
λ11 = 0.1. (b) For the storage of semantic information, modulated λ11 = 0.1. (c) Reference data
for non-standard parameters: λ = [0.01 0.1 0.2 0.2]; δ = [0.001 0.05 0.1 0.1].
and specificity stored in the higher layers. In this scheme any detailed information
that was represented outside of the hippocampus would be represented in a higher
region to that for the most generic information. Furthermore, the enhanced storage of
some traces would be less detrimental in a more realistic, less overloaded net.
The hippocampus stores all information relatively robustly on the first encounter,
without the need for enhanced storage. The cortex, on the other hand, develops recall-
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viable traces only gradually. Therefore, low salience, incidental information will nor-
mally be dependent on the hippocampus, although under high levels of arousal that
trigger the modulation of storage the cortex may be able to acquire some informa-
tion. Thus, as suggested in section 4.4, the acquisition and recall of incidental or low
salience information, is similar to the rapid acquisition of information in the sense
that both depend on the ability of the hippocampus to automatically lay down robust
traces.
7.4.6 Semanticisation of memory
In the previous chapter, I discussed the semanticisation of memories that occurs with
age. I suggested that semanticisation could arise through the loss of detailed infor-
mation with age, or a relative increase in the ability of semanticised traces to mediate
recall2. In this section, I explore the semanticisation that occurs in this model.
7.4.6.1 Semanticisation of memory through decay of details
In the model, the most accurate recall of all pattern elements (details) of an event is
mediated by the hippocampus. The rapid decay of information from the hippocampal
component means that as a memory ages, progressively fewer of the unique details
can be recalled, although any sub-components that by chance (for episodic events) or
by design (semantic events) overlaps with repeating sub-components will be retained.
The cortex can initially support the recall of some random details, but this capacity
also drops with time. Thus the recall of older events from the net will be less detailed
than for more recent information, and tend to depend more on generic information.
The net’s performance on recent memories is dominated by the contribution of the
hippocampal component, whereas for old memories only semanticised information
(i.e. information that is generic to several events) can be recalled above chance (e.g.,
subfigures 7.8f or 7.14d). The initial rapid drop in performance on ’Semantic/sem
var’ items (which contain a mixture of episodic detail and generic information) in sub-
figure 7.14d reflects the decay in recall of random components, whilst the long-term
maintenance of performance reflects the recall of generic semanticised information
that is supported by exposure to repeating sub-patterns.
2A change in the recall strategy used for the recall of recent and remote memories might also play a
part. However, I do not explore this issue here.
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7.4.6.2 Semanticisation of memory through ’real-world’ exposure
In the model, exposure to training events containing repeating sub-patterns simulates
the effect of real-world exposure to generic semantic information. As sub-patterns are
re-experienced, progressively more robust traces are established in the slow-learning
cortical component (subfigure 7.14c, and many others). As a memory ages and the
fully-detailed hippocampal trace is lost, the cortical trace becomes relatively more im-
portant for recall, and the information elicited is progressively more semanticised.
7.4.6.3 Semanticisation of memory through offline replay
I have argued that there may only be quantitative differences in the strengthening
of connections that occurs on re-exposure to real-world information, and that which
may occur with support from the hippocampal component or through local cortically-
driven attractor reactivation. Therefore, the data presented so far could equally well
be considered to reflect ’real-world’ or ’replay-aided’ enhancement of semantic com-
ponents of traces. However, the model does also implement specifically ’off-line learn-
ing’.
Preliminary investigations showed that under standard conditions, information
represented in W12 decays too quickly to allow a reasonable time-window for off-line
learning. Therefore, the same lower-than-standard λ2, λ12, δ2 & δ12 values that were
used in the modulation simulations are also used here. Overwriting in W12 was still
found to be a problem, so offline-learning simulations also used sparser-than-standard
patterns (k1 = 4, k2 = 2). A similar pattern of behaviour was however found for both
standard and sparse patterns.
Figure 7.14a & b shows the effect of allowing off-line learning in W11 for 3 out of 5 of
the most recently experienced training items after each training trial. The initial rise in
performance at low ITT reflects the effect of offline learning trials in the period shortly
after acquisition. All test items benefit from offline learning, but this is especially
evident for the episodic events, as they do not benefit in the same way as semantic
information from incremental learning on re-exposure to sub-patterns. Episodic infor-
mation is lost more slowly from the net as a whole (compare subfigures 7.14b & d),
and semantic information is preserved almost perfectly.
When local W1 weights in the cortical component are allowed to contribute to pat-
tern completion in L1 (in a manner similar to the ’clean-up’ performed by W2 weights
200 7. A simple model of episodic and semantic learning












































































































Figure 7.14: Offline learning enhances retention. (a) & (b): Offline learning in W11 using stan-
dard λ11. 3 out of 5 of the most recently presented events undergo offline learning after the
presentation of each training trial. (c) & (d): Reference data for non-standard parameters: λ =
[0.01 0.1 0.2 0.2]; δ = [ 0.001 0.05 0.1 0.1]; K1 = 4; k2 = 2; d = 2.
in L2), then off-line learning in W12 very clearly benefits the recall of semantic sub-
patterns at the expense of performance on patterns with random components (com-
pare subfigure 7.14a and 7.15a). Overall net performance also shows an enhanced
advantage for semantic information, with lower initial performance for episodic in-
formation when ITT = 0, and a steeper decline in performance as ITT rises (compare
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Figure 7.15: Offline learning incorporating cortical ’clean-up’ benefits semantic information. 3
out of 5 of the most recently presented events undergo offline learning after the presentation of
each training trial. λ = [0.01 0.1 0.2 0.2]; δ = [ 0.001 0.05 0.1 0.1]; K1 = 4; k2 = 2; d = 2.






















































Figure 7.16: Modulation of episodic storage in hippocampal component with off-line learning for
all events. For the storage of episodic information, modulated λ2 and λ12 = 0.5. 3 out of 5 of the
most recently presented events undergo offline learning after the presentation of each training
trial. λ = [0.01 0.1 0.2 0.2]; δ = [ 0.001 0.05 0.1 0.1]; K1 = 4; k2 = 2; d = 2.
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subfigures 7.14b and 7.15b).
In the model, the decay of information in W12 determines the time window after
acquisition in which offline learning driven by hippocampal reactivations is useful.
At r = 5, enough information is retained in W12 for at least some parts of the original
training patterns with which the L2 patterns are paired to be recreated (see subfig-
ure 7.14d). However, as r rises and the patterns recreated in L1 become less similar
to the original training patterns, W11 is effectively learning noise. This reduces perfor-
mance on all patterns (not shown).
Extending the lifetime of traces in the hippocampal component extends the time
window for offline learning. Combining memory modulation in W2 and W12 for
episodic information, say, with offline learning, leads to relatively more constructive
offline learning for the modulated episodic events than others (Figure 7.16), as the pat-
terns activated in L1 and learnt are more accurate for episodic than semantic events.
(As noted earlier, memory modulation impairs performance for all non-modulated
items.)
7.4.6.4 Semanticisation of memory: conclusions
Semanticisation of memories occurs in the model through a loss of hippocampally-
dependent episodic detail, and the relative strengthening of cortically-represented
core components of events that come to dominate recall as a memory ages. No specific
assumptions are needed to generate this behaviour: it arises automatically from the
storage characteristics and learning and forgetting rates in the different components
of the model.
As noted earlier, evidence that the hippocampus is necessary for any post-
acquisition semantic memory processing is currently equivocal. However, it seems
reasonable that if the hippocampus does initiate activity in lower regions in support of
offline learning, local attractor representations in the cortex would influence the trig-
gered patterns of activation. In the model it is clear that allowing cortical involvement
in pattern selection enhances the semanticisation effect that hippocampally-driven re-
play already has. Obviously the effect would be even greater if long-range cortical
connections were allowed to contribute, as they represent the most generic informa-
tion. This implies that ’consolidation-like’ learning would lead to the increasing se-
manticisation of memory.
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’Real-world’ (online) exposure to events has a more profound effect on the main-
tenance of information than offline learning. This seems sensible. However, in a
more realistic situation, online and offline learning would be less distinct. The biggest
source of recall cues for memory reactivation is likely to be external cues, so offline
learning for reactivated information that partially overlaps with new information
would be expected to occur in a similar time period to the acquisition of the new infor-
mation. Such behaviour might contribute to the uncovering of relationships between
semantic information.
It is interesting to speculate that traces that were initially stored most robustly in
the hippocampus (or elsewhere) could contribute longer to a post-acquisition seman-
ticisation process, thereby having a greater effect on the ongoing re-organisation of
memory.
7.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter I have presented findings from a simple neural network that simu-
lates the acquisition and maintenance of episodic and semantic information by the
hippocampus and cortex. The model makes few assumptions beyond the well-
established view that the hippocampal component should be smaller than the cortical
component, should store orthogonalised rather than topographically organised repre-
sentations, and should be capable of more rapid acquisition of information than the
cortex. However, the interaction between these features and aspects of the informa-
tion to be learnt creates interesting and plausible recall performance. In particular, the
findings presented in this chapter provide clear support for the proposals put forward
in earlier chapters.
Almost all authors share the view that the hippocampus can rapidly learn con-
junctive information, whereas many have argued that the cortex cannot. The model
supports the view that relatively fast associative learning can occur without the hip-
pocampus when the information to be associated is represented locally in the cortex,
or there is a learning-set in the cortex that can support the acquisition of new informa-
tion without the need for large-scale change. Information that depends on associations
between information in more distant regions of the cortex can be learnt in the absence
of the hippocampus, albeit at a slower rate. With sufficiently complex cues that act to
partially activate weakly connected areas of the cortex, local cortical connections can
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support local pattern completion allowing good overall recall.
This model implements only two layers and cannot therefore capture more sub-
tle divisions of labour between regions in the neocortical-hippocampal learning hi-
erarchy: associative learning between information of different types, and at different
orders of complexity, would be accomplished at least initially in different layers in
this hierarchy. However, although the model refers to a ’hippocampal’ and a ’cortical
component’, at the level of abstraction employed, in some respects the model could be
considered to represent any higher and lower region in the neocortical-hippocampal
hierarchy. The specific features that distinguish the hippocampus, say, from other re-
gions (such as particular cell fields, internal connectivity) are not modelled. Having
said that, the use of random patterns in the ’hippocampal’ component clearly repre-
sents the higher end of a spectrum from topographically organised to orthogonalised
representations.
The hippocampus has been implicated more generally in the rapid acquisition of
information. In the model, all one-off event traces are stored most robustly in the
hippocampus, so the hippocampus will tend to be relatively more important for the
recall of information to which there has been litle exposure. The cortex can acquire
information independently from the hippocampus only with sufficient exposure to
information. Therefore the storage of truly novel complex information is practically
impossible in one trial in the cortex. Information that is already stored can increase
the likelihood of the cortex developing a robust representation of related information
in a given number of trials. Thus the development of a cortical learning set reduces
dependency on the hippocampus’s ability for rapid robust storage, and would allow
subsequent related learning to be accomplished more quickly by the cortex.
The simulations also provide support for the plausibility of the idea that episodic
and semantic memory represent points on a continuum of memory types. Typical
episodic memory represents one extreme of one-off learning of very complex novel
information; whereas different kinds of semantic memory vary in their dependency
on generic and specific information, and in the exposure there has been to informa-
tion. Although each individual episodic or semantic trace is initially treated in the
same way by the net, as experience accrues, recall performance for different types
of events via the hippocampal and cortical components becomes differentiated. The
’neural basis’ for the recall of memories in the model tends to segregate on the basis
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of the amount of random or generic information integral to a memory, and on how
frequently the information has been encountered.
All information is initially most robustly recalled via the hippocampal route. The
cortex can initially support the recall of some detailed information, but this too decays,
albeit at a slower rate than in the hippocampus. Whilst the most detailed episodic in-
formation is always best recalled by the hippocampus, over time the cortex tends to
take over the recall of all events. Semanticisation of older memories thus results nat-
urally from the rapid loss of detailed episodic information, and from the concomitant
tendency for the recall of old information to depend more on the cortex and thus elicit
more generic information.
Traces for generic cortically-represented information may build up over time, or
at least be lost at a slower rate, as a result of re-exposure to repeated patterns of ’real-
world’ information. Thus recall for a given specific event via the cortex tends to be
dominated by traces representing well-established information. Offline learning in the
model disproportionately benefits semantic learning at the expense of already weaker
representations for random events, when cortical weights are allowed to contribute
to pattern selection as seems reasonable. Thus replay-aided learning similar to that
implemented in consolidation models (e.g., Alvarez and Squire (1994); Murre (1996))
leads to the semanticisation of memories.
In section 6.9 I suggested that the existing empirical data does not tell us whether
there is an absolute increase in the ability of the cortex to mediate recall over time;
or merely a relative increase in recall with respect to the hippocampus, in which case
absolute cortical recall could increase, decrease or be constant over time. In the model,
cortically-mediated performance interacts with forgetting rates and the amount of
’real-world’ re-exposure to information, producing any of these patterns of perfor-
mance. Offline learning as implemented in the model leads to an initial rise in the
ability of the cortex to mediate recall, but this too interacts with the absolute value
of a decay rate. In any case, the recall of recent events is dominated by inputs from
the hippocampus, so the effect of the initial increase in the cortical recall is masked.
Therefore the model does not take an unequivocal position on this issue.
In summary, this model captures earlier proposals about the relative importance
of the hippocampal and non-hippocampal areas in the acquisition of certain types
of information; and the long-term fate of such information with respect to the hip-
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pocampus. Truly random information that requires associations across distant cortical
regions is best recalled by the hippocampus for the lifetime of the memory; whereas
information that could be acquired by the cortical regions albeit more slowly, and
semanticised versions of all information, become relatively more dependent on the
cortex as a memory ages.
7.5.1 Limitations of model and further work
The model is intended to provide a proof of concept for ideas presented earlier in
the thesis, rather than aim for biological realism. To that end, the very small scale of
the model, the extremely simple learning rule and the full connectivity should not be
considered to be problematic. On the other hand, scaling the model up (which would
require an optimisation of the code), and employing sparser connectivity would allow
new features to be explored.
Obvious areas for further work within the current framework of the model include:
Hippocampal representation The hippocampal complex-spike recording literature
implies that the representations used in the hippocampus for encoding similar
information may be relatively stable over time. Thus selecting a random hip-
pocampal pattern to represent each incoming event may be unreasonable. Em-
ploying sparse connectivity between the hippocampal and cortical components
would allow the net to create hippocampal representations, although this kind
of learning needs to be carefully controlled. Adding another set of L1-type nodes
that send inputs to L2 that are randomly activated when an training event is ap-
plied to L1 might provide the right balance of input-driven, but partially orthog-
onalised, representations. Combining stable sparse point-to-point connectivity
with weight changes within connections should be investigated.
Developing long-range connectivity The slow learning rate in the intra-cortical con-
nections represents the difficulty of developing connections between distant
nodes, as well as slow learning between already connected nodes. The current
implementation of the model implies that all nodes in the cortex could poten-
tially be usefully connected, which is unlikely. An improvement would be to
allow intra-cortical weights to learn (as now), but to exclude weights below a
certain threshold from contributing to recall. The value of the weight below the
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threshold value would indicate the ’progress’ made in the formation of a new
viable connection.
Attractor dynamics The model simulates the effect of the interaction between con-
nections in a very simple way, by summing raw activities produced by different
weight sets, or allowing raw activations one pass through a weight set. A more
dynamic system would support more realistic pattern selection for offline learn-
ing.
Comparisons with neuropsychological data Performance analyses in the model are
averaged over all events of a particular type, so it is currently difficult to in-
vestigate the effect of ’lesions’ at a particular point in training. An alternative
method of data visualisation is required. However, conditions such as semantic
dementia could be relatively easily modelled in the static state.
Learning hierarchy I argue for a hierarchy of learning areas in chapter 6. Implement-
ing more than the current two levels would be informative.
Bridging gaps and higher-order learning This model simulates only fast episodic-
type encoding in the hippocampus, and does not attempt to incorporate the hip-
pocampus’ probable role in bridging temporal gaps, or learning about complex
associations that are not immediately evident from observed data. Such roles
seem incompatible, as the latter tasks require that representations for similar re-
presented data are not orthogonalised. It would be very interesting to explore




This thesis has addressed the question of the relationship between the dependence of
information on the hippocampus at acquisition and the hippocampus’s role in its long-
term maintenance. The approach taken was to critically re-examine existing empirical
data and the claims that have been made on its basis, in order to formulate coherent
proposals on the role of the hippocampus in the acquisition and long-term recall of
information. I then tested the plausibility of these proposals with a computational
model.
In short, I conclude that information whose acquisition is most severely impaired
by hippocampal damage is dependent on the hippocampus for longer when it is ac-
quired in the presense of the hippocampus. Tasks that are obligatorily hippocampally-
dependent at acquisition, such as task-dependent use of allocentric information or de-
tailed context-specific information, remain dependent on the hippocampus for recall
for the memory’s lifetime. Tasks that can be acquired to some extent in the absence
of the hippocampus, such as conditional motor learning or semantic information, be-
come independent of the hippocampus over time. In these cases, the type of informa-
tion that is recalled from regions outwith the hippocampus is similar in nature to the




8.1 Main conclusions of thesis
The starting point for this thesis was the observation that tasks whose acquisition is
affected by hippocampal damage are not affected in an all-or-nothing manner. There
are large differences in the extent to which the acquisition of different kinds of infor-
mation is impaired by hippocampal damage. Under a given set of learning conditions
some tasks are obligatorily hippocampally-dependent and only the hippocampus can
form a viable trace that can mediate recall; whereas others are merely facilitated by
hippocampal activity as the hippocampus is merely faster or better at forming traces
than other areas. This division may reflect a distinction between what only the hipp-
campus can do, and what the hippocampus normally does in an intact brain. In the lat-
ter cases, in the intact brain, the automatically-acquired hippocampal trace improves
learning because it is more quickly acquired under given circumstances, although the
information acquired may not be strictly necessary for the task at hand.
Although a distinction has been made between ’obligatory’ and ’facilitated’ tasks
for expositional purposes, all such information falls on a continuum of dependency.
Furthermore, the difference between the ability of the hippocampus and other to areas
to support learning and recall on a given task is not all or nothing. All areas activated
on a particular task record information in parallel, but store different kinds of infor-
mation that can support performance on a given task to different extents.
Some tasks are of course unaffected by damage to the hippocampus – the acqui-
sition of such information is not addressed by this thesis. The acquisition of other
information, such as ego-centric strategies, is actually improved by damage to the
hippocampus. This suggests that the hippocampus and other areas may compete for
control of recall.
Several common traits are shared by tasks whose acquisition is impaired by dam-
age to the hippocampus. Tasks that depend on the task-dependent use of supramodal
information are obligatorily hippocampally-dependent; this information cannot be ac-
quired to any extent in the absence of the hippocampus under the conditions tested to
date. Similarly, the rapid acquisition of detailed context-specific information, such as
that underpinning episodic information, cannot be achieved without the hippocam-
pus. In general, tasks are most likely to require the hippocampus for acquisition if
they depend on rapid associative learning about unfamiliar, complex, low-salience in-
formation. Each of these ’qualifying’ factors are continuous; for example, there can
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be greater or fewer trials, or more or less complexity. None of these factors alone is
sufficient to obligatorily implicate the hippocampus in acquisition. Instead, it is the
combination of factors, weighted by their positions on a notional scale of severity that
is important. Under a given set of learning conditions the hippocampus may be sig-
nificantly better than others areas at acquiring such information, but other areas can
learn when the conditions of training are altered. This general picture holds across
data from many species.
Previous views of the hippocampus have emphasised the role of the hippocampus
in the rapid acquisition of information. However, several tasks that can be acquired
in one trial are not hippocampally-dependent, and some slowly acquired tasks cannot
be acquired after hippocampal damage. Other views have emphasised the role of the
hippocampus in complex associative learning. However, these approaches would not
predict distinctions in performance between, say, implicit and explicit learning, or that
incidental (but not contingent) or trace (but not delay) learning would be impaired by
hippocampal damage. In this thesis, I make proposals that both constrain and extend
existing views on the role of the hippocampus in rapid, associative and automatic
learning.
I concluded that learning about relationships between stimuli of the same modal-
ity does not generally require the hippocampus. Higher-order cross-modal learning
is generally only hippocampally-dependent when the information to be acquired a)
must be stored quickly, but not if there are sufficient training trials; b) is truly novel
and there is no established learning-set outwith the hippocampus; or c) is of low
salience or to be acquired incidentally. The hippocampus is obligatory for learning
about associations between supra-modal and task-related information that does not
converge in regions outside the hippocampus, irrespective of learning conditions. The
hippocampus is also always obligatory for the acquisition of true episodic memories,
given the the inherent conditions of acquisition; that is, the fast incidental acquisi-
tion of low salience, complex information. It is also important for learning when the
’solution’ to a task can be most easily discovered using the default high-order repre-
sentational structure of the hippocampus.
Generally speaking, the term ’episodic memory’ has been used to refer to recall for
context-specific events, whereas ’semantic memory’ refers to any of a wide range of
information representing knowledge about the world. These standard definitions cut
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across several confounding factors such as the amount and type of detail needed to
demonstrate recall, and the amount of exposure there has been to information. I ar-
gue instead that real-world memories fall on a continuum of episodic/semantic-ness.
Memories vary continuously in terms of the number, type and specificity of details re-
called, and the extent to which recall depends on information that archetypally char-
acterises episodic and semantic recall. A typical episodic memory is merely a memory
at one extreme of the continuum of memory types. Episodic memories are by defini-
tion of high complexity, specificity and novelty, refering to an event of short duration
that has only been experienced once. Semantic information, on the other hand, varies
from episodic-like (such as information about a public event which has only been en-
countered once or a few times) to very generic (such as knowledge of common word
meanings). Since the hippocampus is implicated in the rapid acquisition of complex
incidental information, episodic information will be disproportionately affected by
hippocampal damage. Semantic information will be affected to the extent that it de-
pends on such information.
In the second half of the thesis, I examined the long-term role of the hippocampus
in the recall of information that was hippocampally-dependent at acquisition. Infor-
mation that obligatorily requires the hippocampus at acquisition depends on the hip-
pocampus for the lifetime of the trace, although that may be less than the lifetime of the
animal. Any episodic-like or task-dependent allocentric-like information recalled after
hippocampal damage is qualitatively different to that occurring via the hippocampus.
The type of information recalled under these conditions is similar to that which could
have been acquired – albeit to a limited extent – in the absence of the hippocampus.
In other words, detailed context-specific information and task-dependent allocentric
spatial information does not appear to be replicated outside the hippocampus after
initial acquisition by the hippocampus.
In contrast, the recall of information whose acquisition is merely facilitated by the
presence of an intact hippocampus may become independent of the hippocampus
over time. Structures in the medial temporal lobe, and perhaps also at lower levels
of the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy become redundant over time in an orderly
sequence. This suggests that they may play a similar role to the hippocampus in this
respect: each region may act as an indexing zone for information stored at lower lev-
els. Redundancy does not arise from the wholesale transfer of information from the
8.1. Main conclusions of thesis 213
hippocampus or other higher regions to other lower regions, but from a change in the
nature of the information underlying recall. Regions higher in the hierarchy always
support the recall of the most specific information. Clearly, any such change in the na-
ture of the information underlying recall can only occur on tasks that can be performed
by semanticised rather than very specific traces. The existing evidence suggests that
tasks whose acquisition is most impaired by hippocampal damage show longer peri-
ods of retrograde amnesia after hippocampal damage when the task is acquired in the
presence of the hippocampus.
Specific memories tend to become more like generic memories over time: this is
termed semanticisation. Semanticisation results from the relative or absolute increase
in the tendency or ability of semantic traces to mediate recall. There are several main
contributing factors. Firstly, traces representing the most context-specific details of
information decay faster than those for more generic information. This can lead to a
relative increase in the ability of non-hippocampal areas to mediate recall over time, as
the gap between recall abilities narrows. On the other hand, there may be an absolute
increase over time in the ability of the non-hippocampal areas to mediate semanticised
recall. Two main mechanisms are relevant here: 1) re-exposure to real-world events
containing repeated sub-components could lead to a more robust traces for generic
information that develop over time, and 2) offline learning through the reactivation
of attractors. Unlike others, I argue that offline learning contributes to the develop-
ment of representations of the core semantic components of memory, and does not
support an equivalent consolidation of contextual and other details. Whilst there are
reasons for believing that offline learning may be initiated by the hippocampus, this is
currently unproven. Instead, or in addition, offline learning learning may be initiated
by local processes in the cortex or throughout the neocortical-hippocampal hierarchy.
The third main source of semanticisation is that the recall of old and recent memories
may be supported by different strategies.
Semanticisation should not be understood as a negative process in which infor-
mation is lost, but instead as a process that progressively strengthens the storage of
the most valuable and widely-applicable information, and uncovers relationships be-
tween such information. The processes uncovered by reconsolidation studies may
reflect such a semanticisation process. Post-acquisition memory processing is multi-
stage and lifelong, and acts to produce semanticised re-representations of information
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that can co-exist with remaining more detailed traces, and that serve a different pur-
pose.
Finally, I implemented a neural model to test the plausibility of these proposals.
In common with many other models, the model consists of a quickly learning ’hip-
pocampal’ component that stores orthogonalised traces; and an input ’cortical’ com-
ponent which maps information topographically and incorporates very slow-learning
long-range connections and relatively faster local connections. The model also shows
forgetting, with the fastest loss of information occurring from the hippocampus, and
the slowest in the long-range cortical connections. The novelty of this model is in the
nature of the training events and the way the results are analysed. When the model
was trained on random ’episodic’ events and ’semantic’ events that share overlapping
patterns, plausible behaviour developed with regard to the nature of the information
recalled at particular periods after initial acquisition, and of the ’neural basis’ for the
recall of different types of information. The simulation findings provide clear ’proof
of concept’ for the proposals put forward in this thesis.
8.2 Contributions of the thesis
I have met all of the objectives outlined in section 1.2.
The main contributions of this thesis are to have:
• Drawn several coherent themes out of a vast body of empirical data.
• Explicitly assessed current theories against existing data.
• Redefined existing ideas on the role of the hippocampus in the acquisition of
information.
• Established a new conception of episodic and semantic memory.
• Proposed a new conception of the role of the hippocampus in the long-term
recall of information.
• Investigated the relationship between the role of the hippocampus in task acqui-
sition and long-term recall.
• Developed a theory of semanticisation.
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• Created a modelling tool.
• Demonstrated the plausibility of my proposals with the model.
8.3 Predictions
The development of any theory depends on an interaction between hypotheses and
empirical investigation. This thesis make several predictions that could be empirically
tested. A few examples are given here:
1. If the hippocampus is more important for acquiring and maintaining arbi-
trary information than predictable information, then hippocampal damage
should lead to relatively greater impairment in associative memory for recently-
encountered pairs of semantically unrelated words (teapot hang-glider) than of
related words (teapot cup), say.
2. If memories become more semanticised and less context-specific over time, the
effects of context would be expected to diminish at a faster rate than the ability
to perform a generic task learnt in that context.
3. If the semantic regions can over time develop representations that allows them
to support faster acquisition of related information, then the acquisition of some
kinds of information may be more dependent on the hippocampus in younger
or less experienced people than in older or more experienced people.
4. If the hippocampus becomes relatively less important for the recall of informa-
tion to which there has been extensive exposure, the recall of low frequency
words should be more affected by hippocampal damage than high frequency
words. (There is some preliminary evidence for this position.)
5. If post-acquisition semantic memory processing is driven more by real-world
triggers than by an autonomous endogenous process, then leaving cues related
to a recently learnt task in a living environment may enhance the development
of semantic representations over time.
6. Any generic model of ’consolidation’ that involves cortical weights in the se-
lection of patterns for offline replay, will naturally semanticise older memories
when trained on patterns that contain overlapping sub-patterns.
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8.4 Final words
The facts of nature and of life are more apt to be complex than simple.
Simplistic theories are generally one-sided and partial.
James Freeman Clarke (19th century)
Many hundreds of thousands of words have been written on the topic of the hip-
pocampus, and no doubt the debate on the role of the hippocampus in the acquisition
and long-term retention of memory will rage on. This thesis contributes to that debate,
but will clearly not be the last word on the topic.
Indeed, there may be no ’last word’. Not only do different view-points determine
the facts as we see them; but our desire for simple easily-stated explanations may be
misplaced. The brain is vastly complex and its functions are unlikely to be organised
along the discrete divisions favoured by researchers.
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